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Abstract	
How	humans	make	choices	in	uncertain	and	competitive	situations	is	a	key	determinant	of	viability	and	successful	living.	Improving	those	choices	requires	sometimes	encountering	undesirable	outcomes	and	avoiding	them,	eventually	even	anticipating	them	in	novel	situations.	Learning	depends	on	making	choices,	encountering	errors	and	updating	evaluations	of	options.	Various	models	extended	from	the	reinforcement	learning	framework	compared	to	human	behavior	describe	in	part	how	individuals	heterogeneously	make	choices.	To	peer	into	the	components	of	these	mechanisms,	strategic	games	that	emulate	real-world	situations	provide	measurable	and	manageable	environments	in	which	to	examine	slight	differences	in	choice	behavior	among	different	people.	Such	differences	may	be	endogenous	to	participants	(e.g.	age	or	learning	disposition)	while	others	derive	from	external	events	(e.g.	emotional	induction	or	brain	stimulation).	We	contrasted	such	behavior	in	three	situations	involving	learning	or	competition,	leveraging	differences	in	age,	emotional	induction	and	brain	stimulation.	We	aimed	to	describe	the	variations	in	choice	behavior	across	these	differences	and	investigated,	when	possible,	how	prior	conditions	generated	a	transfer	of	learning	from	one	domain	to	another.	The	work	here	builds	on	recent	investigations	of	neural	mechanisms	underlying	choice	behavior	during	strategic	or	competitive	interaction.	
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Structure	of	this	thesis	
This	thesis	comprises	four	sections,	each	concerned	with	modulating	processes	of	learning,	reasoning	and	decision	making.	The	notion	of	each	effort	was	to	examine	speciFic	features	of	the	decision	process	via	deviations	from	baseline,	be	they	induced	or	selected.	In	the	First,	a	review	chapter,	I	critically	examine	the	intersections	between	deFicits	in	moral	decision	making	and	regret	decision	making	in	psychopathic	and	brain-lesion	patients,	Finding	a	number	of	similarities	and	mutual	deFiciencies.	The	next	chapter	consists	of	analysis	of	a	previously	conducted	experiment	that	considers	age	as	a	natural	agent	of	cognitive	change.	My	analysis	examines	how	the	relationship	between	choice	behavior	and	counterfactual	learning	appears	to	change	with	age.	The	latter	two	chapters	consist	of	experimental	studies	that	I	conducted	in	their	entireties.	The	First	study	consists	of	inFluencing	counterfactual	learning	via	emotional	priming	in	a	large	group	of	subjects	and	using	computational	modeling	to	characterize	underlying	cognitive	mechanisms.	The	Final	chapter	takes	a	yet	more	direct	approach	to	test	the	causal	role	of	two	different	brain	areas	in	strategic	thinking	by	employing	transcranial	brain	stimulation	in	an	effort	to	induce	higher	levels	of	strategic	thinking	in	a	classic	economic	strategic	game.	
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General	introduction	
Humans	make	innumerable	choices	during	waking	life,	from	simple	to	complex,	leading	to	patterns	of	behavior.	Those	choices	can	be	changed	by	new	information,	that	is,	learning.	These	can	be	inFluenced	by	other	internal	and	external	factors	brought	to	bear	on	a	decision	maker.		Similar	situations	with	only	slight	differences	can	give	rise	to	different	decisions	and	varied	patterns	of	behavior.	State	of	mind,	mood,	information,	social	situation,	age,	imagination	—	all	may	be	implicated	in	modulating	choice	with	other	conditions	held	constant.	From	which	hand	to	open	a	door	with	to	whether	it	is	safe	to	cross	a	road;	from	which	cake	to	eat	to	which	job	to	choose		—	any	individual	who	has	made	it	far	enough	in	life	to	be	studied	in	a	laboratory	experiment	has	made	a	mountain	of	advantageous	decisions,	though	without	doubt,	accompanied	by	plenty	of	choices	whose	outcomes	were	not	immediately	beneFicial.	Yet,	as	many	a	motivational	speaker	will	remind	his	audience,	as	much	learning	can	come	from	failure	as	from	success.	This	idea	found	generalization	in	the	Rescorla-Wagner	model’s	precept	that	learning	occurs	only	when	events	violate	expectations.		Yet	the	remarkable	Flexibility	of	learning	has	allowed	adaptation	to	countless	situations.	In	repeated	games,	players	often	exhibit	learning	behavior	in	making	best	choices.		Early	reinforcement	learning	models	assumed	that	players	responded	only	to	the	results	of	their	own	choices,	repeating	choices	that	lead	to	success	and	avoiding	those	that	failed.	These	models	were	particularly	good	at	explaining	behavior	in	the	context	of	the	bounded	rationality	of	speciFic	decision	problems.	Later,	expanded	models	such	as	Fictitious	play	that	accounted	for	foregone	choices	and	in	social	situations	anticipated	actions	of	other	players	proved	more	descriptive	of	observed	behavior	(Fudenberg	and	Levine	1995).	Yet	more	recently,	adaptive	models	that	account	for	some	mixture	of	behavior	described	by	more	than	one	model	alone	
Introduction  Timberlake  10have	accounted	for	behavior	more	precisely.	These	hybrid	models,	such	as	experience-weighted	attraction,	afford	individual-level	description	of	sophistication	of	learning	(Camerer	and	Ho	1998).	More	sophisticated	players	make	choices	in	response	to	anticipated	actions	of	others.	The	highest-level	players	further	anticipate	how	their	own	actions	will	inFluence	the	strategies	of	competitors	and	maximize	rewards	by	sometimes	taking	short-term	losses.		In	economic	models	of	choice,	agents	choose	options	to	maximize	long-run	reward.	Various	models	applied	to	behavior,	however,	can	account	for	long-run	reward	in	different	ways.	In	the	short	term,	in	fact,	people	often	give	up	a	higher	expected	reward	in	favor	of	avoiding	the	risk	of	loss.	In	repeated	probabilistic	tasks	in	limited-information	feedback	settings,	choices	are	guided	by	counterfactual	thinking	that	compares	the	outcome	of	a	choice	to	the	best	outcome	that	could	have	been	obtained	with	that	choice.	In	settings	in	which	outcomes	of	unselected	choices	are	known,	however,	subsequent	choices	are	guided	by	the	difference	between	the	outcome	received	and	the	outcome	of	a	choice	not	made.	This	adds	to	counterfactual	thinking	element	of	responsibility,	a	crucial	component	of	the	experience	of	regret.	Anticipated	regret	is	so	inFluential	that	in	choice	problems	similar	to	those	that	have	brought	regret	in	the	past,	people	increasingly	avoid	the	choices	that	present	the	greatest	potential	regret	–	to	an	even	greater	extent	than	they	avoid	risk	(Coricelli,	Critchley	et	al.	2005).	A	discrete	signal	in	the	medial	orbitofrontal	cortex	both	accompanies	the	occurrence	of	regret	during	a	task	as	well	as	its	anticipation	during	the	same	task,	indicating	that	experiencing	regret	is	adaptive.	Could	this	mechanism	that	functions	so	vigorously	within	one	setting	carry	over	and	offer	its	inFluence	in	another	similar	but	novel	situation?	This	document	proposes	to	explore	that	question	at	several	depths.		Proposed	circuits	of	regret	learning	share	some	structures	and	patterns	with	the	systems	implicated	in	moral	decision	making,	in	particular	the	ventromedial	prefrontal	cortex.		We	start	the	consideration	of	decision-making	regret	by	comparing	its	implementation	and	neural	correlates	to	those	involved	in	moral	decision	making	(Chapter	1).	SpeciFically	in	
Introduction  Timberlake  11instances	in	which	normal	function	has	been	interrupted	in	both	domains,	the	processes	share	some	remarkable	similarities.	We	examined	evidence	of	transfer	between	a	lottery	choice	task	and	an	instrumental	learning	task	(Chapter	2).	Here,	we	examined	choice	behavior	as	an	indicator	of	how	learning	might	vary	between	younger	adults	and	older	adults.	We	wanted	to	see	if	the	relationship	and	potential	transfer	between	tasks	varied	depending	on	age.	Aging	is	marked	by	selective	areas	of	cognitive	decline,	particularly	in	the	context	of	decision	making	(Tymula,	Belmaker	et	al.	2013).	Moreover,	adults	older	than	60	have	been	observed	in	one	study	to	incorporate	counterfactual	information	in	learning	to	a	lesser	extent	than	younger	adults	(Tobia,	Guo	et	al.	2016).	Examining	data	from	two	age-segregated	cohorts,	we	investigated	how	the	choice	behavior	of	older	adults	and	younger	adults	in	the	lottery	task	indicated	different	learning	patterns	in	the	second	task.		The	question	of	transfer	is	probed	more	pointedly	in	an	experiment	in	which	we	tried	to	make	people	feel	very	bad	right	from	the	beginning,	having	them	lose	a	stack	of	money	and	showing	them	what	they	could	have	won	if	they	had	made	a	different	choice	(Chapter	3).	Our	hypothesis	was	that	this	induction	of	regret	would	elicit	counterfactual	thinking	and	make	players	learn	from	counterfactual	comparison	in	a	different	game	they	played	right	after	this	large	loss.	We	employed	a	limited-space	strategic	game,	and	then	compared	behavior	to	the	Fit	of	several	models	of	reinforcement	learning	and	belief-based	learning	that	incorporate	counterfactual	thinking	and	strategic	learning	to	various	extents	(Sutton	and	Barto	1998,	Camerer	2003,	Zhu,	Mathewson	et	al.	2012).	Employment	of	belief-based	learning	depends	largely	on	understanding	the	broader	structure	of	a	system,	to	which	a	person	already	attuned	to	regret	may	be	more	sensitive	if	the	experience	transfers.	In	the	context	of	the	competitive	game,	we	hypothesized	that	the	consideration	of	the	counterfactual	demanded	by	the	prior	regret	outcome	would	encourage	this	type	of	learning.	
Introduction  Timberlake  12Transfer	can	begin	with	experience	in	one	activity	before	commencing	another.	In	the	two	previous	overviews,	this	is	realized	with	the	outcome	of	a	decision.	That	information	may	then	modulate	performance	in	the	subsequent	task.	In	a	third	study,	we	proposed	to	skip	the	step	of	introducing	information	with	a	behavioral	situation	and,	instead,	encourage	the	brain	to	reach	a	target	state	via	electrical	stimulation	(Chapter	4).	Different	people	engage	in	strategic	thinking	at	various	levels	of	sophistication,	and	measured	brain	activity	reFlects	that	diversity.	Imaging	studies	have	located	some	neural	correlates	of	mentalizing	in	frontal	cortical	areas	(Hampton,	Bossaerts	et	al.	2008,	Coricelli	and	Nagel	2009).	If	those	areas	are	more	active	during	higher	levels	of	strategic	thinking,	they	may	well	contribute	the	behavior.	We	therefore	suspect	that	if	these	areas	are	stimulated	to	higher	levels	of	activity,	they	could	give	rise	to	more	strategic	thinking.		
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Introduction	Regret	describes	an	emotion	that	arises	from	a	variety	of	circumstances.	We	focus	here	on	a	particular	type	of	regret,	decision	regret,	which	comes	to	the	study	of	decision	making	by	way	of	traditional	economics,	along	with	insights	from	psychology.	This	is	clearly	not	the	only	formal	description	of	regret,	but	it	bears	resemblance	to	variations	studied	in	other	Fields.	The	beneFits	of	this	regret	deFinition	are	its	formalization,	its	operationalized	measurability	and	its	attendant	body	of	literature	in	neuroimaging.	This	last	is	critical	for	comparison	to	the	neural	bases	of	other	phenomena.		Regret	refers	to	a	speciFic	set	of	conditions	and	responses,	which	include	learning	from	an	imagined	alternative	outcome	that	could	have	been	reached	through	different	action	by	the	person	feeling	the	emotion.	This	arises	after	an	actor	or	agent	has	made	a	choice,	sees	its	outcome,	and	then	realizes	that	another	outcome	—	the	result	of	a	different	choice	of	hers	—	is	more	desirable.	Decision-based	regret	or	“decision	regret”	is	proportional	to	the	magnitude	of	the	difference	between	the	obtained	and	missed	outcomes.	These	elements	are	the	deFinitive	components	of	decision	regret:	learning,	responsibility	and	counterfactual	information.	Other	emotions	may	arise	from	any	one	or	two	of	these	elements,	but	all	three	must	be	present	for	regret.	These	situational	requirements	have	long	guided	the	psychological	description	of	regret	(Zeelenberg,	Beattie	et	al.	1996,	Zeelenberg	and	Pieters	2007),	and	they	persist	in	the	economic	deFinition	of	decision	regret	(Loomes	and	Sugden	1982).	Decision-making	studies	operationalize	this	description,	using	both	behavior	and	a	modiFied	utility	function	to	quantify	the	effects	of	the	emotional	experience	(Bell	1982,	Loomes	and	Sugden	1982).	Like	most	decision	processes,	moral	decision-making	pits	multiple	options	against	one	another	in	an	effort	to	arrive	at	the	most	desirable	outcome.	Moral	norms	are	personal	convictions	reFlecting	rules	of	conduct	one	ought	to	adopt	in	a	given	situation.	They	represent	socially	derived,	internalized	values	attributed	to	a	pattern	of	behavior	thought	to	be	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  15appropriate	(Manstead	2000).		Moral	norms	play	an	important	role	in	decision	making	because	internalized	values	attributed	to	a	particular	course	of	action	are	likely	to	guide	behavior.		Consequently,	behaving	in	contradiction	to	one’s	own	moral	norms	is	likely	to	elicit	strong	negative	emotions.	In	such	a	situation,	regret	is	likely	to	arise,	especially	if	the	norm	violation	results	in	a	negative	outcome.	Some	studies	suggest	that	feelings	of	regret	are	anticipated	at	the	prospect	of	violating	one’s	moral	norms	(Parker,	Manstead	et	al.	1995).	Other	studies	have	shown	that	anticipated	regret	and	moral	norms	are	confounded	in	explaining	choices,	especially	those	with	moral	implications	(Rivis,	Sheeran	et	al.	2009,	Newton,	Newton	et	al.	2013).		Despite	preliminary	evidence	from	social	psychology	of	a	possible	overlap	between	anticipated	regret	and	moral	norms,	the	cognitive	mechanisms	linking	the	two	concepts	have	not	yet	been	deeply	investigated.		Evidence	from	neuropsychology,	however,	suggests	that	the	brain	mechanisms	underlying	regret	anticipation	and	the	implementation	of	moral	norms	might	involve	similar	neural	circuits.	By	tracing	the	brain	activity	associated	with	moral	decision	making	and	decision	regret	behaviors,	it	becomes	clear	that	some	of	the	same	brain	areas	are	similarly	implicated	in	both	processes,	suggesting	that	some	connections	between	the	two	categories	of	choices	may	be	identiFied.	Here,	we	explore	this	potential	connection	between	moral-	and	regret-based	decisions	by	reviewing	their	features	and	neural	bases.		
Counterfactual	information	Regret	arises	from	comparison	to	an	alternative	result:	one	that	has	not	actually	occurred.	It	requires	the	imagination	of	an	alternative	reality	that	results	from	a	different	choice	than	the	one	made.	The	process	of	deconstructing	the	present	to	imagine	a	different	reality,	called	counterfactual	thinking,	is	at	the	core	of	regret.	Counterfactual	thoughts	are	often	generated	after	goal	failure	(Byrne	2002).	The	functional	role	of	upward	counterfactual	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  16thinking,	and	thus,	associated	regret,	is	to	learn	from	mistakes,	to	generate	variant	courses	of	action	suspected	to	prove	more	successful	when	similar	situations	are	encountered	in	the	future.		In	a	simple	illustration	of	the	deFinition	and	measurement	of	decision	regret,	imagine	a	game	of	chance:	a	slot	machine.	A	gambler	can	pull	the	lever	in	exactly	one	way	and	take	whatever	result	comes.	Win	or	lose,	his	actions	make	no	difference	(other	than	the	choice	to	play	the	game	in	the	First	place).	Nature,	wearing	the	guise	of	probability,	determines	the	outcome	every	time.	If	he	loses,	the	gambler	by	deFinition	feels	disappointment	(and	if	he	wins,	satisfaction),	but	not	regret.	Now	imagine	two	slot	machines	next	to	each	other.	The	gambler	must	choose	one	to	which	to	stake	his	fortunes,	yet	when	he	pulls	the	lever,	the	wheels	spin	on	both	machines,	and	he	can	see	both	outcomes.	Now	he	sees	both	his	actual	winnings	or	losses	on	the	machine	he	chose,	as	well	as	what	he	would	have	won	or	lost	had	he	selected	the	other	machine.	If	his	slot	machine	loses	while	the	other	wins,	he	can	imagine	a	world	in	which	he	made	a	different,	winning,	choice.	This	identiFication	of	the	counterfactual	precipitates	regret.	A	notion,	even	an	imprecise	one,	that	the	counterfactual	outcome	was	better	may	give	rise	to	regret,	but	the	discrepancy	between	speciFic	values	of	obtained	and	foregone	allow	for	clearer	interpretation	at	this	point.	Simulations	of	this	situation	have	been	used	in	various	experimental	settings	to	measure	and	compare	regret	to	disappointment	(Camille,	Coricelli	et	al.	2004,	Nicolle,	Bach	et	al.	2011,	Gillan,	Morein-Zamir	et	al.	2014).		Regret	is	further	characterized	by	a	negative-valence	error,	which	differentiates	it	from	relief.	The	error	is	the	difference	between	the	obtained	outcome	and	the	imagined	counterfactual	outcome.	This	is	an	important	distinction	in	regret:	that	the	error	must	have	negative	valence,	rather	than	the	obtained	outcome	itself.	This	underscores	the	idea	that	regret	is	the	negative	result	of	comparison	between	outcomes,	which	may	give	rise	to	changes	in	behavior.	In	the	slot	machine	study,	even	when	subjects	won	with	a	certain	choice	but	saw	that	they	could	have	won	more	had	they	made	a	different	choice,	the	net	emotional	sensation	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  17was	negative	(Camille,	GrifFiths	et	al.	2011).	People	describe	their	emotions	as	more	negative	with	a	better	foregone	choice,	even	when	the	obtained	outcome	is	the	same.	This	comparison	is	so	clear	that	the	emotion	following	a	good	outcome	of	a	choice	made	(winning	$50)	compared	to	a	very	good	outcome	of	a	foregone	choice	($200)	can	be	rated	even	lower	than	that	following	a	bad	obtained	outcome	(-$50)	compared	to	a	very	bad	outcome	avoided	(-$200)	(Camille	et	al.	2004).	That	is,	despite	winning	more	money,	people	said	they	felt	worse—because	they	compared	their	winnings	with	what	they	could	have	won	had	they	made	a	different	choice.	This	ability	to	imagine	an	alternative	reality	after	the	fact	informs	decision	problems	not	yet	encountered.	In	fact,	after	experiencing	regret,	subjects	made	choices	in	subsequent	tasks	that	were	consistent	with	trying	to	minimize	that	feeling	of	regret	(Coricelli,	Dolan	et	al.	2007).		
Learning	value	In	a	more	complex	scenario	that	employs	regret	in	learning,	we	might	assign	the	two	machines	different	probabilities	of	paying	out.	We	could	task	the	decision	maker	with	earning	the	most	money	and	therefore	the	goal	of	choosing	the	right	(i.e.	more	likely)	machine	to	play	more	often	over	the	course	of	a	number	of	opportunities.	Such	a	sequential	task	(as	employed	in	Daw,	O’Doherty	et	al.	2006)	allows	the	exploration	of	learning	and	the	comparison	of	various	models,	which	can	include	those	that	incorporate	regret	learning.	Lohrenz	and	colleagues	adopt	the	regret-learning	model	and	rename	it	“Fictive	learning”	to	discard	emotional	connotations	and	to	maintain	only	the	error	signal	of	an	unobtained	outcome	(Lohrenz,	McCabe	et	al.	2007).	Subjects	played	an	investment	game,	in	which	the	researchers	saw	that	incorporating	Fictive	error	(the	difference	between	chosen-obtained	and	foregone-obtained)	over	gains	better	predicted	the	subject’s	subsequent	bet	than	simple	reward	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  18prediction	error:	the	difference	between	what	the	subject	thought	she	would	win/lose	and	what	she	actually	won/lost.		In	the	scenario	of	sequential	choices	of	two	different	gambles,	the	difference	between	the	results	of	the	choice	the	gambler	made	and	those	of	the	one	he	did	not—precisely	the	measure	we	call	decision	regret—can	be	described	as	a	signal	enlisted	to	learn	to	make	better	choices.	That	ability	depends	on	computing	that	difference,	then	employing	it	to	foresee	a	possible	recurrence	before	the	next	choice	is	made,	and	Finally	making	a	different,	presumably	better	choice	(Coricelli,	Critchley	et	al.	2005).	Anticipation	of	regret	induces	a	disposition	to	change	behavioral	strategies	(Ritov	1996),	and	characterizes	an	emotion-motivated	learning	process	in	decision	making	(Zeelenberg,	Beattie	et	al.	1996).	In	theories	of	adaptive	learning	driven	by	regret-based	feedback	(Megiddo	1980,	Foster	and	Vohra	1999,	Hart	and	Mas-Colell	2000,	Foster	and	Young	2003,	Hart	2005),	learning	occurs	by	adjusting	the	propensity	to	choose	an	action	according	to	the	difference	between	the	total	rewards	that	could	have	been	obtained	with	the	choice	of	that	action	and	the	realized	total	rewards.	That	is,	the	tendency	of	choosing	machine	A	depends	on	how	much	would	have	been	won	by	choosing	that	machine	all	along	compared	to	how	much	the	gambler	has	actually	won.	As	gamblers,	humans	tend	to	be	pretty	good	at	this.	Following	regret-based	learning	models,	decision	makers	converge	to	optimal	choices	(Coricelli	and	Rustichini	2010).	
Responsibility  
People	show	strong	regularities	in	the	nature	of	the	event	they	“undo”	when	reFlecting	on	a	bad	situation.	One	of	these	regularities,	the	agency	effect,	is	particularly	at	stake	in	the	experience	of	regret:	though	people	feel	regret	both	for	actions	taken	and	inaction	–	and	although	nostalgia	and	autobiographical	retrospection	often	highlight	missed	opportunities	–	people	in	fact	more	often	generate	counterfactuals	that	undo	some	undertaken	action,	rather	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  19than	inaction	(Byrne	2002).	Thus,	people	have	greater	regret	for	actions	they	have	taken,	more	so	than	for	those	they	failed	to	take—at	least	in	the	short	term.	When	no	action	could	have	been	taken	to	prevent	a	bad	outcome,	and	in	the	absence	of	agency,	people	report	feeling	disappointment	rather	than	regret.	Disappointment	is	also	elicited	by	counterfactual	thought,	though	the	critical	outcome	must	be	due	to	circumstances	beyond	the	agent’s	control,	absolving	him	of	responsibility.	The	key	distinction	is	this:	Disappointment	arises	from	recognizing	that	a	better	outcome	might	have	come	given	the	same	choice;	regret,	from	identifying	a	better	outcome	given	a	different	choice	(Zeelenberg,	van	Dijk	et	al.	1998).	Both	emotions	come	from	examining	outcomes	and	seeing	that	a	better	one	could	have	been	obtained,	but	regret	is	associated	with	the	responsibility	of	having	caused	the	sub-optimal	outcome	by	taking	a	speciFic	action.	Because	regret	comes	with	the	outcome	of	a	forgone	choice,	it	does	bring	with	it	greater	information,	but	its	effect	on	subsequent	decisions	amounts	to	more	than	simply	the	addition	of	that	data.	Rather,	the	increased	information	allows	for	the	recognition	of	agency,	along	with	counterfactual	comparison.	Zeelenberg	and	colleagues	sought	to	differentiate	regret	from	both	disappointment	and	a	general	sense	of	happiness	by	repeating	and	expanding	on	studies	by	Connolly,	Ordoñez,	and	Coughlan	(1997).	They	asked	college	students	to	consider	scenarios	in	which	Fictional	college	students	changed	their	class	assignments	—	either	by	their	own	choice	or	by	computer	Fiat.	The	results	of	these	changes	for	the	Fictional	students	range	from	improvement	to	neutral	to	downgrade.	The	subjects	rated	how	the	Fictional	students	would	feel	along	scales	measuring	happiness,	regret	and	disappointment,	as	well	as	to	what	extent	students	in	the	stories	were	responsible	for	their	outcomes.	The	researchers	found	that	happiness	tracked	outcome	but	not	responsibility,	while	disappointment	and	regret	were	assessed	inversely	depending	on	level	of	responsibility:	that	is,	the	more	responsibility	subjects	perceived,	the	greater	the	amount	of	regret	they	believed	the	character	would	feel	in	downgrade	outcomes.		
Chapter 1  Timberlake  20Children	as	young	as	5	seem	to	have	some	grasp	of	their	agency.	In	a	choice	task	involving	two	boxes	containing	different	amounts	of	stickers,	children	reported	greater	happiness	or	unhappiness	when	they	chose	which	box	to	open	than	when	the	choice	was	determined	by	an	experimenter	or	a	roll	of	dice	(Weisberg	and	Beck	2012).	Though	it	was	long	unclear	at	what	age	the	notion	of	personal	responsibility	in	choices	emerges,	recent	research	suggests	that	agency	does	not	inFluence	the	emotional	response	to	outcomes	in	children	younger	than	6	(Guerini,	FitzGibbon	et	al.	in	press).	Using	a	modiFied	Wheels	of	Fortune	task	(with	stickers	rather	than	money	as	the	winnings)	on	children	between	ages	3	and	10,	Guerini	and	colleagues	found	that	children	were	more	sensitive	to	the	outcomes	of	the	choice	they	made	than	those	the	computer	made	for	them	—	but	only	in	trials	with	complete	feedback,	and	only	signiFicantly	for	children	ages	6	and	older.	That	is,	both	counterfactual	outcome	and	responsibility	were	required	in	order	for	the	child	to	feel	the	outcome	with	greater	magnitude.	In	trials	with	just	partial	feedback,	the	children’s	sensitivity	to	outcomes	was	similar	when	they	made	the	choice	and	when	the	computer	made	the	choice	—	situations	that	generate	disappointment	rather	than	regret.	This	evidence	of	differentiation	at	young	ages	further	supports	the	necessary	role	of	agency	in	regret.		
Neural	Circuits	of	Regret	The	comparison	between	the	outcome	of	a	choice	and	the	foregone	outcome	of	an	alternative	option	triggers	speciFic	brain	responses.	The	ventromedial	prefrontal	cortex	(vmPFC)	encodes	the	difference	between	what	has	been	obtained	and	the	outcome	of	the	non-chosen	option	(Coricelli,	Critchley	et	al.	2005).	The	vmPFC	is	a	functional	area	that	includes	the	anatomical	medial	orbitofrontal	cortex	(mOFC),	an	area	that	encompasses	the	most	central	parts	of	both	hemispheres	at	the	very	front	of	the	brain.	The	vmPFC	is	believed	to	hold	on	to	reward	value	over	time,	possibly	through	tonic	activity,	then	to	send	that	signal	to	other	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  21areas	involved	in	choice,	like	the	dorsolateral	prefrontal	cortex	and	the	medial	caudate	(Hampton,	Bossaerts	et	al.	2006,	Behrens,	Hunt	et	al.	2008).	Findings	from	neuroimaging	studies	support	the	understanding	that	responsibility	is	a	necessary	component	of	experiencing	regret.	Indeed,	during	the	lottery	task,	activity	of	the	OFC	in	response	to	a	gain	or	a	loss	was	modulated	by	the	outcome	of	the	non-chosen	lottery	(Coricelli,	Dolan	et	al.	2007).	However,	when	the	outcome	of	the	non-chosen	lottery	remained	unknown,	the	counterfactual	process	between	losses	(or	wins)	and	any	missed	outcome	of	the	chosen	lottery	was	accompanied	by	a	weaker	effect	in	OFC	activity.	Thus,	the	OFC	appears	to	encode	the	counterfactual	comparison	between	obtained	and	unobtained	outcomes,	but	only	when	the	result	comes	from	a	choice,	rather	than	misfortune.	vmPFC	signals	the	value	of	the	obtained	outcome	compared	to	that	of	the	non-obtained	outcome,	suggesting	that	these	regret	signals	are	related	to	the	way	the	brain	evaluates	choices	and	their	consequences.	It	exhibits	activity	that	correlates	with	regret	at	all	stages	of	the	choice	process:	preference,	expectation	and	reward	(Montague,	King-Casas	et	al.	2006).		Correlates	of	regret	have	also	been	measured	in	parts	of	the	brain	considered	to	have	key	roles	in	assessing	and	communicating	the	value	of	choice	(Nicolle,	Bach	et	al.	2011).	In	neuroimaging	studies,	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	(ACC)	and	hippocampus	have	also	shown	increased	activity	correlated	with	regret	during	choice	tasks	(Coricelli,	Critchley	et	al.	2005).	The	hippocampus,	a	cortical	folding	below	the	cerebral	cortex,	is	implicated	in	consciously	accessible	declarative	memory,	which	is	important	for	making	future	decisions	based	on	past	events	(Coricelli,	Dolan	et	al.	2007),	such	as	trying	to	avoid	previously	encountered	sub-optimal	outcomes.	This	ability	to	guide	future	actions	is	a	key	component	in	anticipating	regret	based	on	experience.		The	vmPFC	increased	activity	during	the	reported	experience	of	regret	reoccurs	in	the	period	just	before	making	subsequent	choices—the	period	leading	up	to	a	decision	in	which	regret	would	be	anticipated	(Coricelli,	Dolan	et	al.	2007).	Because	the	signal	measured	in	the	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  22vmPFC	appears	in	other	areas,	this	reoccurrence	suggests	that	the	measurement	is	not	merely	of	happiness,	nor	simply	an	outcome	value	(Coricelli,	Critchley	et	al.	2005,	Van	Hoeck,	Watson	et	al.	2015).	It	suggests	that	regret	is	computed	by	one	brain	area	and	then	conveyed	to	others	that	modulate	and	implement	it	in	subsequent	decisions.	Critically,	the	differentiation	of	experience	and	anticipation	is	clear,	though	they	both	involve	the	vmPFC/mOFC	(Coricelli,	Critchley	et	al.	2005).	Thanks	to	that	error	signal,	along	with	the	opportunity	to	make	a	different	choice,	modeling	regret	anticipation	is	a	reliable	predictor	of	choice	probability	in	certain	sequential	decision	tasks	(Coricelli,	Critchley	et	al.	2005,	Marchiori	and	Warglien	2008).	Marchiori	and	Warglien	found	that	incorporating	a	regret	signal	into	even	a	simple	learning	neural	network	better	predicted	human	behavior	than	long-employed	models	like	reinforcement	learning	and	a	hybrid	model	that	combines	reinforcement	learning	with	a	player’s	beliefs	about	other	players.	Coricelli	and	colleagues	observed	that,	as	players	experienced	more	regret	in	complete-feedback	trials	of	a	sequential	Wheels	of	Fortune	task,	they	decreasingly	chose	options	more	likely	to	lead	to	regret.	They	also	saw	that	the	more	a	given	choice	had	lead	to	regret	before,	the	less	likely	the	subject	was	to	choose	it	again	(Coricelli,	Critchley	et	al.	2005).	Regret,	then,	is	not	merely	a	negative	emotion,	but	a	calculated	signal	that	guides	agents	away	from	choices	that	could	reproduce	that	signal.	This	effort	to	minimize	regret	is	a	key	differentiator	in	its	role	as	a	learning	mechanism:	the	emotional	experience	alone	would	have	little	meaning	beyond	sensation,	were	it	not	to	guide	future	behavior.	The	examination	of	choice	behavior	of	patients	with	lesions	in	the	vmPFC	reveals	insight	into	the	causal	link	between	regret-related	brain	activity	and	behavior.	vmPFC	patients	are	typically	described	as	making	disastrous	life	decisions	despite	apparently	intact	cognitive	abilities.	A	famous	example	is	the	case	of	ERV,	a	patient	who	had	a	successful	career	and	stable	marital	life	before	he	developed	a	meningioma	compressing	his	OFC.	He	then	lost	his	job	and,	against	his	family's	advice,	invested	all	his	savings	in	a	business	partnership	with	a	man	of	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  23questionable	reputation.	He	went	bankrupt,	got	divorced	and	then	a	month	later	married	a	prostitute,	a	union	that	lasted	just	six	months.	Yet	he	passed	all	neuropsychological	tests	of	intellectual,	memory	and	verbal	skills	with	normal	scores	(Damasio,	Tranel	et	al.	1990).	Alongside	such	calamities	in	their	daily	lives,	experimental	evidence	shows	that	people	with	vmPFC	lesions	display	abnormal	emotions	elicited	by	reward	and	punishment	(Bechara,	Tranel	et	al.	1996,	Bechara,	Tranel	et	al.	2000).	Careful	investigation	of	the	underlying	computational	deFicits	has	revealed	a	general	deFicit	in	integrating	values	attributed	to	various	actions	with	the	current	goals	(Camille,	GrifFiths	et	al.	2011),	function	that	has	been	assigned	to	the	vmPFC	in	brain	imaging	studies.	Patients	are	able	to	assign	a	subjective	value	to	options;	however	they	will	not	commit	to	the	option	with	the	highest	value.	Additionally,	vmPFC	lesions	result	in	an	inability	to	feel	regret	after	a	bad	choice,	and	consequently	in	anticipating	future	regret	during	the	decision	process	(Camille,	Coricelli	et	al.	2004).	Both	reported	subjective	ratings	of	the	outcome	of	their	choices	and	the	associated	skin	conductance	responses	of	vmPFC	patients	were	different	from	that	of	controls.	Behavior	of	vmPFC	patients	was	not	signiFicantly	changed	by	knowing	the	outcome	of	the	alternative	option,	an	absence	of	the	signature	feature	of	regret.	While	healthy	control	subjects	changed	their	choices	to	avoid	regret	over	the	course	of	the	task,	vmPFC	patients	did	not.			While	the	fMRI	and	lesion	studies	mentioned	above	have	identiFied	common	neural	mechanisms	for	experienced	and	anticipated	regret,	more	recent	Findings	suggest	that	people	with	psychiatric	and	neurological	dysfunction	can	exhibit	one	stage	of	the	process	but	not	another	(Gillan,	Morein-Zamir	et	al.	2014,	Levens,	Larsen	et	al.	2015).	Although	brain	areas	associated	with	the	several	stages	of	processing	and	anticipating	regret	overlap,	they	are	not	coextensive.	Damage	to	the	vmPFC	may	allow	the	recognition	and	experience	of	regret	but	not	its	application	to	future	decisions	(Levens,	Larsen	et	al.	2015).	Various	dysfunctions	of	this	regret	mechanism	offer	at	least	partial	explanations	of	the	behavior	of	people	with	evidence	of	neurological	disorders.	Both	obsessive-compulsive	disorder	patients	and	people	with	high	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  24indications	of	psychopathy	report	feeling	regret	more	keenly	but	do	not	avoid	it	in	future	choices	to	the	same	extent	as	healthy	subjects	(Hughes,	Dolan	et	al.	2013,	Gillan,	Morein-Zamir	et	al.	2014).		
Moral	Decision	Making	The	vmPFC,	which	represents	a	crucial	portion	of	a	proposed	regret	circuit,	also	plays	a	key	role	in	some	emotional	components	of	moral	decisions	(Moll,	Oliveira-Souza	et	al.	2002,	Blair	2007,	Koenigs,	Young	et	al.	2007).	Brain	imaging	studies	of	moral	decision	making	have	implicated	some	of	the	same	areas	and	networks	in	the	frontal	cortex	that	are	associated	with	emotion	and	deliberation	–	often	Finding	these	regions	to	be	in	competition	during	difFicult	choices.	A	study	of	moral	judgment	(without	any	decision	component)	implicated	the	mOFC	as	part	of	a	neural	circuit	that	showed	higher	activity	when	subjects	read	sentences	with	a	moral	component.	The	same	areas,	which	also	included	the	temporal	pole	and	the	superior	temporal	sulcus,	did	not	show	higher	activation	when	subjects	read	statements	with	emotional	components	but	no	moral	element	(Moll,	Oliveira-Souza	et	al.	2002).	Researchers	have	developed	a	range	of	these	problems	to	probe	the	spectrum	of	moral	decision	making,	and	this	has	yielded	distinct	differences	in	choice	and	brain	activity.	Among	the	most	well-known	set	of	dilemmas	is	the	family	that	arises	from	the	trolley	problem.	Subjects	read	about	a	hypothetical	situation	in	which	they	are	standing	next	to	a	set	of	railroad	tracks,	while	some	distance	away,	a	group	of	workers	is	standing	on	the	track.	The	subjects	are	told	that	they	see	a	streetcar	coming	down	the	tracks	with	no	chance	of	stopping	before	striking	and	killing	the	Five	workers.	The	subjects	are	told	they	are	standing	next	to	a	lever,	which,	if	they	pull	it,	will	switch	the	car	and	send	the	train	onto	a	side	track,	where	there	is	a	lone	worker	who	will	be	struck	and	killed.	Though	this	would	be	a	difFicult	situation	in	real	life,	in	the	hypothetical,	it	is	characterized	as	easy	and	impersonal	—	because	the	subject’s	level	of	involvement	from	the	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  25consequences	is	distant	and	most	people	presented	with	the	question	answer	quickly	and	in	the	same	manner	(Greene,	Nystrom	et	al.	2004).	Most	people	choose	to	pull	the	lever,	making	a	simple	utility	calculation	(Greene,	Sommerville	et	al.	2001).	A	variant	of	this	dilemma	that	brings	the	decision	closer	to	the	subject,	however,	is	the	footbridge	problem.	Now,	the	subject	is	on	a	bridge	over	the	railroad	tracks.	He	can	still	see	the	workers,	and	there	is	still	a	street	car	barreling	toward	them,	but	instead	of	a	switch,	the	subject	has	the	opportunity	to	save	the	workers	by	pushing	a	large	person,	who	is	also	on	the	bridge,	off	the	bridge	and	into	the	path	of	the	street	car,	saving	the	Five	workers	but	killing	the	innocent	person.	Given	simple	calculation	of	number	of	people	saved	versus	killed,	these	situations	are	identical.	Yet	according	to	measures	of	three	features	of	these	dilemmas	identiFied	by	Greene	(2007):	expectation	of	bodily	harm,	agency	of	actor	and	speciFicity	of	victims,	some	dilemmas	are	more	“up	close	and	personal.”	The	“closeness”	of	the	action	brings	the	emotional	salience	of	the	problem	into	conFlict	with	the	pure	utilitarian	calculation.	This	antagonism	seems	to	be	carried	out	in	the	brain	in	both	processes	and	areas	that	bear	resemblance	to	the	experience	of	regret	(Koenigs,	Young	et	al.	2007).		Another	family	of	moral	decisions	brings	an	even	sharper	contrast.	It	starts	with	the	easily	solved	infanticide	dilemma,	which	poses	the	question	of	whether	or	not	a	teenage	mother	should	kill	her	unwanted	newborn	baby.	The	prospect	of	killing	a	baby	in	service	of	discomfort	is	easily	rejected,	and	subjects	respond	quickly	and	uniformly	in	the	negative.	Brain	imaging	during	this	decision	showed	lower	levels	of	activity	in	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	(ACC)	and	the	dorsolateral	prefrontal	cortex	(dlPFC),	suggesting	little	conFlict	between	the	overwhelming	emotional	aversion	to	the	choice	to	kill	the	baby	and	the	low	level	of	utility.	Subjects	also	consider	a	more	difFicult	analogue	of	this	problem:	the	crying	baby	dilemma,	in	which	subjects	are	asked	to	imagine	a	group	of	people	hiding	from	a	group	of	outlaws.	Among	the	people	hiding	are	a	mother	and	her	newborn	baby,	which	begins	to	cry,	which	could	alert	the	outlaws	to	the	presence	of	the	hiding	people,	resulting	in	the	death	of	all	of	them,	including	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  26the	baby.	Subjects	are	asked	if	it	is	morally	permissible	for	the	mother	to	smother	her	baby	to	death,	saving	the	people	but	killing	her	own	baby.	Here,	the	calculation	leads	to	a	simple	utilitarian	conclusion	that	more	people	are	saved	by	killing	the	baby.	Yet	this	stands	in	conFlict	with	the	stark	emotional	opposition	to	killing	a	baby.		Observations	in	other	brain	areas	support	this	framework.	Greene	and	colleagues	observed	increased	activity	in	ACC	and	dlPFC	during	more	difFicult	dilemmas	like	the	crying	baby	and	the	footbridge	problems,	as	compared	to	easier	dilemmas.	They	argue	that	this	indicates	that	the	ACC	detects	these	conFlicts	and	that	the	dlPFC	then	deliberates	and	resolves	them.	Supporting	this	proposal,	the	dlPFC	shows	even	greater	activity	when	the	problem	results	in	a	utilitarian	judgment	that	violates	personal	morality.	But	it	is	also	possible	that	the	dlPFC	instigates	a	period	of	cognitive	control,	delaying	the	decision	to	allow	the	ACC	enough	time	to	employ	a	utilitarian	cognitive	response,	thus	overriding	a	more	immediate	affective	response	(Greene,	Nystrom	et	al.	2004).	If	the	ACC	is	a	general	arbiter	of	antagonism,	then	it	is	no	surprise	that	it	would	be	more	active	both	in	cases	of	difFicult	moral	dilemmas	and	for	discrepancies	between	predictions	and	realities,	as	in	experiences	of	regret.	This	shared	step	in	decision	making	connects	the	two	processes	and	suggests	that	cognitive	resolution	of	conFlicts	of	any	type	may	be	handled	with	some	similarity.	Notably,	the	several	types	of	moral	dilemma—personal	and	impersonal,	distant	and	close—incorporate	degrees	of	action,	though	Greene	et	al.	(2004)	differentiate	between	the	greater	agency	of	“authoring”	and	the	impersonal	deFlection	of	a	threat,	described	as	“editing”.	Regret	similarly	requires	a	personal	agency—that	responsibility	attenuated	only	if	the	choice	giving	rise	to	the	emotion	is	shared	with	others	(Nicolle,	Bach	et	al.	2011).	The	role	of	responsibility	links	the	two	considerations	and	carries	the	question	of	decision-making	regret	to	a	moral	level.	The	more	a	person	gauges	himself	responsible	for	an	outcome,	the	more	keenly	he	feels	regret	(Frijda,	Kuipers	et	al.	1989).	Both	ranges	of	moral	decision	—	those	that	favor	utilitarian	decisions	and	those	with	a	greater	emotional	component	—	employ	brain	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  27areas	that	compose	part	of	the	regret	circuit.	This	observation	suggests	that	the	ability	to	feel	accountable	for	one’s	choice	and	the	phenomenon	of	feeling	regretful	in	the	case	of	a	bad	decision	might	be	the	premises	for	making	non-utilitarian	decisions	in	moral	dilemmas.	It	does	not	prove	the	existence	of	a	causal	link	between	the	two.	Nevertheless,	gathering	evidence	approaching	a	causal	link,	we	report	the	cases	of	two	different	populations	of	patients	—	patients	with	lesions	in	the	vmPFC	and	psychopaths	—	which	exhibit	a	co-occurrence	of	difFiculties	with	all	previously	mentioned	processes.		
OFC	Lesions	Modulate	Regret	and	Morality	Patients	with	particular	types	of	brain	damage	can	demonstrate	how	those	portions	of	the	brain	are	implicated	in	speciFic	processes.	Brain	lesions	are	disactivations	of	sections	of	the	brain	due	to	events	like	tumors,	stroke	or	head	injury.	Depending	on	the	type	of	precipitating	event,	lesions	may	occur	in	similar	regions.	Their	speciFic	location,	while	not	uniform,	can	be	established	for	each	patient	through	the	use	of	anatomical	MRI	and	other	brain	scanning	techniques.	By	comparing	the	behavior	of	healthy	controls	to	that	of	patients	with	lesions	in	the	same	region,	the	role	of	that	brain	area	in	the	process	can	be	described.	So	people	with	lesions	to	areas	implicated	in	moral	decision	making	or	regret	decision	making	may	exhibit	behavior	signiFicantly	different	from	people	whose	brains	are	fully	functional	in	that	region.	Similarly,	people	with	psychological	disorders,	which	have	brain-based	causes	and	therefore	cognitive	implications,	may	exhibit	similar	types	of	different	behavior	from	healthy	controls.		Patients	with	lesions	in	the	vmPFC,	like	those	who	demonstrated	difFiculty	with	applying	anticipated	regret,	also	exhibit	trouble	in	following	social	norms.	Both	types	of	unusual	decision	outcome	accompany	damage	to	the	vmPFC,	implicating	this	area	in	a	key	role	of	both	moral	and	regret	choice.	SpeciFically,	when	presented	with	the	footbridge	problem,	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  28which	demands	proximate	action,	most	healthy	people	cannot	overcome	the	emotional	aversion	of	the	proposition.	Conversely,	vmPFC	patients	—	whose	lesions	deactivate	portions	of	this	brain	area	—	exhibited	utilitarian	behavior,	choosing	to	sacriFice	one	life	in	favor	of	Five,	a	decision	that	appears	to	consider	only	the	Final	tally	of	the	choice	and	to	ignore	the	emotional	aspects	(Koenigs,	Young	et	al.	2007).	In	a	battery	of	hypothetical	situations,	these	patients	were	presented	with	choices	of	sacriFicing	one	life	to	save	multiple	other	lives.	Among	the	best-known	non-emotionally	salient	dilemmas	is	the	trolley	problem,	in	which	the	trolley	is	diverted	by	a	lever	onto	a	track	with	one	person,	avoiding	the	death	of	Five.	In	this	dilemma,	vmPFC	lesion	patients	make	the	choice	to	pull	the	lever	about	as	often	as	healthy	controls	do,	making	a	pure	calculation	about	the	impersonal	action	of	pulling	a	lever.	Given	that	these	patients	had	impaired	autonomic	activity	in	response	to	emotionally	charged	pictures,	the	authors	conclude	that	the	problem	in	generating	“normal”	moral	judgments	come	from	impaired	emotional	processing.	This	was	supported	by	two	other	studies	showing	that	vmPFC	patients	do	not	experience	aversive	emotional	responses	to	moral	violations	(Ciaramelli	and	Pellegrino	2011,	Gu,	Wang	et	al.	2015).	When	a	personal	element	is	involved,	healthy	people	choose	to	intervene	much	less	frequently	(Greene,	Sommerville	et	al.	2001).	Not	so	lesion	patients,	who	continue	to	make	the	utilitarian	choice	at	about	the	same	rate	as	they	did	in	the	less-emotional	impersonal	scenario	(Koenigs,	Young	et	al.	2007).		Importantly,	vmPFC	lesions	also	impair	the	experience	of	self-conscious	emotions	such	as	shame	or	embarrassment	(Beer,	Heerey	et	al.	2003).	Moreover,	the	social	behavior	of	lesion	patients	in	social-norms	reinforcing	games	has	been	compared	to	that	of	psychopaths	(Koenigs,	Kruepke	et	al.	2010).	It	should	also	be	noted	that	we	do	not	suggest	that	the	moral	dilemmas	described	elicit	regret.	Rather,	because	the	outcome	of	the	choice	has	consequences	for	other	people,	the	anticipated	negative	counterfactual	emotion	involved	in	these	situations	would	better	be	described	as	remorse	or	guilt:	cognitively	distinct	from	regret	(Baskin-Sommers,	Stuppy-Sullivan	et	al.	2016).	Nonetheless,	the	results	from	the	vmPFC	patient	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  29studies	mentioned	here	suggest	that	taking	responsibility	for	one’s	own	actions,	questioning	oneself,	feeling	regret	and	reinforcing	social	norms	rely	on	the	same	neural	circuitry.	
Psychopathy	Psychopathy	is	characterized	by	diminished	inhibitory	control,	impulsive	behavior	and	violence.	Notably,	the	psychiatric	condition	is	also	attended	by	unusual	morality	judgment,	including	the	conFlation	of	conventional	and	moral	violations	(Blair	1995).	While	healthy	people	see	great	differences	in	a	conventional	violation	such	as	wearing	inappropriate	clothes	in	public	and	a	moral	violation	such	as	hitting	another	person,	psychopaths	see	less	difference	between	the	two	types	of	transgression.	Psychopaths	are	also	more	tolerant	of	moral	transgressions	against	other	people,	which	may	stem	from	a	lack	of	sufFicient	aversion	to	distress	in	others	(Blair	2007).	They	display	a	similar	deFiciency	for	aversion	in	cost-beneFit	choice	series.		The	impaired	decision	making	by	people	with	psychopathic	tendencies	has	long	been	attributed	to	their	curtailed	experience	of	emotions	involving	responsibility	(Koenigs,	Kruepke	et	al.	2012),	but	recent	studies	suggest	that	the	breakdown	in	learning	via	regret	happens	further	downstream,	at	the	point	of	employing	regret	values	in	subsequent	choices	(Hughes,	Dolan	et	al.	2013,	Gillan,	Morein-Zamir	et	al.	2014,	Baskin-Sommers,	Stuppy-Sullivan	et	al.	2016).	This	would	suggest	that	people	with	psychopathy	do	indeed	feel	regret	but	do	not	incorporate	the	signal	into	future	decisions,	a	model	consistent	with	some	Findings	about	the	moral	decision	making	of	psychopaths.		Considering	the	implication	of	the	vmPFC	is	such	feed-forward	mechanisms,	the	breakdown	may	well	stem	from	a	diminished	vmPFC,	which	in	psychopathic	individuals,	has	been	shown	to	be	reduced	in	every	dimension:	volume,	thickness	and	surface	area	(Yang,	Raine	et	al.	2005,	Baskin-Sommers,	Neumann	et	al.	2016).	If	other	considerations	are	equal,	healthy	people	make	the	choice	that	carries	the	least	expected	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  30regret,	sometimes	even	at	the	cost	of	proFit.	Yet	the	higher	people	scored	on	a	psychopathy	scale,	the	less	likely	they	were	to	avoid	regret	in	a	repeated	wheels	of	fortune	task	(Baskin-Sommers,	Stuppy-Sullivan	et	al.	2016).	It	was	not	simply	that	the	missed	opportunity	bothered	them	less	–	they	reported	negative	emotions	at	about	the	same	level	as	controls,	and	sometimes	even	more.	In	fact,	the	highest	scorers	on	the	psychopathy	self-report	scale	reported	negative	emotions	after	a	bad	outcome	comparison,	yet	they	seemed	to	ignore	that	information.	The	bad	outcome	comparison	that	serves	as	a	signal	to	healthy	people	was	not	being	used	by	the	people	with	psychopathy.	Their	behavior	indicated	that	they	employed	only	the	simpler	signal	of	expected	value.	This	suggests	some	link	between	psychopathy	and	regret	avoidance,	though	a	study	that	searched	explicitly	for	such	a	connection	in	criminal	offenders	did	not	Find	one	(Hughes,	Dolan	et	al.	2013).	People	with	psychopathic	indications	are	thus	apparently	capable	of	imagining	alternative	realities	and	generating	and	experiencing	the	negative	emotion	associated	with	the	comparison	to	actual	reality,	suggesting	that	psychopathy	is	characterized	not	by	a	deFicit	of	emotion	but	by	weakened	general	cognitive	processes	like	the	ability	to	maintain	previous	counterfactual	information	and	to	apply	it	to	subsequent	decisions.	So	if	these	people	were	experiencing	the	emotion	but	apparently	not	employing	it	in	choice	tasks	immediately	following	arousal,	it	raised	the	possibility	that	the	information	was	not	being	applied	to	guide	future	choice	in	the	manner	of	predictive	models.		The	understanding	of	moral	processing	in	psychopaths	is	not	well	understood.	Though	people	with	psychopathy	have	long	been	observed	to	engage	in	amoral	behavior,	the	mechanism	of	that	deFiciency	has	only	recently	been	explored.		Psychopathy	has	been	ascribed	to	a	depleted	ability	to	empathize	with	a	person	being	harmed	as	well	as	a	deFicient	mechanism	to	inhibit	violence	(Blair	1995).	In	a	study	by	Blair,	criminal	offenders	considered	several	scenarios	of	moral	and	conventional	violations	set	in	a	school,	showing	that	psychopaths	signiFicantly	did	not	differentiate	permissibility	between	the	two	types	of	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  31violations,	while	non-psychopaths	did.	Blair	rejects	several	models	in	which	psychopaths	experience	moral	emotions	but	do	not	employ	them	in	mentalization	or	fail	to	take	perspectives	of	others.	Rather,	he	proposes	a	fault	in	a	separate	system,	a	“violence	inhibition	mechanism.”	Cima	and	colleagues	(2010),	by	contrast,	argue	that	while	people	with	psychopathic	traits	may	have	some	emotional	deFicits,	enough	emotion	is	preserved	(or	in	fact	may	be	unnecessary)	to	make	similar	moral	judgments	to	healthy	controls.	The	fact	that	they	can	identify	the	rightness	or	wrongness	of	moral	actions,	but	then	by	deFinition	act	in	contrivance,	indicates	that	they	may	simply	not	care	about	morality,	the	study	suggests.	This	would	again	be	consistent	with	psychopaths	experiencing	regret	but	not	applying	it	to	subsequent	choices.	Whatever	emotional	component	that	is	lacking	in	people	with	psychopathy	may	be	the	element	responsible	for	the	application	of	the	moral	understanding	toward	future	decisions.		Yet	by	reFining	groups	of	people	by	placement	on	the	psychopathy	scale	and	with	greater	precision	in	the	moral	dilemmas	presented,	Koenigs	and	colleagues	Find	that	a	counterfactual	mechanism	may	indeed	be	at	fault	for	some	abnormal	moral	choices	by	people	with	psychopathy	(2012).	Using	inmates	from	a	Wisconsin	prison,	the	study	considered	only	those	participants	who	scored	in	the	highest	and	lowest	portions	of	psychopathy	indications,	further	reFining	the	high	scorers	in	terms	of	assessed	anxiety	in	consideration	of	a	theory	that	psychopathy	is	too	broad	a	term	for	several	possible	conditions.	Using	the	same	situations	as	in	the	Greene	study,	both	high-anxious	psychopaths	and	non-psychopaths	endorsed	the	utilitarian	outcome	of	personal	dilemmas	with	approximately	the	same	lower	frequency.	But	low-anxious	psychopaths	judged	the	utilitarian	choice	acceptable	more	often	than	either	other	group.	The	Finding	suggests	that	some	subtypes	of	people	with	psychopathic	indications	resolve	the	emotion-utility	conFlict	in	a	similarly	unusual	manner	to	that	with	which	psychopathic	people	eschew	regret.	Where	the	breakdown	occurs	in	either	population	and	in	either	mechanism	—	or	even	the	certainty	that	the	causes	are	the	same	—	is	still	up	for	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  32debate:	psychopaths	and	lesion	patients	may	experience	emotion	less,	or	they	may	experience	emotion	and	simply	not	apply	it.	Either	way,	it	is	clear	that	people	with	psychopathic	tendencies	do	not	change	their	choice	behavior	in	emotional	situations	to	the	same	extent	that	healthy	people	do,	both	after	experiences	that	typically	generate	regret	and	when	confronted	with	moral	dilemmas.		
A	Social	Dimension	of	Regret	and	Agency	The	consideration	of	others	connects	with	regret	not	only	in	representing	levels	of	responsibility.	The	regret	circuit	co-locates	with	neurological	phenomena	that	involve	consideration	of	others	via	social	versus	private	situations	(Bault,	JofFily	et	al.	2011,	Zhu,	Mathewson	et	al.	2012).	Studies	on	levels	of	strategic	thinking	have	shown	higher	levels	associated	with	the	same	areas	as	counterfactual	emotions	like	regret	(Bault,	JofFily	et	al.	2011).	In	an	experimental	game	called	the	“beauty	contest”	or	guessing	game,	the	choices	a	player	makes	indicate	the	extent	to	which	he	is	thinking	about	other	players	and	how	much	he	thinks	they	are	thinking	about	him.	Increased	amounts	of	this	recursive	thinking	are	associated	with	higher	levels	of	brain	activity	in	the	mOFC	(Coricelli	and	Nagel	2009),	the	location	of	most	of	the	vmPFC,	a	key	component	of	the	regret	circuit.	As	with	so	many	co-located	brain	activities,	however,	it	is	necessary	to	note	that	anatomical	proximity	does	not	necessarily	indicate	a	functional	relationship.	Nevertheless,	the	notion	of	thinking	about	the	activity	in	other	brains	(in	the	case	of	the	recursive	thinking	demanded	in	the	beauty	contest)	is	different	from	other	types	of	input	in	a	similar	way	that	the	calculation	and	experience	of	counterfactual-based	emotions	(as	in	the	case	of	regret)	varies	from	other	input—that	is,	it	is	largely	internal.		Studies	have	associated	the	vmPFC/mOFC	with	thoughts	about	others	(Frith	and	Frith	1999,	Gallagher	and	Frith	2003,	Hampton,	Bossaerts	et	al.	2006,	Suzuki,	Jensen	et	al.	2016).	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  33These	areas	become	active	not	only	when	thinking	about	others—when	evaluating	violations	of	social	norms,	for	example—but	also	when	it	comes	to	representing	our	own	mental	state,	including	emotion	(Gallagher	and	Frith	2003).	When	subjects	were	directed	to	think	about	a	friend	or	someone	who	was	similar	to	them,	the	vmPFC	showed	stronger	activations	(Mitchell,	Macrae	et	al.	2006).	Given	the	vmPFC/mOFC	association	with	processing	information	relevant	to	the	self,	Mitchell	and	colleagues	suggest	that	thinking	about	related	others	may	depend	on	self-evaluations	in	the	vmPFC.	This	introduces	the	possibility	of	a	connection	between	internal	and	external	considerations:	between	regret’s	internally	oriented	self-evaluation	and	thoughts	about	others.	In	fact,	despite	regret’s	essential	interior	aspect,	it	has	been	shown	to	be	modulated	by	the	actions	of	others.	If	an	individual	experiences	regret	that	comes	as	the	partial	result	of	the	actions	of	others,	the	brain	appears	to	shift	some	of	the	blame	for	the	less-then-optimal	outcome	to	these	others—thus	reducing	at	least	the	anticipation	of	regret	(Nicolle,	Bach	et	al.	2011).	As	described	above,	measurable	regret	is	deFined	by	the	notion	of	agency.	It	is	usually	addressed	in	a	polar	manner,	however:	with	agency,	the	negative	feeling	associated	with	a	different	outcome	is	regret;	and	in	its	absence,	disappointment	(Zeelenberg,	van	Dijk	et	al.	1998).	But	within	those	categorizations,	there	appears	to	be	room	for	gradation.	Nicolle	et	al.	had	participants	complete	a	task	in	which	they	made	similar	gambling	choices	as	in	standard	regret	tasks,	but	on	some	trials,	the	choice	was	determined	not	by	the	participant	alone,	but	by	vote	(they	were	told)	of	a	group	of	which	they	were	a	member,	ranging	from	2	to	8	people	in	all.	In	this	case,	the	participant’s	action	alone	did	not	determine	the	choice	and	its	attendant	result.	The	measured	effect	saw	reduced	activity	in	the	amygdala,	compared	to	trials	in	which	the	participant	was	solely	responsible	for	choices.	The	amygdala,	implicated	in	emotional	memory,	is	associated	with	activity	involving	personally	relevant	information.	It	is	also	known	to	integrate	the	relationship	between	stimulus	and	reward	and	to	send	it	on	to	the	vmPFC,	where	the	information	is	used	in	subsequent	choices	(Coricelli,	Critchley	et	al.	2005).	So	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  34increased	activity	during	instances	of	regret	in	which	the	participant	is	the	only	decision	maker	suggests	a	kind	of	“self-blame	regret”,	Nicolle	and	colleagues	argue.	The	diminished	sense	of	responsibility	attenuates	the	negative	feeling	of	regret,	and	that	consequently	appears	also	to	dampen	the	learning	effect.	A	better	response	in	an	alternative	reality	becomes	clearer	in	the	amygdala	with	greater	individual	responsibility.	A	related	question,	unexplored	to	this	point,	is	how,	if	at	all,	shared	responsibility	for	positive	outcomes	might	modulate	brain	activity	compared	to	that	of	negative	outcomes,	or	for	positive	outcomes	that	result	from	solo	choices.	
Conclusion	The	goal	of	any	decision	process	is	to	arrive	at	the	optimal	outcome,	given	the	conditions.	But	when	several	important	factors	come	into	conFlict	in	a	decision,	the	brain	must	mediate	among	them.	Separately,	the	processes	for	moral	decision	making	and	choices	involving	decision	regret	have	been	further	explored	via	brain	imaging	and	lesion	studies.	These	have	shown	that	segments	of	these	processes	share	some	anatomy	and	even	similar	dysfunction	among	people	with	psychopathy	or	lesions	to	the	vmPFC.	Our	understanding	of	both	systems	still	needs	clarity	before	they	can	be	considered	to	play	any	part	in	each	other,	but	some	recent	research	proposes	frameworks	that	hint	at	how	they	might	be	joined.	Blair	argues	that	the	learning	systems	in	the	vmPFC	are	the	foundations	of	moral	decisions	that	concern	harm	to	other	people	(2007).	These	same	systems	undergird	error	signals	that	include	decision	regret,	showing	heightened	activity	during	both	the	experience	and	anticipation	of	regret.	The	work	on	moral	decisions	by	Greene	and	colleagues	suggests	that	the	vmPFC	might	serve	in	a	regulatory	role,	delaying	decisions	during	high-conFlict	or	difFicult	dilemmas	—	especially	those	involving	competition	between	emotional	and	utilitarian	outcomes.		
Chapter 1  Timberlake  35Moll	and	de	Oliveira-Souza,	however,	push	back	on	the	Greene	model,	saying	this	conFlict	framework	is	too	complex.	They	hold	instead	that	the	lesions	attenuate	the	prosocial	inFluence	of	the	vmPFC,	thus	allowing	utilitarian	decisions	without	the	interference	of	emotion.	The	inverse	logic	is	that	in	healthy	people,	by	contrast,	the	vmPFC	encourages	greater	consideration	of	other	people,	in	contrivance	of	purely	numeric	considerations.	Yet	this	runs	against	the	tonic	activity	of	the	vmPFC	that	maintains	value	information	during	a	series	of	choices.	Moral	and	regret	decision	processes	appear	to	share	patterns,	but	if	those	are	reFlections	of	shared	pathways	in	the	brain,	studies	to	this	point	present	contradicting	roles	for	these	areas.		Those	who	see	the	greatest	connections	between	learning	signals	and	moral	decisions	include	Thomas	and	colleagues,	who	argue	that	the	vmPFC’s	role	is	similar	across	reasoning	processes	—	including	moral	and	complex	decision	making.	In	their	model,	the	vmPFC	integrates	emotion	into	judgments	of	complicated	decisions,	acting	as	adjudicator	when	considering	future	consequences	(Thomas,	Croft	et	al.	2011).	The	vmPFC	would	be	responsible	for	assimilating	the	emotional	effects	of	regret	experience	or	imagination	of	harm	to	another	into	a	decision	that	would	otherwise	address	only	the	utilitarian	concerns	of	economic	value	or	number	of	people	protected	from	harm.	Such	a	broad	function	could	incorporate	either	of	the	Greene	or	Moll/de	Oliveira-Souza	proposals.		Separating	these	competing	goals	and	observing	how	special	populations	deviate	in	their	decisions	from	they	typical	allows	us	to	see	that	regret	and	morality	are	at	least	occupying	some	of	the	same	space	in	the	brain.		Moral	decisions	play	serious	emotional	consequences	against	preserving	the	lives	(or	limbs)	of	others.	Similarly,	decision	regret	pits	the	possible	emotional	pain	of	making	a	sub-optimal	choice	against	maximizing	gains.	In	both	cases,	the	effort	to	avoid	negative	emotions	comes	into	competition	with	the	achieving	the	most	utilitarian	outcome.	Though	the	implications	of	moral	versus	economic	decisions	are	on	different	scales,	the	human	brain	appears	to	process	similarly	some	portion	of	them.	Crucially,	
Chapter 1  Timberlake  36they	both	require	the	previous	experience	or	understanding	of	emotional	outcomes	and	the	incorporation	of	their	possible	reoccurrence	into	a	new	decision.	Thus,	these	complex	types	of	decision	require	the	ability	to	consider	the	impact	of	the	choice	before	it	is	made	—	they	demand	the	conception	of	realities	both	encountered	and	imagined.	These	processes	use	the	past	and	a	conceptual	future	to	put	new	realities	in	conFlict	with	each	other	to	judge	one	the	most	desirable.	
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Motivating	questions	How	do	the	experience	and	anticipation	of	regret	during	choices	evolve	with	age?	Is	the	propensity	to	experience	regret	after	a	bad	decision	linked	to	counterfactual	learning?		
Introduction	
Older	adults	make	different	choices	than	younger	adults	under	certain	conditions,	even	in	identical	situations,	suggesting	an	internal	change	in	the	decision	process	correlated	with	aging.	These	changes	are	evident	in	myriad	behavioral	decision-making	studies,	most	often	to	worsening	effect	(Riggle	and	Johnson	1996,	Denburg,	Cole	et	al.	2007,	Löckenhoff	and	Carstensen	2007).	Older	adults	make	hastier	investment	decisions	and	have	more	difFiculty	justifying	those	choices	(Shivapour,	Nguyen	et	al.	2012).	Older	adults	are	also	more	prone	to	be	duped	by	scams	and	are	more	susceptible	to	deceptive	advertising	(Yoon,	Cole	et	al.	2009).	Aging	is	marked	by	selective	areas	of	cognitive	decline,	including	performance	in	episodic	memory	and	executive	function.	While	some	mental	processes	remain	stable	throughout	adulthood,	others	change	in	ways	that	result	in	less-advantageous	outcomes	(Tymula,	Belmaker	et	al.	2013).	Performance	in	both	long-term	memory	and	working	memory	tasks,	which	depend	on	processing	capacity,	appear	to	decline	beginning	almost	as	soon	as	adulthood	is	reached	(Park,	Lautenschlager	et	al.	2002).	Due	to	these	several	cognitive	constraints,	older	adults	are	more	likely	to	rely	on	heuristic	processing	to	make	decisions	(Riggle	and	Johnson	1996).		Such	age-related	decline	in	tasks	that	involve	reward	and	learning	are	consistent	with	reduced	density	of	dopamine	receptors	in	brain	areas	implicated	in	encoding	reward	prediction	error	and	in	learning.	Midbrain	dopamine	neurons	have	been	robustly	demonstrated	to	encode	for	reward	prediction	error	(Schultz,	Tremblay	et	al.	1998,	Bayer	and	Glimcher	2005).	Older	adults	exhibit	lower	dopamine	transporter	density	in	the	striatum,	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  39which	correlated	with	reduced	performance	in	tests	assessing	episodic	memory	and	executive	function	(Erixon-Lindroth,	Farde	et	al.	2005,	Troiano,	Schulzer	et	al.	2010).		Through	the	combined	lenses	of	imaging	and	behavioral	studies,	these	changes	can	be	read	as	markers	of	cognitive	decline	with	age.		Purely	cognitive	processes	like	working	memory	and	reward-based	learning	have	been	studied	thoroughly,	if	not	exhaustively,	but	the	effect	of	aging	on	other	aspects	of	learning	and	decision	making	are	less	well	explored	–	in	particular	the	inFluence,	if	any,	of	emotional	affect.	Because	the	neuronal	decline	is	different	in	areas	implicated	in	emotion,	they	may	attenuate	–	or	exacerbate	–	the	decline	seen	in	strictly	cognitive	tasks.	Cognitively	enhanced	emotions	such	as	regret	and	envy	employ	counterfactual	reasoning,	an	additional	vector	of	learning	processes	(Coricelli	and	Rustichini	2010).	Importantly,	they	appear	to	follow	discrete	pathways,	suggesting	that	their	inFluence	on	learning	over	the	course	of	aging	may	be	not	only	different	from	simpler	models,	but	also	from	each	other.		Slipping	performance	accompanies	age	in	tasks	that	call	on	episodic	memory	(recall	of	words	and	Figures	and	for	face	recognition)	as	well	as	those	that	employ	executive	functioning	(visuospatial	working	memory	and	verbal	Fluency),	which	correlate	with	reduced	density	of	striatal	dopamine	transporter,	a	key	neurotransmitter	in	discerning	reward	(Erixon-Lindroth,	Farde	et	al.	2005,	Troiano,	Schulzer	et	al.	2010).		Age-related	decline	also	attends	structural	connections	between	First-order	reward-processing	areas	in	the	striatum	and	basal	ganglia	to	higher-order	areas	like	the	prefrontal	cortex	(Samanez-Larkin,	Levens	et	al.	2012).	When	these	connections	are	depleted,	the	processes	that	represent	value	and	reward	predictions	are	attenuated,	impeding	identiFication	and	exploitation	of	rewarding	decisions	and	more	successful	strategies	(O'Doherty	2004).	The	combined	effect	of	a	reduction	in	dopamine	density	and	diminished	structural	connection	in	the	reward	system	suggest	at	least	a	partial	explanation	for	changing	choice	behavior	in	older	adults.		
Chapter 2  Timberlake  40Similarly	impeding	these	processes,	the	level	of	detail	of	both	past	events	and	future	scenarios	declines	in	older	adults	(Addis,	Wong	et	al.	2008).	Suddendorf	and	Corballis	argue	that	mental	time	travel	plays	a	crucial	role	in	predicting	future	situations	because	it	allows	the	recollection	of	previous	events	and	the	anticipation	of		outcomes	when	those	events	are	reencountered	(2007).	In	an	evaluation	of	autobiographical	memory,	older	adults	demonstrate	a	diminished	capacity	for	this	form	of	mentalization,	both	in	self-projection	into	future	events	and	in	situating	events	in	the	future	with	regard	to	the	present	(	Anelli,	Ciaramelli	et	al.	2016).	This	trend	has	bidirectional	implications	for	learning:	both	a	reduction	in	recall	of	consequences	of	previous	actions	and	lesser	ability	to	predict	outcomes	of	future	choices.			The	types	of	decision	contexts	that	reveal	different	performance	with	age	can	be	characterized	by	the	several	types	of	probability	situations	that	decision	makers	encounter	(Mata,	Josef	et	al.	2011).	Mata	and	colleagues	outline	that	A	priori	probabilities	feature	known	probabilities	and	are	marked	by	relatively	easy	mathematical	calculations.	Statistical	probabilities,	by	contrast,	demand	an	empirical	gauge	informed	by	experience.	A	third	type	involving	rare	events	brings	extreme	uncertainty	and	prompts	individuals	to	make	estimates.	Changes	in	cognitive	control	may	modulate	the	assessment	of	the	type	of	probability	situation	and	therefore	how	to	respond	to	it.	Declines	in	working	memory	make	strategy	selection	and	application	more	difFicult,	which	compounds	the	effects	of	aging	since	older	adults	tend	to	rely	on	simpler	strategies	that	require	reduced	information	search	and	integration	(Chen	and	Sun	2003).	In	a	quintessential	example,	in	a	gambling	task,	while	younger	people	used	more	cognitive	skills	like	learning	and	memory,	older	adults	relied	on	valence	of	recent	outcomes	(Wood,	Busemeyer	et	al.	2005).	The	decline	in	higher	cognitive	function	is	made	more	clear	when	age-related	performance	differences	are	compared	to	performance	in	decision	tasks	that	do	not	feature	a	key	learning	component,	in	which	older	adults	and	younger	adults	do	not	signiFicantly	differ	(Brand	and	Markowitsch	2010,	Hosseini,	Rostami	et	al.	2010,	Mata,	Josef	et	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  41al.	2011).	Meanwhile,	older	adults	perform	about	as	well	as	younger	adults	in	memory	tasks	that	demand	only	storage,	such	as	short-term	memory	span	tasks,	compared	to	signiFicant	deFiciency	in	tasks	that	require	both	storage	and	processing,	as	in	working	memory	tasks	(Bopp	and	Verhaeghen	2005).	Such	differences	emerge	in	tasks	that	call	on	subjects	to	learn	from	feedback	over	time.	
Emotional	assistance	The	story	of	aging,	however,	is	not	one	of	broad,	continuous	decline.	Some	meta-features	of	decision	making	improve	with	age,	such	as	performance	assessment,	in	which	older	adults	seem	to	have	greater	understanding	of	the	limits	of	their	knowledge	(Hershey	and	Wilson	1997).	Though	much	work	has	been	done	to	speciFically	characterize	cognitive	decline	that	accompanies	aging,	the	effort	is	not	yet	exhaustive.	In	particular,	much	remains	to	be	understood	about	the	interaction	between	affective	and	cognitive	processes	in	learning	and	decision	making.	Those	processes	that	remain	relatively	intact	and	that	may	attenuate	declines	in	decision	making	could	be	teased	out.	Key	components	of	choice	behavior,	such	as	risk	preference,	have	been	measured	as	not	signiFicantly	different	in	older	subjects	in	some	contexts	(Tymula,	Belmaker	et	al.	2013).	Likewise,	some	affective	processes	are	relatively	resistant	to	effects	of	age	(Carstensen,	Turan	et	al.	2011).		Decision-making	processes	that	incorporate	both	cognitive	and	affective	functions,	with	their	greater	and	lesser	susceptibility	to	age,	may	therefore	decline	to	varying	extents.	In	fact,	older	adults	have	been	shown	to	focus	on	positive	outcomes	and	events,	perhaps	at	the	expense	of	comparisons	that	encourage	learning	(Mather	and	Carstensen	2002).	We	hypothesize	that	decisions	modulated	by	cognitively	enhanced	emotions,	such	as	regret,	may	maintain	stability	with	age,	compared	to	more	drastic	declines	in	more	purely	cognitive	processes,	such	as	memory,	and	that	how	these	emotions	stabilize	other	processes	depends	on	affective	valence.		
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Positivity	effect	A	striking	difference	between	older	and	younger	adults	is	the	positivity	effect:	the	tendency	for	older	adults	to	feel	positive	outcomes	more	strongly,	as	well	as	to	recall	them	better	(Reed,	Chan	et	al.	2014).	Yet	the	variable	evidence	of	subsequent	studies	suggests	that	this	phenomenon	does	not	have	a	singular	effect	on	learning.	Various	studies	have	investigated	how	age-related	depletion	in	the	density	of	dopamine	neurons	changes	reward-based	learning.	A	key	consideration	of	feedback	is	valence	–	both	as	it	applies	to	reward	itself	as	well	as	to	the	various	types	of	errors	that	feedback	informs.	While	the	absolute	valence	of		a	reward	tends	not	to	be	perceived	differently	depending	on	age,	the	valence	of	its	comparison	to	other	amounts	in	fact	may	be	different	for	older	adults	than	for	younger	adults.	A	small	negative	result	may	have	a	negative	prediction	error	compared	to	what	was	predicted,	but	it	may	have	a	positive	error	if	it	is	compared	to	some	other	worse	outcome	that	could	have	been	obtained,	given	a	different	result	of	probability	or	choice.		
Risk	and	emotion	Older	adults	make	less-advantageous	choices	under	uncertainty,	yet	depending	on	the	type	of	risk	that	accompanies	the	task,	tolerance	of	risk	(measured	as	the	variance	of	probability	of	possible	outcomes)	of	older	adults	may	be	the	same	as	that	of	younger	adults,	or	lower,	or	even	higher,	as	in	tasks	that	call	for	decisions	from	experience	(Mata,	Josef	et	al.	2011).		One	explanation	for	this	variability	is	that	older	adults	may	have	difFiculty	representing	changing	option	values,	which	can	lead	to	inconsistent	choices	(Mata,	Josef	et	al.	2011,	Tymula,	Belmaker	et	al.	2013,	Samanez-Larkin	and	Knutson	2015).	In	the	Iowa	Gambling	Task	(IGT),	the	highest	reward	comes	from	learning	that	of	two	risky	options,	the	initially	less-attractive,	lower-risk	choice	is	more	favorable.	The	Balloon-Analog	Risk	Task	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  43(BART),	by	contrast,	encourages	learning	that	higher	rewards	come	with	riskier	choices	(Mata,	Josef	et	al.	2011).	In	some	IGT	studies,	most	older	adults	start	out	as	risk-seeking	and	become	more	risk-averse	over	the	duration	of	the	task	(Denburg,	Cole	et	al.	2007).	Participants	choose	from	four	decks	of	cards	in	which	there	are	both	gain	and	loss	cards.	Two	contain	larger	single-win	cards	and	larger	losses	but	average	net	losses,	and	the	other	two,	smaller	individual	gains	and	losses	with	average	net	gains.	Most	participants	start	out	choosing	from	the	high-gain/high-loss	decks,	and	healthy,	unimpaired	subjects	eventually	settling	on	the	decks	that	provide	long-term	net	gains.	That	deck	also	represents	the	lower-variance	and	therefore	lower-risk	deck.	The	IGT	was	developed	speciFically	to	examine	the	effect	of	emotion	on	cognition,	including	in	an	early	representative	case	study	of	a	ventromedial	prefrontal	cortex	(vmPFC)	lesion	patient	in	which	the	authors	measured	sensitivity	to	reward,	insensitivity	to	punishment	or	insensitivity	to	consideration	of	consequences	(Bechara,	Damasio	et	al.	1994).	Individuals	with	vmPFC	lesions,	who	demonstrate	an	impaired	ability	to	integrate	cognition	and	emotion,	continue	selecting	the	riskier	deck	in	pursuit	of	high	gains	(Bechara,	Damasio	et	al.	1997,	Bechara,	Tranel	et	al.	2000).	A	meta-analysis	shows	that	risk-preference	differences	are	more	context-dependent:	older	adults	took	fewer	risks	than	younger	adults	in	tasks	that	involved	learning,	but	more	risks	in	tasks	that	did	not	(Mata,	Josef	et	al.	2011).	When	higher	rewards	require	increased	risk	tolerance,	such	as	in	the	Balloon-Analog	Risk	Task	(BART),	older	adults	are	more	risk-averse	throughout,	in	contrast	to	the	IGT,	in	which	higher	rewards	come	from	embracing	less-lucrative	and	less-risky	options.	Other	evidence	suggests	that	risk	preference	may	appear	to	shift	due	to	differentiation	in	gain	and	loss	contexts	(Tymula,	Belmaker	et	al.	2013).	These	different	performances	highlight	the	variability	in	cognitive	demand.	Although	both	tasks	engage	statistical	probabilities	and	demand	experience-based	responses,	those	responses	differ	depending	on		outcome	valence:	in	the	IGT,	participants	should	learn	to	avoid	the	initially	attractive	risky	option	to	reach	the	optimal	choice,	while	the	BART	rewards	learning	to	become	more	risk-seeking.	Complicating	this	comparison	is	the	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  44BART’s	greater	demands	on	calculating	statistical	probabilities	that	lead	to	taking	higher	risks.	A	deFiciency	in	this	type	of	learning	in	older	adults	means	they	do	not	make	riskier	choices	demanded	for	higher	reward	(Mata,	Josef	et	al.	2011).	
Counterfactual	learning	In	standard	models	of	reward-based	learning,	agents	receive	feedback	on	choices	made,	prompting	them	to	adjust	future	actions.	Although	informative	models	can	be	built	based	only	on	the	information	from	the	choice	made,	when	the	outcomes	of	alternative	choices	not	taken	are	known,	models	that	incorporate	that	information	better	describe	decision	behavior.	This	counterfactual	information,	along	with	the	comparison	between	unobtained	and	obtained	outcomes,	guide	learning	(Zeelenberg,	Beattie	et	al.	1996).	Counterfactual	or	Fictive	learning	updates	information	about	potential	future	choices	using	information	from	both	obtained	and	unobtained	outcomes.	An	affective	accompaniment	to	this	imagined	alternative	reality	gives	rise	to	negative	or	positive	emotions:	regret	or	relief.	The	negative	feeling	of	regret	prompts	aversive	behavior	that	guides	learning.	Individuals	avoid	potentially	rewarding	options	if	it	helps	them	to	avoid	anticipated	regret	(Coricelli,	Critchley	et	al.	2005).		The	effect	of	age	on	counterfactual	learning	has	been	little	considered.	To	date,	just	one	published	study	addresses	this	question,	moreover,	incorporating	underlying	neural	activity	(Tobia,	Guo	et	al.	2016).	Though	the	study	found	differences	in	counterfactual	thinking	between	the	age	groups,	their	characteristics	and	causes	were	not	as	clear.	The	strategic	sequential	investment	task	employed	provided	counterfactual	information	as	a	vector	to	arrive	at	more-	or	less-desirable	Final	states	following	a	three-choice	round,	experienced	10	times	over	the	course	of	a	block.	Older	adults	on	average	invested	less	money	and	earned	less.	They	selected	the	path	leading	to	the	least-rewarding	outcome	more	often	than	the	other	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  45three	paths	combined,	while	more	than	half	of	the	younger	adults	developed	a	preference	for	the	most	lucrative	path.	The	study	found	that	older	adults	were	more	responsive	to	counterfactual	gains,	both	behaviorally	and	neuronally,	but	that	this	did	not	lead	to	more	rewarding	choices.	Computational	modeling	also	showed	that	older	adults	explored	more,	while	younger	adults	made	more	stable	choices,	which	is	more	rewarded	in	this	particular	task.			
Experimental	questions	In	this	study,	our	goals	were	twofold:	First,	we	examined	the	differences	in	experience	of	regret	between	older	and	younger	adults,	and	second,	we	explored	the	connection	between	experience	of	regret	and	counterfactual	learning	in	terms	of	inter-individual	differences,	independent	of	age.	We	aimed	to	further	explore	the	characteristics	and	trajectories	of	decision-making	change	in	older	adults	compared	to	younger	adults.	As	shown	in	previous	studies,	the	cognitive	decline	accompanying	age	is	not	uniform	and	seems	to	hinder	various	processes	differently	(Riggle	and	Johnson	1996,	Erixon-Lindroth,	Farde	et	al.	2005,	Tymula,	Belmaker	et	al.	2013).	Even	within	a	given	task,	performance	with	different	demands	declines	to	varied	extents	(Bopp	and	Verhaeghen	2005,	Wood,	Busemeyer	et	al.	2005,	Brand	and	Markowitsch	2010,	Hosseini,	Rostami	et	al.	2010,	Mata,	Josef	et	al.	2011).	The	positivity	effect	in	particular	indicates	that	learning	and	effect	in	older	adults	depend	on	valence.	Therefore,	we	expect	different	outcomes	from	the	experience	of	regret,	since	it	is	a	valence-dependent	phenomenon.	Yet	it	is	not	a	direct	experience,	as	with	wins	or	losses,	but	a	comparative	one,	based	on	the	counterfactual.	Would	this	give	rise	to	the	same	effect	as	standard	negative	outcomes,	or	would	it	generate	some	sort	of	modulated	or	even	inverted	effect?	Because	older	adults	report	lower	emotional	response	from	the	experience	of	negative	emotions	like	regret	(Reed,	Chan	et	al.	2014),	in	the	First	part	of	this	study,	we	hypothesized	that	the	emotional	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  46effect	of	regret	experience	and	anticipation	would	be	lower	compared	to	that	of	younger-adult	participants.		We	next	set	out	to	examine	the	connection	between	regret	and	counterfactual	learning.	We	suspected	some	relationship	between	experience	and	avoidance	of	regret	in	one	task	and	the	employment	of	counterfactual	learning	in	another	task.	However,	because	the	change	in	counterfactual	learning	with	age	is	not	clear.	Due	to	the	asymmetric	decline	of	cognitive	processes	(Mather	and	Carstensen	2002,	Carstensen,	Turan	et	al.	2011)	and	the	as-yet-unestablished	effect	of	age	on	counterfactual	learning	(Tobia,	Guo	et	al.	2016),	we	realized	that	any	correlations	might	be	evident	at	an	individual	level,	but	not	at	the	level	of	age	groups.	We	hypothesized	that	for	all	participants,	individuals	who	show	greater	regret	sensitivity	would	also	have	higher	counterfactual	learning	rates.		To	examine	the	varied	effects	of	regret	on	older	adults	as	compared	to	younger	adults,	we	measured	the	performances	in	non-counterfactual	and	counterfactual	contexts	by	age-segregated	participants.	We	employed	tasks	that	allowed	discrete	characterization	of	these	contexts	to	examine	any	differences	between	age	groups.	An	initial	task	was	selected	that	would	allow	us	to	measure	the	level	of	inFluence	of	regret	anticipation	and	avoidance	for	each	participant.	Then	participants	would	complete	a	second	task	in	which	their	learning	behavior	was	described	according	to	several	computational	models.	This	would	allow	us	to	compare	regret	sensitivity	in	the	First	task	to	counterfactual	learning	in	the	second	at	group	and	individual	levels.		
Methods	
One	group	of	22	adults	aged	60	and	older	(15	female,	M_age	=	70.1	±	1.3	years,	range	63-86)	was	recruited	in	Lyon,	France.	They	were	screened	for	a	history	of	neurological	and	psychiatric	disorders,	as	well	as	for	depression	(score	higher	than	10	on	the	Geriatric	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  47Depression	Scale,	French	version,	Clément,	Nassif	et	al.	1997)	and	cognitive	impairment	(score	lower	than	24	on	the	Mini	Mental	Examination	test,	French	translation,	Derouesne,	Poitreneau	et	al.	1999).	A	group	of	younger	adults	comprised	24	participants	(11	female,	M_age	=	24.8	±	1.8	years,	range	18-53).	Groups	were	matched	for	education	(older	adults	M_edu	=	13.2	±	0.8	years;	younger	adults	M_edu	=	14.3	±	0.4	years).		The	experimental	session	consisted	of	two	main	portions:	a	lottery	choice	task	and	a	learning/post-learning	task.		
Lottery	choice	task	In	the	First	task,	participants	completed	a	two-player	choice	task	adapted	from	Bault,	Coricelli	et	al.	(2008).	Participants	were	presented	with	two	Wheel	of	Fortune	lottery	circles	with	possible	outcomes	of	-20,	-5,	+5,	+20	(Fig.	2-1).	The	probability	of	obtaining	each	outcome	was	indicated	by	different	color	segments	on	the	wheel.	Probabilities	were	0.2,	0.5,	0.8.	Green	indicated	probability	of	a	positive	outcome;	red,	negative.	In	each	trial,	the	expected	values	of	the	two	lotteries	had	the	same	valence,	and	the	difference	between	the	two	expected	values	never	exceeded	7	euro.		Participants	completed	80	trials	with	complete	feedback.	In	these,	40	private	trials	were	intermixed	with	40	social	trials,	in	which	
Fig. 2-1. Wheel of fortune lottery task In 
the complete feedback condition, the participant 
selects one of the two lottery wheels, then sees 
both arrows spinning. When the arrows stop, the 
participant sees both her own, obtained outcome 
and the outcome of the non-chosen lottery. In the 
partial-information condition, only the arrow of the 
selected lottery is shown, and the result of the 
non-chosen lottery remains unknown.  
Adapted from Bault et al. 2019
Chapter 2  Timberlake  48participants	saw	the	outcome	of	another	player’s	lottery	choice.	In	this	study,	we	consider	both	types	of	complete-information	trials,	as	well	as	20	trials	that	provided	only	partial	feedback.	In	those	trials,	participants	saw	only	the	outcome	of	the	wheel	they	chose	and	received	no	information	about	the	outcome	of	the	unselected	lottery.	To	start	each	trial,	the	two	wheels	were	displayed,	surrounded	by	a	green	dashed	square	(in	private	trials).	At	their	own	pace,	participants	chose	one	by	pressing	the	right	or	left	arrow	keys	on	a	keyboard.	In	complete-feedback	trials,	arrows	inside	both	wheels	would	spin	at	the	same	time,	while	in	partial-feedback	trials,	only	the	arrow	in	the	selected	wheel	spun.	When	the	arrows	stopped,	the	portion	of	the	wheel	indicated	the	outcome	of	the	trial:	green	for	the	positive	result,	red	for	the	negative.	To	encourage	participants	to	think	of	each	trial	as	independent,	they	were	told	that	20	trials	would	be	randomly	selected	to	determine	payment.	After	each	trial,	participants	gauged	their	emotional	reaction	to	the	outcome	by	answering	the	prompt	“How	do	you	feel	about	the	outcome	of	your	choice”	by	selecting	a	number	between	-50	(for	“Extremely	Negative”)	through	0	(“Neither	Positive	nor	Negative”)	to	+50	(“Extremely	Positive”).	
Learning	task	Participants	then	performed	a	two-part	probabilistic	instrumental	learning	task	adapted	from	Palminteri	et	al.	(2015).	The	First	section	was	a	learning	task	that	manipulated	outcome	valence	to	present	either	reward	or	punishment,	as	well	as	feedback	information	(partial	or	complete),	using	a	2x2	factorial	design	(Fig.	2-2).	Participants	completed	192	trials	in	two	blocks	of	96	trials	each.	In	each	trial,	a	participant	viewed	Fixed	pairs	of	abstract	symbols	(Agathodaimon	alphabet	characters)	on	a	screen	and	selected	one.	Each	symbol	appeared	in	the	same	pair,	and	four	Fixed	pairs	were	shown	24	times	throughout	the	block.	Each	pair	was	tied	to	one	quadrant	of	the	design:	reward-partial,	reward-complete,	
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punishment-partial	or	punishment-complete.	They	were	presented	in	pseudo-random	order.	In	the	reward	context,	the	two	outcomes	were	gaining	50	cents	or	0,	neither	gaining	nor	losing.	In	the	punishment	context,	the	outcomes	were	losing	50	cents	or	0,	neither	gaining	nor	losing.	In	each	pair,	one	symbol	was	assigned	a	0.75	probability	of	a	positive	outcome,	and	the	other	was	given	a	0.25	probability	of	a	positive	outcome.	Participants	were	told	neither	the	probability	amounts,	nor	which	symbol	had	a	greater	probability	of	a	positive	outcome.	The	outcome	of	each	symbol	was	independent	of	the	other	on	each	trial,	so	both	could	yield	positive	outcomes	or	both	could	yield	negative	outcomes	in	the	same	trial.		As	in	the	previous	task,	participants	sometimes	saw	outcomes	of	only	the	symbol	they	chose,	while	in	other	trials,	they	were	shown	outcomes	of	both	symbols.	Participants	were	instructed	to	gain	as	many	points	as	possible	to	increase	their	payment.	They	were	told	that	only	the	symbol	they	chose	would	count	toward	their	score,	even	if	they	saw	the	outcome	of	the	other	symbol.	In	the	second	block,	eight	new	symbols	replaced	those	from	the	First	block.	Presentation	on	the	screen	was	counterbalanced	within	pairs	across	the	block.	Values	of	the	
Fig. 2-2 Symbolic learning task Contingencies of the task show probabilities of winning 50 cents in the 
reward context (left squares) or losing 50 cents in the punishment context (right squares). On each trial, subjects 
saw one of the four screens, with the color background cueing the specific condition and context pair. In trials 
featuring the symbol pairs in the partial-feedback condition (top row), the result only of the chosen symbol are 
shown, while in the complete-feedback condition (bottom row), both results would be shown. Outcomes were 
independent.  
Adapted from Bault et al. (in preparation)
Chapter 2  Timberlake  50symbols	were	randomly	assigned	for	each	participant.	Participants	completed	4	practice	trials,	one	for	each	condition,	but	using	symbols	not	employed	in	the	rest	of	the	experiment.		A	trial	started	with	a	Fixation	cross	(0.5	s),	followed	by	the	symbol	pairs.	A	participant	selected	the	symbol	by	pressing	the	corresponding	arrow	key	(self-paced).	A	red	arrow	indicated	the	selection	for	1	s.	A	feedback	screen	indicating	the	outcome	of	either	the	chosen	symbol	(partial	feedback)	or	both	symbols	(complete	feedback)	appeared	for	3	s.	In	reward	trials,	appearing	below	the	cue		were	either	a	50-cent	coin	with	the	label	“+0.5EUR”	or	a	gray	square	labeled	“0EUR”.	In	punishment	trials,	the	outcomes	were		indicated	with	either	a	gray	square	with	the	“0EUR”	label	or	a	50-cent	coin	with	an	“X”	across	it	and	the	label	“-0.5EUR”.		After	the	learning	section,	participants	took	a	post-learning	test	of	cue	values	in	which	the	eight	symbols	from	the	second	block	only	were	re-presented.	They	were	shown	in	unFixed	pairs,	each	symbol	appearing	4	times	with	every	other	symbol.	This	totaled	112	trials	for	28	possible	combinations.	For	each	pair,	participants	were	instructed	to	indicate	the	symbol	they	believed	had	the	higher	value,	based	on	outcomes	from	the	previous	section.	Instructions	were	presented	only	after	the	learning	section	was	complete,	so	as	not	to	prompt	attempts	to	memorize	values.	Participants	were	told	that	symbols	would	not	necessarily	appear	in	the	same	pairs	that	had	been	presented	in	the	previous	section.	Responses	were	self-paced,	and	no	feedback	was	presented.	There	was	no	Financial	incentive	in	this	part,	though	participants	were	encouraged	to	play	as	if	they	would	be	rewarded.		
Emotional	rating	analysis	After	each	trial	in	the	lottery	choice	task,	participants	rated	their	emotional	reaction	to	the	outcome.	Trials	were	categorized	as	partial-information	or	complete-information	feedback.	To	analyze	ratings,	we	employed	non-parametric	tests	because	we	anticipated	violation	of	parametric	assumptions.	We	estimated	the	signiFicance	of	differences	between	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  51behavioral	variables	and	emotional	ratings	using	the	Wilcoxon	signed	rank	test	(WSRT).	We	tested	differences	between	groups	using	the	Mann-Whitney	U	test.		We	further	analyzed	subjective	evaluations	with	mixed-effects	linear	regressions	by	age	group	and	by	trial	information,	which	allowed	us	to	estimate	both	random	and	conditional	Fixed	effects.	Only	random	effects	are	reported.	Parameters	were	estimated	by	generalized	least	squares.	All	regressions	were	run	using	the	statistical	software	package	Stata,	Stata	Corp.,	College	Station,	TX.	Other	analyses	were	performed	using	Matlab,	The	MathWorks,	Natick,	MA.		
Choice	behavior	analysis	The	choice	lottery	task	yields	a	range	of	information	to	analyze.	In	order	to	examine	how	components	of	lotteries	affected	choice,	we	considered	what	choice	told	us	about	an	individual’s	weighing	of	expected	value,	risk,	anticipated	disappointment	and	anticipated	regret.	We	further	examined	the	effect	these	factors	had	on	subsequent	choices.		The	aspects	considered	comprised	difference	in	expected	value	(dEV),	anticipated	regret	(r),	and	anticipated	disappointment	(d).	These	are	computed,	per	Camille	et	al.	(2004)	as:	   	  	  	We	also	considered	risk,	following	Bault,	JofFily	et	al.	(2011),	and	computing	it	as	the	difference	in	standard	deviation	(dSD):	
	   	
	 	 	 	   	
dEV = EV1 − EV2 = [px1 + (1 − p)y1] − [qx2 + (1 − q)y2]
r = |y2 − x1 | − |y1 − x2 |
d = [ |y2 − x2 | (1 − q)] − [ |y1 − x1 | (1 − p)]
dSD = SD1 − SD2 = p(x1 − EV1)2 + (1 − p)(y1 − EV1)2
− q(x2 − EV2)2 + (1 − q)(y2 − EV2)2
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Here,	x1,	y1	and	x2,	y2	are	the	two	possible	outcomes	(x,	y)	of	two	lotteries	(1,	2).	The	probability	of	the	First	outcome	is	p	or	q,	while	the	probability	of	the	second	outcome	is	1-p	or	1-q.		 A	positive	(negative)	dEV	coefFicient	indicates	that	participants	were	more	likely	to	choose	the	lottery	with	the	higher	(lower)	expected	value.	A	positive	(negative)	regret	(r)	coefFicient	indicates	that	participants	anticipated	(minimized)	regret	and	chose	the	lottery	with	the	lower	(higher)	anticipated	regret.	In	this	calculation,	participants	considered	what	would	happen	if	they	obtained	the	worst	outcome	in	the	chosen	wheel,	compared	to	the	better	outcome	in	the	unchosen	wheel.	Anticipated	disappointment	(d),	by	comparison,	involved	the	consideration	of	obtaining	the	lower	outcome	on	the	wheel	compared	to	higher	outcome	on	the	same	wheel.	Because	this	is	calculated	based	on	the	outcomes	of	a	single	wheel,	it	bears	some	relation	to	risk,	but	as	can	be	seen	from	the	formulae	above,	it	is	not	the	same	calculation.	The	absolute	value	of	the	difference	between	the	two	outcomes	is	weighted	by	the	probability	of	obtaining	the	lower	value,	correlating	with	the	notion	of	avoiding	more	probable	losses.	A	positive	(negative)	disappointment	(d)	coefFicient	indicates	that	participants	anticipated	(minimized)	higher	and	more	probable	losses	disappointment	and	chose	the	lottery	with	the	lower	(higher)	potential	disappointment.	We	analyzed	choice	behavior	with	multi-level	mixed	logit	regressions	with	participants	in	groups,	which	allowed	us	to	estimate	both	random	and	conditional	Fixed	effects.	Parameters	were	estimated	by	maximum	likelihood.		To	compare	the	emotional	impact	of	counterfactual	outcomes	to	standard,	we	took	the	mean	emotional	rating	of	each	subject	for	all	complete-feedback	trials	that	had	a	better	(upward-looking)	obtained-other	outcome	than	obtained-chosen	and	subtracted	the	mean	emotional	rating	for	all	partial	feedback	trials	with	a	negative	outcome.	This	regret-disappointment	factor	is	an	indication	of	the	relative	strength	of	the	counterfactual.	We	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  53further	described	the	counterfactual	by	performing	a	regression	of	emotional	rating	on	all	outcome	values	in	complete	trials.	The	contribution	of	the	obtained-unchosen	constitutes	a	counterfactual	coefFicient	for	each	subject.	We	then	categorized	all	subjects	into	either	“weak”	or	“strong”	counterfactual	coefFicients	at	the	median	point	(-0.3528,	range:	[-2.2013,	0.6419]).	Lower	amounts	indicated	that	greater	missed	opportunities	had	a	more	negative	emotional	effect,	so	the	lower	half	composed	the	strong	group.			
Learning	behavior	analysis	From	the	learning	task,	we	extracted	several	variables,	including	earnings	and	correct	choice	rate	as	dependent	variables.	A	“correct”	response	was	determined	to	be	either	the	more-rewarding	choice	or	the	less-punishing	choice.	We	looked	separately	at	earnings	in	complete-feedback	trials	and	partial-feedback	trials.	Because	earnings	may	vary	absolutely	on	an	individual	basis,	we	wanted	to	see	how	earnings	in	the	two	types	of	trials	compared.	To	obtain	an	individually	internal	comparison,	we	subtracted	each	participant’s	mean	earnings	in	partial-feedback	trials	from	the	man	of	earnings	in	complete-feedback	trials	to	arrive	at	a	regret-disappointment	differential	score	for	each	participant.	We	performed	statistical	analyses	on	these	variables	using	Mann-Whitney	U-tests,	Wilcoxon	Signed	Rank	Tests	and	groupings	by	counterfactual-coefFicient,	age	group	and	between	task	information	feedback	type.	
Learning	computational	models	Data	was	previously	analyzed	with	four	reinforcement	learning	models:	Q-learning,	counterfactual	learning,	normalized	Q-learning	and	normalized	counterfactual	learning	(Bault,	Palminteri	et	al.	2018).	In	the	normalized	model,	learning	is	considered	to	occur	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  54relative	to	the	average	value	of	context,	which	allows	learning	to	occur	from	zero-value	outcomes,	which	are	frequently	encountered	in	this	task	but	still	provide	information.	The	reinforcement	learning	models	operate	on	direct	experience	by	updating	values	only	for	chosen	options	based	on	outcome.	Counterfactual	models	update	both	the	chosen	option	and	the	unchosen,	when	counterfactual	information	was	available.		All	four	produced	a	softmax	parameter	that	indicates	how	selectively	an	individual	discriminated	between	the	two	options	and	a	standard	learning	rate	parameter.	The	two	counterfactual	models	also	generated	a	counterfactual	learning	rate	parameter.	The	two	contextual	models	also	generated	a	contextual	learning	rate	parameter.		
Results	
Emotional	ratings	As	in	previous	studies,	regret	in	this	task	is	characterized	in	two	ways:	by	an	effect	of	the	outcome	of	the	unchosen	lottery	on	the	emotional	evaluation,	and	by	a	stronger	inFluence	on	that	evaluation	of	the	unchosen	lottery	outcome	in	the	complete	feedback	condition	than	of	the	unobtained	outcome	of	the	chosen	lottery	in	the	partial	feedback	condition.	In	both	instances,	it	is	the	imagination	of	an	obtained	outcome	in	an	alternative	world	given	a	different	choice	that	drives	the	effect.		Emotional	ratings	across	all	trials	were	not	signiFicantly	different	between	older	and	younger	age	groups,	apart	from	trials	that	resulted	in	regret	(complete-information,	private	trials	with	a	worse	outcome	than	the	obtained	outcome	in	the	unchosen	lottery)	(Fig.	2-3).	Younger	adults	(YA)	reported	feeling	worse	than	older	adults	(OA)	(complete-private	trials,	Mann-Whitney,	Z=1.97	,	p=0.0484).	In	situations	of	large	upward	comparison	–	when	the	obtained	outcome	is	less	than	the	unobtained	–	OA	rated	emotions	higher,	indicating	that	in	some	contexts,	they	experienced	regret	less	than	YA	(Fig.	2-4).		
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Fig. 2-3. Subjective 
emotional ratings in 
l o t t e r y t a s k M e a n 
subjective emotional ratings 
(error bars: s.e.m.) by older 
adults and younger adults 
following partial feedback 
trials (“Disappointment” and 
“Satisfaction”) and complete 
feedback trials (“Regret” and 
“Relief”). 
Fig. 2-4. Emotional 
ratings comparison by 
unobtained outcome 
Mean   emotional ratings by 
older adults and younger 
adults for two obtained 
outcomes (–5 and +5) as 
functions of the unobtained 
outcome (blue line, +20; red 
line, +20) in partial and 
c o m p l e t e f e e d b a c k 
c o n d i t i o n s . I n p a r t i a l 
feedback, the unobtained 
outcome is the unobtained 
amount in the selected 
lottery; in complete feedback, 
it is the obtained amount on 
the unchosen lottery. 
Chapter 2  Timberlake  56For	all	participants,	emotional	reactions	were	signiFicantly	affected	by	both	the	amount	of	the	outcome	(Subjective	rating,	Obtained-chosen,	partial-feedback	trials,	Coeff.	1.392,	Z	=	41,	p	<	0.001)	and	the	amount	of	the	unobtained	result	of	the	chosen	wheel	(Subjective	rating,	Unobtained-chosen,	partial-feedback	trials,	Coeff.	-0.102,	Z	=	-3.17,	p	<	0.01)	in	partial-feedback	trials.	This	relationship	held	true	in	complete-feedback	trials	as	well,	with	similar	effects	of	both	the	amounts	of	the	obtained	outcome	(Subjective	rating,	Obtained-chosen,	Coeff.	1.345,	Z	=	53.78,	p	<	0.001)	and	unobtained-chosen	(Subjective	rating,	Unobtained-chosen,	Coeff.	-0.126,	Z	=	-5.12,	p	<	0.001).	However,	the	emotional	rating	of	the	obtained	outcome	was	modulated	to	a	greater	extent	by	the	obtained	outcome	of	the	un-chosen	lottery	(Subjective	rating,	Obtained-unchosen,	complete-feedback	trials,	Coeff.	-0.305,	Z	=	12.68,	p	<	0.001)	than	the	unobtained	outcome	of	the	chosen	lottery,	demonstrating	an	ampliFication	effect.	That	is,	the	result	of	the	lottery	that	was	not	chosen	had	a	greater	effect	on	the	emotional	rating	than	the	result	that	was	not	obtained	in	the	chosen	lottery.		Both	age	groups	gave	increasingly	negative	ratings	with	higher	obtained	amounts	in	the	un-chosen	lottery,	meaning	the	higher	the	amount	they	could	have	obtained	with	a	different	choice,	the	worse	they	felt.	But	the	effect	this	had	on	the	rating	was	signiFicantly	different	for	the	two	groups	(Table	2-1),	with	YA	having	a	greater	negative	reaction	to	higher	values	in	the	obtained	amount	on	the	un-chosen	lottery	than	OA	(Table	2-1).	Here,	the	negative	coefFicient	indicates	the	adverse	reaction	to	a	higher	value.	YA	had	a	stronger	negative	reaction	to	missed	opportunities,	i.e.	the	higher	value	in	the	un-chosen	lottery.	OA,	though	still	reporting	a	negative	emotion,	did	not	experience	it	as	much,	indicating	that	they	experienced	regret	to	a	lesser	extent	for	the	same	amount	of	a	missed	opportunity.	No	other	value	had	a	signiFicant	interaction	by	group.		In	YA,	emotional	reactions	to	upward	counterfactual	comparisons	(i.e.	relative	losses)	were	signiFicantly	stronger	in	the	complete-feedback	condition	than	in	the	partial-feedback	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  57condition	(WSRT,	Z=-3.77,	p<0.001).	The	same	comparison	was	not	signiFicantly	different	among	OA	(WSRT,	Z=-1.76,	p=0.079).	A	key	characteristic	of	regret	is	the	greater	affect	reported	in	upward-looking	complete-feedback	trials	compared	to	upward-looking	partial-feedback	trials.	The	individual-level	differences	between	ratings	in	upward-looking	complete-feedback	and	upward-looking	partial-feedback	was	stronger	for	YA	(all	trials,	Mann-Whitney,	Z=2.11	,	p=0.0345).	
Choice	behavior	We	tested	a	model	of	choice	that	comprised	as	choice	predictors	the	difference	in	expected	value	of	the	two	lotteries,	risk	and	anticipated	regret.	Mixed	logistic	regressions	
Table 2-1. Scale: Age group
Younger Older
Subjective ratings Coeff Std Error Z Coeff Std Error Z
obtained-chosen 1.413 0.048 29.49*** 1.364 0.050 27.21***
unobtained-chosen -0.067 0.046 -1.470 -0.118 0.050 -2.34*
obtained-other -0.457 0.045    -10.14*** -0.290 0.050 -5.8***
unobtained-other 0.068 0.049 1.370 0.042 0.052 0.800
Group 3.285 1.964 1.670
obtained-chosen X 
group -0.049 0.069 -0.700
unobtained-chosen X 
group -0.051 0.068 -0.750
obtained-other X group 0.167 0.067 2.48*
unobtained-other X 
group -0.026 0.072 -0.360
constant 2.337 1.358 1.720
complete-private feedback trials complete-private feedback trials
Wald Chi2 = 4088.89*** * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p< .001
Table 2-1. Scale: Effects of potential outcome amounts on emotional self-evaluation by age group. 
Mixed-effects linear regressions modeling the effect of lottery components on rating in older adults and 
younger adults. Both groups had stronger negative emotional ratings with higher amounts obtained in the 
unchosen wheel, that is, missed opportunities. Younger adults, however, had a significantly stronger negative 
reaction than older adults.
Chapter 2  Timberlake  58showed	that	while	both	groups	sought	higher	EV	when	choosing	which	lottery	to	play	(Table	
2-2),	YA	were	more	likely	to	do	so	(Table	2-2).	Expected	Value	is	the	variable	with	the	greatest	inFluence	on	choice,	and	higher	EV	has	a	greater	inFluence	on	the	choices	of	YA	than	on	OA.		YA	did	not	signiFicantly	account	for	risk	(Table	2-2),	but	OA	did,	avoiding	it	across	all	trial	types	(Table	2-2)	to	signiFicantly	greater	extent	(Table	2-2).	That	preference	is	driven	largely	by	complete-feedback	trials,	because	OA	consider	risk	to	a	signiFicantly	higher	extent	in	those	compared	to	partial	trials	(Table	2-4).	The	same	regression	for	partial-information	trials	was	not	signiFicant	in	either	OA	or	YA.	These	analyses	suggest	that	OA	are	more	risk	averse	and	less	considerate	of	expected	value	than	YA.	Because	the	variable	r	represents	anticipated	regret,	a	positive	coefFicient	indicates	an	attempt	to	avoid	regret	by	choosing	the	lottery	with	the	smaller	difference	between	worst	outcome	on	chosen	and	best	outcome	on	unchosen.	Both	YA	and	OA	minimize	regret	across	
Table 2-2. Choice: Effects of expected value, risk and regret on lottery choice by age group. Multi-
level mixed logit regression modeling the effect of lottery components on choice in older adults and 
younger adults. Both older and younger adults made choices at significant levels that favored expected 
value and minimized anticipated regret. Older adults significantly made choices that minimized risk, while 
younger adults did not.
Table 2-2. Choice: EV/risk/regret - Age Group
Younger Older
Choice Coeff Std Error Z Coeff Std Error Z
dev 0.155 0.012 12.86*** 0.069 0.012 5.76***
dsd 0.013 0.008 1.550 -0.037 0.008 -4.42***
r 0.015 0.003 4.77*** 0.025 0.003 7.57***
Group -0.011 0.064 -0.170
dev X group -0.086 0.017 -5.06***
dsd X group -0.050 0.012 -4.26***
r X group 0.010 0.005 2.21*
constant 0.051 0.044 1.150 0.040 0.045 0.900
partial, complete-private, complete-social trials partial, complete-private, complete-social trials
Wald Chi2 = 281.31*** Wald Chi2 = 111.67***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p< .001
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Table 2-3. Choice-younger: Effects of expected value, risk and regret on lottery choice by trial type 
in younger adults. Younger adults made choices at significant levels that favored expected value and 
minimized anticipated regret in both types of trials. They significantly minimized risk in complete feedback 
trials only.
Table 2-4. Choice-older: Effects of expected value, risk and regret on lottery choice by trial type in 
older adults. Older adults made choices at significant levels that favored expected value and minimized 
anticipated regret in both types of trials. They significantly minimized risk in complete feedback trials only.
Table 2-4. Choice: EV/risk/regret - Older Adults
Partial Complete
Choice Coeff Std Error Z Coeff Std Error Z
dev 0.081 0.027 2.98** 0.067 0.013 4.98***
dsd 0.015 0.019 0.760 -0.050 0.009 -5.31***
r 0.031 0.008 4.07*** 0.024 0.004 6.44***
Feedback 0.076 0.112 0.680
dev X feedback -0.013 0.030 -0.450
dsd X feedback -0.065 0.021 -3.01**
r X feedback -0.007 0.008 -0.840
constant -0.020 0.100 -0.200 0.056 0.051 1.110
complete-private, complete-social trials
Wald Chi2 = 119.40*** Wald Chi2 = 99.91***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p< .001
Table 2-3. Choice: EV/risk/regret - Younger Adults
Partial Complete
Choice Coeff Std Error Z Coeff Std Error Z
dev 0.121 0.026 4.60*** 0.165 0.014 12.08***
dsd 0.018 0.018 0.970 0.011 0.009 1.260
r 0.021 0.007 3.00** 0.013 0.003 3.83***
Feedback 0.064 0.108 0.600
dev X feedback 0.044 0.030 1.490
dsd X feedback -0.006 0.020 -0.300
r X feedback -0.008 0.008 -1.000
constant -0.000 0.097 0.000 0.064 0.049 1.320
complete-private, complete-social trials
Wald Chi2 = 174.00*** Wald Chi2 = 150.98***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p< .001
Chapter 2  Timberlake  60both	types	of	trials,	but	not	to	any	signiFicantly	different	extent	(Tables	2-3,	2-4).	Surprisingly,	a	trend	shows	that	higher	anticipated	regret	has	a	greater	inFluence	during	choice	in	partial-feedback	trials	for	both	age	groups.	Although	participants	would	be	aware	that	they	would	not	see	the	outcome	of	the	unchosen	lottery	in	partial-information	trials,	they	may	still	anticipate	regret	as	an	ordering	effect,	due	to	the	intermixing	of	trial	types	throughout	the	task.	Both	groups	anticipate	regret,	with	OA	doing	so	to	a	greater	extent	across	all	trials,	but	not	signiFicantly	so.	
Learning	behavior	We	compared	earnings	from	the	learning	task	by	age	group	in	complete-information	trials	and	found	that	YA	earned	signiFicantly	more	than	OA	in	complete-information	feedback	trials	in	the	learning	task	(Mann-Whitney,	Z=	-2.177,	p	=	0.0295)	(Fig.	2-5).	Both	age	groups	earned	signiFicantly	more	in	complete-information	trials	than	in	partial-information	trials	(YA,	WSRT,	Z	=	3.34,	p	<	.001)(OA,	WSRT,	Z	=	2.24,	p	=	.0249)	(Fig.	2-5).	Then	we	compared	earnings	differentials	between	types	of	trial.	For	each	subject,	we	subtracted	earnings	in	partial-feedback	trials	from	earnings	in	complete-feedback	trials.	There	was	no	signiFicant	difference	between	OA	and	YA	in	this	earnings	differential	in	the	learning	task	(Mann-Whitney,	Z	=	-0.82,	p	=	0.41)	(Fig.	2-6).	We	then	considered	two	types	of	player	measurements	from	the	lottery	task,	dividing	all	participants	according	to	a	median	counterfactual	coefFicient,	as	calculated	from	the	lottery	task.	We	compared	the	two	groups,	asking	if	either	one	earned	signiFicantly	more	than	the	other	in	complete-information	trials	(Fig.	2-7)	and	found	that	the	half	of	subjects	who	felt	worse	about	missed	opportunities	in	the	lottery	task	(stronger	counterfactual-coefFicient)	earned	signiFicantly	more	than	the	weaker	group	(Mann-Whitney,	Z	=	1.96,	p	=	0.0495).	We	then	asked	if	either	group	earned	more	in	complete-feedback	than	in	partial-feedback	trials	
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in	the	learning	task	(Fig.	2-7).	The	difference	between	earnings	in	feedback	types	was	not	signiFicant	in	the	weaker	counterfactual-coefFicient	group	(WSRT,	Z	=	1.69,	p	=	.0911.	The	stronger	counterfactual-coefFicient	group,	however,	earned	signiFicantly	more	in	complete-information	trials	compared	to	partial-information	trials	(WSRT,	Z	=	3.93,	p	<	.001).		Next	we	considered	the	complete-partial	earnings	differential,	as	we	did	age	groups.	Both	counterfactual-coefFicient	groups	on	average	earned	more	in	complete-feedback	trials	of	the	learning	task	compared	to	what	they	earned	in	partial-feedback	trials	(Fig.	2-8).	The	stronger	counterfactual-coefFicient	group,	however,	had	a	signiFicantly	higher	differential	than	that	of	the	weaker	counterfactual-coefFicient	group	(WRST,	Z	=	2.21,	p	=	0.027).	Their	earnings	differential	between	complete	and	partial	trials	were	higher	by	a	larger	margin	than	those	who	were	less	unhappy	about	the	counterfactual	outcome	in	the	lottery	task.	That	weaker	group	followed	the	same	trend	but	did	not	have	a	signiFicant	difference.	
Fig 2-5. Learning task: earnings by feedback and age group  Mean earnings (error bars are s.e.m.) of 
older adults and younger adults in complete feedback trials and partial feedback trials in an instrumental learning 
task. Circles represent individual mean earnings for the feedback type they overlay. 
Fig 2-6. Learning task: earnings differential by age group Mean earning differential (and s.e.m.), 
calculated as the amount earned in complete feedback trials, less the amount earned in partial feedback trials.
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Discussion	
Older	and	younger	adults	performed	a	lottery	choice	task,	followed	by	an	instrumental	probabilistic	learning	task.	In	both	tasks,	behavior	could	be	guided	by	measurable	factors,	such	as	risk,	expected	value,	anticipated	disappointment	and	anticipated	regret.	In	both	tasks	different	feedback	conFigurations	made	possible	decision	comparisons.	In	partial-information	trials,	subjects	saw	the	result	of	their	choice	only.	In	complete-information	trials,	they	saw	the	outcome	of	the	choice	they	decided	against,	introducing	elements	of	foregone	possibilities	and	responsibility,	therefore	enabling	counterfactual	thinking.	In	the	lottery	task,	we	aimed	to	gauge	individual	and	group	sensitivities	to	counterfactual	outcomes.	We	asked	if	comparing	these	measurements	to	learning	behavior	in	the	subsequent	task	would	reveal	differences	at	an	inter-individual	level,	thus	suggesting	implications	of	regret	sensitivity	on	emotion-related	
Fig. 2-7. Learning task: earnings by feedback and counterfactual-coefficient group  Mean 
earnings (and s.e.m.) of Stronger and Weaker counterfactual coefficient subjects in complete feedback trials and 
partial feedback trials in an instrumental learning task. Circles represent individual mean earnings for the feedback 
type they overlay. 
Fig. 2-8. Learning task: earnings differential by counterfactual-coefficient group Mean earning 
differential (and s.e.m.), calculated as the amount earned in complete feedback trials, less the amount earned in 
partial feedback trials.
Chapter 2  Timberlake  63counterfactual	thinking.	We	hypothesized	that	emotional	experience	and	effect	in	the	gambling	task	would	correlate	differently	with	counterfactual	learning	in	the	learning	task	both	at	an	individual	level.	We	categorized	subjects	by	these	measurements	to	gauge	how	choices	in	and	reactions	to	the	lottery	task	correlated	with	performance	in	the	learning	task.		Both	age	and	behavior	characterization	in	the	lottery	choice	task	yielded	signiFicant	effects	in	the	learning	task.	Subjective	emotional	ratings	in	the	lottery	choice	task	indicate	that	younger	adults	felt	worse	when	they	saw	the	better	results	of	a	lottery	they	did	not	choose.	This	negative	reaction	to	a	missed	opportunity	is	the	experience	of	regret.	The	affective	rating	of	older	adults	was	also	signiFicant,	but	not	as	high.	Despite	this	disparity	in	the	experience	of	regret,	we	found	that	both	age	groups	chose	to	minimize	regret	more	often	and	at	about	the	same	rate.	The	notable	differentiation	from	the	lottery	choice	task,	then,	was	that	while	older	adults	appear	to	be	less	disturbed	by	regret	situations,	they	continue	to	employ	anticipation	of	regret	as	an	avoidance	behavior.		In	the	learning	task,	participants	faced	situations	in	which	they	might	encounter	disappointment	and	other	situations	that	could	bring	regret.	It	is	in	these	complete-information	feedback	trials	that	we	would	expect	them	to	employ	anticipated	regret	as	a	learning	signal.	Indeed,	both	age	groups	demonstrated	greater	ability	via	higher	earnings	in	complete	feedback	trials	over	partial	feedback	trials.	Younger	adults	showed	greater	mean	earnings	in	complete	feedback	trials.	This	may	have	been	an	effect	of	higher	earnings	across	all	trials,	however,	since	the	differential	between	mean	earnings	in	complete	feedback	trials	versus	partial	feedback	trials	was	not	signiFicantly	different	between	the	two	groups.			To	gain	a	better	comprehension	of	how	performance	in	the	two	tasks	interacts,	we	considered	how	much	the	alternative	reality	of	the	outcome	on	the	unchosen	lottery	wheel	inFluenced	the	emotional	rating.	We	expected	this	counterfactual	coefFicient	to	indicate	a	strength	of	experience	of	regret.	Though	YA	and	OA	performed	differently	in	the	learning	task,	we	did	not	Find	a	signiFicant	difference	by	age	group	in	the	correlation	between	experience	of	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  64regret	and	use	of	counterfactual	learning.	We	did	Find,	however,	that	emotional	experience	correlated	with	counterfactual	learning	at	an	individual	level,	as	we	hypothesized.	We	found	that	the	individuals	who	felt	this	more	strongly	had	a	similarly	signiFicant	differentiation	between	earnings	in	complete	feedback	trials	in	the	learning	task	versus	partial	feedback	trials.	The	weaker-experience	group	did	not	have	a	signiFicant	differentiation,	indicating	that	the	lesser	experience	of	regret	may	lead	to	a	diminished	ability	to	employ	counterfactual	thinking	in	learning	tasks.	The	stronger	counterfactual	group	earned	more	than	the	weaker	group	in	complete	feedback	trials,	a	differentiation	conFirmed	by	a	signiFicantly	higher	complete-partial	differential	in	the	stronger	counterfactual	group	compared	to	the	weaker	group.	Individuals	who	felt	worse	about	regret,	according	to	their	ratings	during	the	lottery	task,	appeared	to	be	more	motivated	in	complete	feedback	trials	during	the	learning	task	at	a	higher	rate	than	those	who	were	less	affected	by	regret.	One	explanation	for	this	is	that	the	emotional	effect	that	was	strong	enough	to	signiFicantly	guide	choice	in	the	lottery	task	soon	after	continued	to	use	counterfactual	learning	to	greater	reward	by	avoiding	aversive	outcomes.		Aging	is	accompanied	by	reduced	preference	for	negative	stimuli	in	both	attention	and	in	memory.	This	well-established	positivity	effect	emerges	in	middle	and	late	adulthood.	Based	on	the	positivity	effect,	a	decreased	attention	to	negativity	should	lead	to	reduced	experience	of	regret	and	therefore	reduced	anticipation	and	avoidance	of	regret.	Yet	only	the	First	part	of	that	conjecture	bears	out,	raising	the	question	of	how	important	the	experience	of	regret	is	to	its	later	use	in	anticipation	for	avoidance.	We	suspected	that	the	positivity	effect	would	yield	reduced	learning	from	regret	situations	in	older	adults.	We	saw	some	evidence	of	that	in	the	lower	experience	of	regret	in	the	lottery	choice	task	among	older	adults,	as	well	as	some	indications	in	the	learning	task,	in	which	they	earned	less	than	younger	adults	in	situations	that	might	employ	regret	learning.	We	also	considered	that	the	emotional	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  65component	of	counterfactual	learning	might	stabilize	declines	in	performance	that	have	been	shown	to	otherwise	accompany	aging.		Brassen	and	colleagues	found	that,	following	outcomes	that	would	elicit	regret,	older	adults	showed	increased	activity	in	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex,	an	area	associated	with	emotional	regulation	(2012).	The	authors	propose	that	this	is	a	cognitive-control	mechanism	that	re-assesses	regretful	experience	as	less	negative.	They	also	suggest	that	healthy	older	adults	externalize	the	causes	of	regret	situations,	attributing	them	to	factors	they	could	not	control	and	removing	the	responsibility	that	is	a	key	component	of	regret.	This	is	consistent	with	the	positivity	effect,	which	states	that	minimizing	negative	experiences	in	older	adults	is	not	an	emotional	regulation	strategy,	but	rather	goal-oriented	cognitive	processing	(Carstensen	and	DeLiema	2018).	According	to	the	socioemotional	selectivity	theory,	this	is	consistent	with	aging,	since	it	is	accompanied	by	changing	goals	(due	to	diminishing	time	horizons)	that	trigger	increasing	occurrence	of	the	positivity	effect.	Brassen	and	colleagues	argue	that	the	positivity	effect	in	general	and	diminished	regret	experience	in	particular	are	adaptive	for	emotional	well-being	in	older	age.	Disengagement	from	regret	constitutes	a	special	case	of	the	positivity	effect.	In	addition	to	the	emotional	well-being	derived	from	avoiding	negative	emotions,	disregarding	regret	experience	is	protective	for	older	adults	because	they	have	reached	a	time	in	life	when	opportunities	to	undo	regretted	behavior	are	diminishing	to	the	point	of	vanishing	(Brassen,	Gamer	et	al.	2012).	Previous	studies	are	mixed	in	their	assessment	of	how	risk	preference	changes,	if	at	all,	with	age,	and	the	context	of	how	risk	can	inFluence	learning	and	earnings	seems	to	play	outsize	importance	in	how	it	changes.	Older	adults	in	this	study	accounted	for	risk	in	the	lottery	choice	task,	while	younger	adults	did	not,	suggesting	that	minimizing	risk	becomes	more	important	with	age	in	a	task	that	does	not	have	a	tendency	of	rewarding	or	punishing	risk	seeking.	Our	Findings	expand	on	those	shown	by	Tobia	and	colleagues	(Tobia,	Guo	et	al.	2016),	who	found	that	older	adults	were	more	responsive	to	counterfactual	gains.	We	found	
Chapter 2  Timberlake  66that	older	adults	are	conversely	less	responsive	to	missed	opportunities.	We	further	saw,	however,	that	this	does	not	give	rise	to	any	signiFicant	difference	in	choice	behavior.		These	results	suggest	differences	in	the	experience	and	anticipation	of	regret	in	decision	making	and	learning.	The	wheel	of	fortune	lottery	is	a	reliable	indicator	of	preference	for	risk,	anticipation	of	regret	and	importance	of	expected	value.	To	further	explore	the	relation	between	choice	behavior	and	counterfactual	learning,	the	lottery	task	could	be	paired	with	other	learning	tasks	that	can	employ	regret	learning.		Due	to	the	necessity	of	two	types	of	complete-information	feedback	trials	in	the	lottery	choice	task,	partial-information	feedback	trials	were	limited	to	just	one-quarter	of	all	the	complete	feedback	trials,	making	regression	comparisons	to	the	complete	feedback	trials	less	reliable.	A	future	study	could	increase	the	number	of	partial	feedback	trials.  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Experimental	questions	Can	the	experience	of	complete-information	counterfactual,	speciFically	regret,	in	one	task	modulate	learning	in	a	separate	task?	If	so,	does	the	transfer	encourage	more	sophisticated	learning	behavior?	
Introduction	
In	decision	making,	the	brain	compares	actual	outcomes	of	choices	to	other	possible	outcomes,	both	alternatives	from	the	choice	made	and	those	foregone	(Loomes	and	Sugden	1982).	This	counterfactual	information	from	imagined	alternative	realities	gives	rise	to	a	set	of	emotional	situations.	Alternative	choice	outcomes	are	not	always	known	to	us,	but	when	we	do	see	them,	and	the	comparison	between	those	and	actual	outcomes	correspond	to	the	emotions	that	we	label	regret	or	relief	(Zeelenberg,	van	Dijk	et	al.	1998).	These	are	distinct	from	the	emotions	we	call	disappointment	and	satisfaction,	which	are	still	counterfactual	emotions	but	result	in	the	comparison	to	alternative	outcomes	of	the	same	choice	due	to	nature.	A	signature	component	of	regret	is	agency:	it	requires	the	imagining	of	an	alternative	reality	that	could	have	been	realized	via	a	different	choice.	The	information	from	these	comparisons	can	guide	learning	within	a	task	(Zeelenberg,	Beattie	et	al.	1996).	But	in	the	framework	of	Transfer	Learning,	we	ask	if	this	mechanism	can	cross	over	from	one	decision	context	to	another:	If	learning	from	counterfactual	emotions	in	one	task	produces	a	different	state,	would	that	modulate	learning	in	a	different	task?	In	various	states,	people	may	be	better	or	worse	prepared	to	learn	rapidly	(Young	and	Nusslock	2016).	Several	learning	models	with	robust	reFlections	of	behavioral	and	brain	activity	suggest	that	learning	incorporates	not	only	choices	made	and	their	actual	outcomes,	but	also	paths	not	taken	and	imagined	rewards	or	punishments	from	some	alternative	reality	
Chapter 3  Timberlake  69(Zeelenberg,	Beattie	et	al.	1996,	Camerer	and	Ho	1998,	Zeelenberg,	van	Dijk	et	al.	1998,	Fudenberg	and	Levine	1999).	The	weight	given	to	these	alternative	realities	can	vary	from	session	to	session,	person	to	person,	and	even	trial	to	trial.	Certain	types	of	thinking	may	manifest	as	different	behavioral	strategies.	Counterfactual	thinking,	including	the	cognitively	enhanced	emotions	drive	learning	within	the	same	task	(Camille,	Coricelli	et	al.	2004).	Traditional	models	of	regret	are	based	on	adaptive	learning,	in	which	the	probability	of	making	a	choice	varies	depending	on	the	difference	between	actual	reward	and	the	rewards	that	option	would	have	yielded	if	it	had	been	chosen	in	the	past	(Foster	and	Vohra	1999,	Hart	and	Mas-Colell	2000,	Foster	and	Young	2003).		In	a	repeated	game,	a	player	who	recognizes	that	a	different	strategy	would	have	brought	higher	reward	if	she	had	made	a	different	choice	could	change	strategies	in	the	next	iteration	(Coricelli,	Dolan	et	al.	2007).	Moreover,	simulated	behavior	in	neural	networks	showed	that	incorporating	regret	into	choice	models	yielded	improved	performance	(Marchiori	and	Warglien	2008).	This	improvement	appears	not	to	be	a	phenomenon	purely	of	additive	information,	learning	actual	and	imagined	outcomes	of	a	single	game,	but	rather	the	trigger	for	a	particular	learning	mechanism.	Coricelli	and	colleagues	observed	BOLD	activity	that	led	them	to	suggest	this	integration	of	cognition	and	emotion	occurs	in	the	orbitofrontal	cortex	(OFC)	following	feedback	from	a	decision,	in	this	case	a	gambling	task	trial,	but	before	the	presentation	of	a	subsequent	choice.	The	supplemental	emotional	component	of	regret	raises	the	possibility	of	sustained	affect	that	may	transfer	into	an	unrelated	and	novel	task,	and	once	there,	potentially	accelerating	learning	as	it	has	been	seen	to	do	within	a	single	repeated	game.		After	experiencing	regret,	individuals	make	choices	to	avoid	the	negative	feeling,	often	in	violation	of	normative	behavior	(Ritov	1996).	The	emotional	motivation	of	avoiding	regret	can	modulate	choices	away	from	purely	rational	expected	utility.	In	an	ongoing,	adaptive	context,	it	constitutes	a	learning	behavior	(Zeelenberg,	Beattie	et	al.	1996).	Punishment	as	
Chapter 3  Timberlake  70effective	learning	signal	presents	a	paradox,	because	once	individuals	learn	to	avoid	it,	the	reinforcer	is	not	encountered.	Instead,	successful	avoidance,	which	is	intrinsically	neutral,	gains	a	positive	sign	by	way	of	the	counterfactual,	comparing	the	successful,	neutral	avoidance	to	another	possible	outcome	that	would	have	been	worse	(Kim,	Shimojo	et	al.	2006,	Palminteri,	Khamassi	et	al.	2015).	In	adaptive	learning	models,	the	regret	signal	modulates	the	tendency	to	make	a	given	choice	by	comparing	the	rewards	that	choice	would	have	brought	and	actual	rewards	(Megiddo	1980,	Foster	and	Vohra	1999,	Hart	and	Mas-Colell	2000,	Hart	2005).	In	regret	models	in	repeated	games,	the	probability	of	switching	to	another	choice	varies	depending	on	how	much	reward	that	choice	would	have	brought	if	it	had	been	chosen	throughout	the	game,	compared	to	actual	reward	(Hart	2005).	Players	that	minimize	regret	converge	on	optimal	solutions,	sometimes	more	quickly	or	with	fewer	loses	than	those	who	do	not	minimize	(Coricelli	and	Rustichini	2010).	Because	regret	carries	a	connotation	of	affective	inFluence,	some,	including	Lohrenz	and	colleagues	(2007),	differentiate	between	the	emotion	regret	as	described	by	Bell,	Loomes	and	Sudgen	(Bell	1982,	Loomes	and	Sugden	1982)	and	the	signal	the	later	study	observes	as	the	result	of	Fictive	Learning.	Though	both	terms	are	used	in	the	literature,	here,	we	use	regret	to	describe	this	effect.	Measures	of	primate	dopaminergic	neurons	examined	the	temporal	difference	(TD)	model	in	situations	that	correspond	to	disappointment	(e.g.	a	conditioned	stimulus	not	followed	by	an	expected	reward)	(Dayan	1994,	Schultz,	Dayan	et	al.	1997,	Schultz,	Tremblay	et	al.	1998,	Schultz	2002)	and	showed	that	dopamine	neurons	react	not	to	reward	itself	but	to	reward	prediction	error,	the	difference	between	expected	reward	and	received	(Schultz	et	al.	1997).	Counterfactual	outcomes	appear	to	register	in	single	neurons	in	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	(ACC)	(Hayden,	Pearson	et	al.	2009).	In	the	task,	monkeys	selected	one	of	eight	screen	positions	in	an	effort	to	get	a	single	highest	juice	reward.	Single	neurons	showed	higher	activity	when	the	best	option	was	chosen,	varying	depending	on	the	magnitude	of	that	option	in	a	given	trial.	Yet	even	when	the	monkey	failed	to	choose	the	best	option	but	saw	the	
Chapter 3  Timberlake  71magnitude	of	that	missed	reward,	the	ACC	neuron	(and	local	population)	encoded	it	at	the	same	magnitude	relative	to	best-option	amounts	in	other	trials.	More	recent	work	in	humans	showed	that	a	model	combining	prediction	error	and	counterfactual	learning	better	predicted	striatal	dopaminergic	activity	(Kishida,	Saez	et	al.	2016).	This	work	suggests	a	more	elaborate	and	complex	role	for	dopamine,	encoding	not	only	rewards	and	losses,	but	also	the	results	of	computations	comparing	actual	outcomes	to	alternative,	imagined	realities	(Platt	and	Pearson	2016).	Hsu	&	Zhu	(2012)	compared	neuronal	manifestation	of	two	models	of	regret-related	learning	in	a	competitive	game,	Finding	broader	evidence	for	a	belief-based	Fictitious	Play	model.		One	RPE	signal	corresponded	to	the	difference	between	the	received	reward	and	the	highest	possible,	as	with	the	monkeys,	which	does	not	take	into	account	the	actions	of	the	opponent.	This	signal	correlated	with	activity	only	in	the	bilateral	putamen.	The	Fictitious	play-based	signal	by	contrast	considered	the	difference	between	actual	reward	and	an	expected	reward	that	is	based	on	the	frequency	of	the	opponent’s	previous	choices.	This	signal	correlated	with	activity	in	the	bilateral	putamen	and	in	an	area	comprising	the	mPFC,	the	OFC	and	the	ACC.		
Experience-Weighted	Attraction	model	Previous	research	has	described	learning	by	comparing	players'	choice	strategies	to	these	various	learning	models.	Reinforcement	learning	(RL)	models	best	describe	players	who	value	strategies	that	have	paid	off	in	the	past.	Because	reinforcement	learners	pay	the	most	attention	to	their	own	choice	history,	their	behavior	is	often	marked	by	sequentially	dependent	choices	–	that	is,	choices	that	have	led	to	positive	outcomes	are	most	likely	to	be	made	again.	Though	RL	has	some	clear	shortcomings	because	it	does	not	incorporate	all	available	information,	it	does	describe	well	behavior	in	a	number	of	mixed-strategy	games	
Chapter 3  Timberlake  72(Roth	and	Erev	1995).	Belief-Based	learning	(BBL)	models,	by	contrast,	reFlect	the	choices	of	players	who	take	into	account	their	opponent's	decisions.	In	BBL,	the	outcomes	of	decisions	not	made	are	incorporated,	taking	into	consideration	beliefs	about	the	actions	of	another	player,	allowing	subsequent	choices	that	have	not	been	rewarding	before	or	may	not	even	have	been	made	previously.		Players	seem	to	incorporate	some	combination	of	these	types	of	play,	even	varying	the	amount	within	a	series	of	choices	(Ansari,	Montoya	et	al.	2012).	To	capture	the	relative	use	of	each	type	of	learning,	Camerer	and	Ho	developed	the	hybrid	Experience-Weighted	Attraction	(EWA)	model,	which	nests	both	Reinforcement	and	Belief-Based	learning	models.	Behavior	that	reFlects	either	of	these	models	is	accounted	for	in	EWA,	and	EWA’s	key	beneFit	is	its	production	of	parameter	∂	that	indicates	the	relative	weight	of	action	values.	In	RL,	the	most	recently	rewarding	decisions	are	most	valuable	and	attractive	and	therefore	continue	to	be	chosen.	The	BBL	model	nested	in	EWA	is	itself	a	nested	model	of	several	belief	models,	including	Fictitious	play	(Fudenberg	and	Levine	1998),	which	incorporates	all	past	actions.	But	unlike	BBL,	Fictitious	play	applies	no	temporal	decay.	In	an	update	rule	for	the	attraction	to	strategy	k,	the	decay	of	the	strength	of	past	attractions	is	the	weighted	parameter	Φ,	as	in			
where	  	is	the	attraction	of	strategy	k	to	individual	i	after	time	period	t	and	 represents	updated	game	experience	(Ansari,	Montoya	et	al.	2012).	The	parameter	Φ	indicates	the	level	of	Fictitious	play	(Φ	=	1)	versus	single-period	Cournot	belief	learning	(Φ	=	0),	and	π	is	the	payoff	function.		
ABik(t) Ni(t)
ABik(t) =
ϕiABik(t − 1)Ni(t − 1) + πi(ski , si(t))
ϕiNi(t − 1) + 1
Chapter 3  Timberlake  73When	behavioral	data	reFlects	more	sequentially	dependent	play,	EWA-modeled	behavior	indicates	RL,	whereas	when	data	indicates	deletion	of	dominated	strategies,	the	model	should	yield	BBL.	The	tendency	toward	one	strategy	or	the	other	derives	from	a	weighted	combination	of	the	actual	payoff	and	those	foregone,	as	well	as	an	average	of	all	past	attractions	–	rather	than	a	sum	of	those	prior	measures	(Rapoport	and	Amaldoss	2000).	The	EWA	dynamically	combines	the	apparent	best	parts	of	RL	(reinforced	chosen	strategies)	and	BBL	(consideration	of	unchosen	strategies	by	all	players).	It	is	a	Flexible	model	because	the	extent	to	which	it	incorporates	these	two	components	varies.	And	numerous	studies	have	shown	that	hybrid	models	like	EWA	better	predict	behavioral	data	than	models	that	employ	just	one	type	of	learning	(Camerer	and	Ho	1998).	This	comes	out	even	despite	penalties	for	the	higher	number	of	parameters	in	many	versions	of	EWA.	Further,	Zhu	and	colleagues	(2012)	found	that	BBL	and	RL	models	performed	about	equally	well,	but	still	not	as	well	as	EWA.		 The	constituents	of	RL	and	BBL	are	evident	in	the	EWA	update	rule	for	strategy	k	of	player	i:		
(Zhu,	Mathewson	et	al.	2012).	The	Φ	parameter	discounts	previous	attractions,	and	N(t)	represents	the	decay	of	past	experience.	The	∂	indicates	how	much	weight	is	given	to	strategies	not	taken.	Giving	them	full	weight	(∂=1)	would	reFlect	fully	belief-based	learning,	while	∂=0	indicates	no	consideration	of	foregone	choices,	and	therefore	reinforcement	learning.	The	∂	parameter	then	provides	a	clear	and	continuous	measure	of	a	player's	relative	use	of	RL	and	BBL.	Parameter	I	makes	the	switch	between	the	weight	of	chosen	strategy	(1)	
Vki (t) =
ϕ ⋅ N(t − 1) ⋅ Vki (t − 1) + πi(ski , s−i(t))
N(t) , if ski = si(t)
ϕ ⋅ N(t − 1) ⋅ Vki (t − 1) + δi ⋅ πi(ski , s−i(t))
N(t) , if ski ≠ si(t)
Chapter 3  Timberlake  74and	foregone	strategy	weight	(between	0	and	1).	N(t)	is	estimated	initially	and	then	is	updated	each	period,	according	to	the	decay	represented	by	ρ.	The	previous	expected	reward	of	a	given	strategy	is	depreciated	by	φ,	a	conception	of	the	opponent's	adaptation	speed,	and	a	discount	rate	for	past	experience.	It	is	then	increased	by	the	reward	for	that	strategy,	given	the	opponent's	actual	choice	in	the	previous	period,	and	that	is	divided	by	all	past	experience	to	arrive	at	the	new	value	of	the	strategy	in	question.	A	small	φ	means	that	the	player	believes	her	opponent	adapts	quickly,	so	previous	values	are	depreciated	more	quickly.	A	large	ρ,	which	updates	the	past-experience	discount,	indicates	a	rapid	decline	of	prior	beliefs.		The	hybrid	model	reduces	to	RL	when	parameters	∂	and	ρ	are	0	and	initial	experience	N=1.	The	model	is	pure	BBL	when	∂=1	and	φ=ρ.	So	the	update	to	a	value	of	an	action	is	given	full	weight	when	it	was	the	one	chosen	–	exactly	as	it	would	be	in	RL.	But	in	BBL,	the	value	is	weighted	by	the	beliefs	the	player	has	about	the	future	actions	of	other	players	(Zhu,	Mathewson	et	al.	2012).	So	∂	can	be	seen	to	describe	the	player's	tendency	toward	either	RL	or	BBL.		
The	Patent	Race	The	patent	race	game	provides	a	framework	in	which	to	observe	iterative	thinking	in	limited	strategy	space.	In	this	asymmetric	conFiguration,	two	players	compete	for	a	prize	in	one	of	two	asymmetric	roles:	one	with	an	endowment	of	Five	cards	(strong	role);	the	other,	four	(weak).	In	each	round,	the	endowment	is	renewed,	and	each	player	must	invest	from	0	to	the	full	amount	of	the	endowment.	The	player	who	invests	strictly	more	wins	a	prize	of	10	cards.	Any	endowment	cards	that	the	player	does	not	invest	go	into	her	winnings	but	do	not	carry	over	into	the	next	round’s	endowment.	In	case	of	a	tie,	neither	player	wins	the	reward	but	retains	that	portion	of	the	endowment	not	invested.	
Chapter 3  Timberlake  75To	understand	and	predict	the	opponent’s	choices,	players	beneFit	by	examining	the	structure	of	the	game	from	the	beginning,	including	its	asymmetrical	aspect.	To	wit,	the	strong	player	might	realize	that	she	can	win	the	prize	every	time	by	always	investing	the	full	endowment.	She	would	lose	the	entire	Five-card	endowment	but	win	the	prize.	The	weak	player	might	invest	some	or	all	of	his	endowment	several	times,	losing	the	entire	endowment	and	never	winning	the	prize,	before	realizing	the	futility,	then	reducing	his	investment	to	zero	so	as	to	retain	the	entire	endowment	in	his	earnings.	Seeing	this,	the	strong	player	might	realize	that	she	does	not	have	to	invest	her	entire	amount	in	order	to	win,	leading	her	to	increase	earnings	by	occasionally	investing	less	than	the	full	amount.	This	then	provides	openings	to	the	weak	player	to	predict	when	the	strong	player	will	play	less	than	the	full	amount	and	to	invest	more	in	order	to	win	the	prize,	even	with	a	smaller	endowment.		The	strong	(weak)	player	can	employ	six	(Five)	strategies:	one	for	each	possible	investment	choice.	“Strategy”	in	this	case	refers	simply	to	the	choice	of	how	many	cards	to	invest	in	each	round.	Players	with	more	iterative	strategic	thinking	may	realize	that	some	strategies	almost	never	make	sense	in	a	given	role.	These	so-called	iteratively	dominated	strategies	derive	from	a	knowledge	of	the	structure	of	the	game.	The	strong	player	may	not	need	to	invest	her	entire	amount,	but	it	would	never	make	sense	for	her	to	invest	0,	thus	guaranteeing	a	payment	of	5,	since	she	can	guarantee	a	payment	of	10	simply	investing	the	full	amount.	So	0	is	a	dominated	strategy.		A	high-level	reasoner	will	consider	whether	or	not	his	opponent	understands	the	structure	of	the	game.	To	that	end,	he	would	observe	that	it	never	makes	sense	for	the	strong	player	to	play	0	cards.	If	the	weak	player	realizes	this,	he	would	see	that	it	would	never	make	sense	for	him	to	invest	1,	since	it	would	never	beat	any	strategy	played	by	the	strong	player.	If	the	strong	player	believes	that	the	weak	player	understands	the	structure	well	enough	to	reach	this	level,	she	may	conclude	that	it	never	makes	sense	for	her	to	invest	2	cards.	It	might	result	in	a	win,	as	well	as	some	retained	endowment.	But	if	the	weak	player	is	unlikely	to	play	
Chapter 3  Timberlake  761,	she	loses	an	additional	card	of	earnings	by	investing	two	rather	than	1.	This	continues	with	iteratively	eliminated	dominated	strategies	for	the	weak	player	comprising	1	and	3,	and	for	the	strong	player,	0,	2	and	4.	In	this	way,	the	iteratively	eliminated	dominated	strategies	of	the	strong	(weak)	player	are	0,	2	and	4	(1	and	3).		A	player	more	reliant	on	reinforcement	learning	would	be	slower	to	adapt	to	the	opponent’s	behavior,	continuing	for	more	rounds	to	make	the	choices	that	brought	higher	reward	more	recently.	The	inFluence	of	either	some	belief-based	learning	or	a	tendency	to	explore	new	options	may	eventually	induce	the	player	to	try	a	different	strategy.			However,	if	the	player	observes	or	assumes	that	his	opponent	does	not	understand	the	structure	of	the	game	–	i.e.	these	dominated	strategies	–	he	may	well	choose	the	dominated	strategies	of	his	role.	Rapoport	and	Amaldoss	found	that	iteratively	eliminated	dominated	strategies	were	played	more	often	than	probability	prediction,	yet	that	those	higher	in	the	hierarchy	of	deletion	(i.e.	those	for	which	the	thought	process	takes	longer	to	get	to:	2	and	4	for	the	strong	player,	3	for	the	weak)	were	played	less	frequently	than	lower-level	dominated	strategies	(2000).		The	patent	race	is	particularly	well	suited	to	EWA	measurements	because	the	asymmetrical	endowments	generate	the	different	secure	strategies	of	0	or	5	investment	for	weak	and	strong	players.	These	investments	act	as	a	sort	of	"safety	net,"	since	they	yield	the	same	payoff,	regardless	of	the	opponent's	choice.	When	played	as	a	n	asymmetric	mixed-strategy	game,	the	patent	race	is	shown	to	employ	both	RL	and	BBL	(Camerer	and	Ho	1998,	Rapoport	and	Amaldoss	2000).	Yet	it	is	possible	that	EWA	could	measure	a	mixed	pool	of	purely	RL	players	and	purely	BBL	players.	To	ensure	that	the	two	learning	methods	are	both	present	at	various	strengths	in	individuals	in	one	population,	the	BBL	parameter	should	be	distributed	along	an	interval,	rather	than	clustered	at	either	end,	which	by	contrast	would	indicate	two	distinct	populations	(Zhu,	Mathewson	et	al.	2012).	Hsu	and	Zhu	characterize	the	combination	of	learning	types	not	as	a	true	hybrid,	rather	as	that	of	two	systems	in	conFlict	
Chapter 3  Timberlake  77(2012).	Indeed,	over	the	course	of	the	task,	the	model	mix	may	change	in	the	same	individual,	employing	at	First	more	BBL	and,	as	rhythms	of	the	game	and	habits	of	the	opponent	become	clear,	relying	more	on	the	cognitively	less-demanding	RL	(Ansari,	Montoya	et	al.	2012).	
Priming	task:	Wheel	of	Fortune	The	Wheel	of	Fortune	gambling	task	adapted	by	Camille	and	colleagues		(2004)	from	an	earlier	task	(Mellers,	Schwartz	et	al.	1999)	can	elicit	with	little	manipulation	emotions	borne	of	either	responsibility	or	nature,	that	is,	disappointment	or	regret.	The	only	change	is	one	of	presenting	alternative	results,	so	participants	primed	with	either	type	of	emotion	undergo	largely	the	same	task.	The	emotion	an	individual	feels	depends	on	both	the	obtained	outcome	and	one	of	the	unobtained	outcomes.	Even	if	the	obtained	outcome	is	positive,	the	prevailing	emotion	can	be	negative	if	an	individual	sees	that	the	unobtained	outcome	was	better	(Camille,	Coricelli	et	al.	2004).	Subjects	who	obtained	an	outcome	of	-50	reported	emotional	ratings	of	-20	when	the	other,	unobtained	possibility	on	the	wheel	was	200	(Fig.	3-1).	Yet	when	subjects	who	obtained	-50	saw	that	the	unobtained	option	on	the	wheel	was		-200,	they	reported	net	positive	emotional	ratings.	A	similar	shift	was	evident	in	subjects	who	won	50,	in	cases	in	which	the	unobtained	result	was	200	the	emotion	was	slightly	positive	versus	highly	positive	when	the	unobtained	 Fig. 3-1 Effect of unobtained outcome on emotional rating of obtained outcome in healthy subjects following (A) partial-information feedback and (B) complete-information feedback. Image adapted from Camille, 
Coricelli et al. 2004. 
Chapter 3  Timberlake  78result	was	-200.	In	complete	feedback,	the	result	on	the	unchosen	wheel	overwhelmed	the	effect	of	the	unobtained	result	on	the	chosen	wheel.	The	disparity	in	emotional	ratings	for	the	same	obtained	amount	follows	the	same	pattern	for	the	result	on	the	unchosen	wheel	as	for	the	unobtained	amount	in	the	partial	feedback	condition.	In	fact	the	modulating	effect	of	the	unobtained	outcome	on	the	unchosen	wheel	is	so	strong	that	in	complete-information	feedback	conditions,	the	relief	at	obtaining	a	smaller	loss	(obtaining	-50	on	the	chosen	wheel	instead	of	-200	obtained	on	the	foregone	wheel)	produces	a	higher	mean	emotional	rating	than	50	obtained	on	the	chosen	wheel	in	light	of	an	unobtained	200	result	on	the	unchosen	wheel.	Notably,	the	effect	of	regret	is	more	pronounced	than	that	of	disappointment,	even	with	the	magnitudes	of	obtained	and	foregone	held	constant.	Patients	with	lesions	in	the	orbitofrontal	cortex	exhibit	the	same	pattern	of	emotional	shift	depending	on	foregone	outcome	in	partial-information	feedback	conditions.	The	shift	disappears,	however,	in	the	complete	feedback	condition.	Both	negative	emotions	at	losing	and	positive	emotions	with	wins	are	constant,	whether	the	foregone	wheel’s	outcome	was	better	or	worse.		
Mood	priming	Moods,	sustained	affective	states,	have	been	likened	to	a	climate	with	gradual	changes,	as	contrasted	to	the	more	sudden	and	brief	occurrences	of	emotions,	which	are	comparable	to	daily	weather	events	(Rottenberg	and	Gross	2007,	Kohn,	Falkenberg	et	al.	2014).	Immediate	emotional	actions	are	modulated	by	external	events:	improved	by	reward	and	worsened	by	loss.	They	are	similarly	improved	by	downward	counterfactuals	(in	which	the	outcome	is	better	than	the	alternative)	and	worsened	by	upward	counterfactuals	(seeing	that	what	was	foregone	was	worse	than	what	was	obtained)	(Markman,	Gavanski	et	al.	1993,	Roese	1994,	Sanna	and	Turley	1996,	Sanna	1997).	The	sustained	nature	of	mood,	however,	allows	the	
Chapter 3  Timberlake  79effect	to	run	the	other	direction,	forming	a	potential	positive	feedback	loop	between	mood,	emotion	and	reward.	Indeed,	mood	and	mental	simulation	are	so	related	that	they	are	both	cause	and	consequence	of	each	other	(Sanna	1998).	Mood	can	change,	affecting	the	valuation	of	choices	(Tamir	and	Robinson	2007).	The	outcome	of	a	wheel	of	fortune	(WoF)	game	changed	participants’	moods,	then	inFluenced	their	feelings	during	an	immediately	subsequent	task	(Eldar	and	Niv	2015).	Participants	chose	between	pairs	of	marked	slot	machines	with	different	but	stable	probabilities	of	a	reward	with	the	goal	of	maximizing	reward.	They	then	participated	in	a	Wheel	of	Fortune,	an	unrelated	task	with	no	choice	but	with	a	relatively	large	payout,	and	those	who	won	reported	being	in	a	better	mood.	Afterward,	they	played	the	slot	machine	task	again	with	different	sets	of	differentiating	markings	but	with	(unbeknownst	to	them)	similar	probabilities.	After	the	slot	machine	learning	tasks,	participants	assigned	values	to	all	the	slot	machines	they	had	seen.	People	who	won	the	wheel	of	fortune	assigned	higher	values	to	slot	machines	they	encountered	after	the	WoF	game	of	chance,	even	though	their	values	were	similar	to	those	encountered	before	the	WoF.	Participants	had	no	inFluence	over	the	game	of	chance,	yet	the	outcome	reliably	predicted	whether	they	were	happier	with	the	slot	machines	in	the	later	task.	 At	the	neuronal	level,	positive	mood	induction	is	accompanied	by	cortico-striatal	activity	during	reward	anticipation	versus	loss	anticipation,	as	compared	to	differences	with	neutral	mood	induction	(Young	and	Nusslock	2016).	Critically	for	regret	learning,	positive	mood	induction	brought	greater	activity	in	the	vmPFC	during	anticipation	of	reward	versus	anticipation	of	loss.	Notably,	those	differences	are	not	evident	in	any	of	the	areas	during	the	outcome	phases	of	win	or	loss.	These	measurements	suggest	that	people	who	are	already	feeling	good	assign	more	importance	to	positive	outcomes,	effectively	enhancing	them.	It	further	suggests	that	positive	feelings	may	constitute	some	insulation	against	the	negative	feelings	required	of	regret	learning.	The	obverse	raises	the	possibility	that	the	presence	of	
Chapter 3  Timberlake  80negative	feelings	could	make	a	person	particularly	susceptible	to	learning	via	anticipation	of	regret.	However,	it	is	possible	that	instating	a	negative	mood	may	bring	subsequent	losses	into	lower	relief,	which	is	consistent	with	prospect	theory	(Kahneman	and	Tversky	1979).	That	is,	if	a	player	is	already	feeling	badly,	she	will	not	be	“brought	down”	by	subsequent	smaller	losses.	How	that	high-pass	Filter	might	bear	on	regret	anticipation	has	not	been	explored.		
Hypotheses	As	demonstrated	in	previous	studies,	the	experience	of	regret	and	the	subsequent	anticipation	and	avoidance	of	regret	is	a	form	of	learning	(Zeelenberg,	Beattie	et	al.	1996,	Foster	and	Vohra	1999,	Hart	and	Mas-Colell	2000,	Camille,	Coricelli	et	al.	2004).	In	repeated	interactions,	this	adaptive	behavior	leads	to	more	rewarding	outcomes	(Coricelli,	Dolan	et	al.	2007,	Marchiori	and	Warglien	2008),	as	well	as	more	rapid	arrival	at	equilibrium	(Coricelli	and	Rustichini	2010).	As	described	by	the	EWA	model,	people	may	employ	either	RL	or	BBL	to	differing	extents	while	playing	an	asymmetric	repeated	strategy	game	(Camerer	and	Ho	1998,	Rapoport	and	Amaldoss	2000,	Young	and	Nusslock	2016).	The	precise	ratio	of	RL	to	BBL	even	appears	to	vary	throughout	a	task	(Ansari,	Montoya	et	al.	2012).	Yet	to	this	point,	the	cause	of	these	varieties	have	not	been	characterized.		Why	do	people	use	RL	and	BBL	to	varying	extents	instead	of	at	the	same	rates?	Why	do	some	people	employ	BBL	more	than	others?	One	possibility	for	the	variation	between	people	is	their	state	at	initialization,	that	is,	the	disposition	of	the	player	at	the	start	of	the	game.	Whereas	one	person	might	come	to	a	task	more	naively	and	consider	implications	of	structure	as	he	goes	along,	another	might	be	prepared	from	the	outset	to	consider	the	entire	framework	of	the	task.	We	hypothesized	that	players	already	in	the	midst	of	a	counterfactual	consideration	would	be	more	inclined	to	continue	similar	consideration.	Such	a	player	would	more	quickly	come	to	understand	the	structure	of	the	game,	and	her	choices	would	indicate	
Chapter 3  Timberlake  81greater	employment	of	BBL.	To	test	this,	we	would	have	all	subjects	play	a	strategy	game	that	would	measure	their	learning	mix,	with	one	more	indicative	of	behavior	arising	from	counterfactual	learning.	We	would	segregate	them	into	groups,	priming	them	with	different	counterfactual	outcomes	in	an	unrelated	choice	task	(or	not	prime	them	at	all).	We	randomly	assigned	various	players	to	one	of	these	Five	pre-game	conditions.	Our	greatest	interest	was	in	the	highly	salient	negative	counterfactual	regret	condition,	but	we	employed	two	active	controls	(one	each	for	valence	and	feedback)	and	one	passive	control	(no	priming).	If	the	player	had	already	experienced	a	regret	situation	with	large	consequences,	we	hypothesized	that	it	would	ready	her	learning	processes	in	such	a	condition	as	to	make	different	choice	patterns	during	a	new	task.	That	is,	having	already	engaged	in	consideration	of	the	better	alternatives	to	her	choices,	this	learning	would	transfer	to	a	greater	preparation	to	anticipate	and	avoid	regret	in	an	unrelated	situation.		Regret	is	common	in	the	patent	race	because	the	game	incorporates	elements	of	regret	in	any	round	that	does	not	include	a	perfect	win.	In	most	conFigurations	of	choice	that	end	in	a	loss,	the	player	could	either	have	made	a	different	choice	to	avoid	the	loss	or	could	have	made	a	different	choice	to	attenuate	the	loss	(i.e.	maintain	more	of	the	endowment).	Likewise,	in	most	strategy	conFigurations	that	result	in	a	win,	the	player	could	have	made	a	different	choice	to	optimize	the	win,	earning	more.	Any	of	these	non-optimal	outcomes	results	in	regret:	the	recognition	that	a	different	choice	would	have	yielded	a	better	outcome.	This	regret	signal,	its	anticipation	and	likely	avoidance	give	rise	to	learning	and	better	understanding	the	opponent's	play.	Such	increased	utilization	of	the	regret	signal	and	more	sophisticated	understanding	should	generate	a	greater	incorporation	of	belief-based	learning	in	the	hybrid	model	of	choice	behavior.		
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Methods	
We	designed	an	experiment	incorporating	a	well-documented	and	researched	Wheel	of	Fortune	(WoF)	lottery	task	(Mellers,	Schwartz	et	al.	1999,	Camille,	Coricelli	et	al.	2004),	along	with	a	simple	competitive	strategy	game.	Subjects	First	play	the	wheel	of	fortune	lottery	task	and	receive	either	partial	feedback	or	complete	feedback	(Fig.	3-2).	The	result	primes	them	in	different	ways:	either	with	counterfactual	emotions	(regret/relief	in	complete	feedback)	or	with	non-counterfactual	emotions	(disappointment/satisfaction	in	the	case	of	partial	feedback).	They	then	immediately	play	the	competitive	strategy	card	game	called	the	patent	race.	The	opponent	is	a	learning	computer	algorithm	that	responds	to	the	subject's	gameplay.		
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Fig. 3-2 In the Wheel of Fortune (WoF) priming task, participants choose one of two wheels presented to 
determine their win or loss. Subjects selected for complete feedback see the arrow spin both on the wheel they 
selected and on the one they did not, even though it has no bearing on the amount they win or lose. In partial 
feedback, subjects see the arrow spin only on the wheel they chose; they are not informed of the result of the wheel 
that they did not choose.  
Chapter 3  Timberlake  83The	Wheel	of	Fortune	task	presents	two	wheels,	each	divided	into	two	results	sectors	(red	and	green)	indicating	the	probability	of	that	result.	Results	are	matched	to	value	pairs,	in	this	case	one	positive,	one	negative	and	presented	in	the	same	color	as	the	corresponding	portion	of	the	wheel.	Participants	completed	10	practice	trials	with	values	less	than	1	and	no	currency	symbol.	They	were	told	these	outcomes	would	not	affect	their	score.	When	directed,	they	proceeded	to	the	main	lottery	task,	where	they	were	directed,	as	before	to	use	arrow	keys	to	select	which	wheel	they	wished	to	play.		All	participants	saw	the	same	set	of	wheels:	+€8/-€16	at	probabilities	of	.66	and	.33,	and	+€18/-€6	at	probabilities	.25/.75.	Amounts	and	probabilities	were	set	to	have	equal	expected	outcome	of	0.	The	potential	regret	error	differs	between	the	two,	making	the	choice	an	indicator	of	either	regret	tolerance	(in	complete	feedback)	or	risk	tolerance	(in	partial	feedback).	In	partial	feedback	sessions,	the	arrow	inside	the	unselected	wheel	disappeared,	while	the	arrow	inside	the	selected	wheel	began	to	spin,	indicating	the	outcome	where	it	stopped.	Outcomes	were	predetermined	by	seating	position.	The	number	of	participants	who	won	or	lost	corresponded	to	the	presented	probabilities.	In	complete-information	feedback	sessions,	the	arrow	on	the	opposing	wheel	was	set	to	land	in	the	area	of	opposite	valence	to	that	of	the	obtained	outcome.			Participants	played	the	patent	race	against	a	computer	algorithm	that	adjusted	its	play	based	on	the	choices	of	the	participant	and	a	belief-based	learning	“Fictitious	play”	algorithm	(see	Box	3-1).	Participants	were	informed	beforehand	that	their	opponent	was	a	learning	computer	algorithm.	Previous	studies	have	had	participants	play	against	each	other	or	against	randomized	round-matched	responses	from	a	pool	of	past	human	players.	We	sought	consistent	opponent	play	to	provide	stable	progressions	of	learning	over	the	course	of	the	two	blocks.	We	reasoned	that	randomized	pool	play	would	not	provide	a	sense	of	consistency	and	that	human	versus	human	interaction	would	introduce	elements	of	reputation	and	mentalizing	considerations	(Zhu,	Mathewson	et	al.	2012).	This	limited	the	human	player’s	
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considerations	to	recent	actions	by	the	computer	or	its	pattern	history,	which	are	the	levels	of	differentiation	our	modeling	sought	to	describe.	Though	the	game	features	secure	strategies	for	each	role,	neither	has	a	pure	Nash	equilibrium	because	payoff	can	be	increased	by	changing	strategy.	The	relatively	large	strategy	space	provides	a	breadth	of	choice	and	prompts,	which	affords	greater	modeling	distinction	between	reinforcement	and	belief-based	behavior.		
Regret	Our	hypothesis	rests	on	the	idea	that	individuals	exposed	to	regret	in	the	priming	task	will	engage	to	a	greater-extent	in	belief-based	learning	during	the	patent	race.	One	potential	vector	for	this	more	extensive	use	of	the	more	sophisticated	learning	type	is	an	avoidance	of	regret	in	the	patent	race.	Regret	is	a	particularly	useful	signal	in	the	patent	race	because	of	the	task’s	asymmetric	roles	that	result	in	frequent	disparities	between	outcome	and	regret.	We	
Box 3-1. Computer player value update
Fic$ve	earnings	f(s)	is	the	amount	that	would	have	been	earned	
by	playing	strategy	s	in	the	current	trial	t,	in	which	Pt	is	the	human	
player’s	investment,	given	computer	endowment	e	and	reward	r.	
Value	update	V(s)t	is	the	value	of	strategy	s	at	the	end	of	trial	t,	
a=er	being	updated	by	f(s).	The	learning	rate	constant	α	[0,	1]	
determines	how	much	effect	new	data	has	on	the	previous	value.	
f (s) = e + r − st, if Pt > st
f (s) = e − st, if Pt ≤ st
V(s)t = V(s)t − 1 + δ ⋅ f (s)
Chapter 3  Timberlake  85calculate	regret	error	in	each	round	  	as	the	difference	between	actual	earnings	and	highest-possible	earnings:	   	
Regret	error	in	round	t	is	the	reward	returned	by	chosen	strategy	k	by	player	i	minus	the	maximum	reward	returned	by	any	strategy	in	time	t	if	that	strategy	had	been	chosen.	In	rounds	in	which	a	player	lost	but	could	have	played	a	strategy	that	would	have	won,	regret	is	easy	to	identify:	the	strong	player	plays	3	and	loses	to	the	weak	player	playing	4.	Here,	the	strong	player	has	kept	2,	while	playing	5	would	have	won	him	10,	producing	a	regret	error	of	8.	The	weak	player,	meanwhile,	has	played	the	equilibrium	strategy	and	has	no	regret	error.	In	this	scenario,	if	the	strong	player	had	invested	just	1,	he	would	still	have	regret,	but	it	would	be	lower,	having	retained	4	cards	of	the	endowment,	resulting	in	a	regret	error	of	just	6.	In	a	winning	scenario,	however,	there	can	still	be	regret.	Suppose	the	strong	player	invests	all	5,	a	fairly	common	investment,	and	the	weak	player	has	realized	the	frequent	inutility	of	investing	anything	and	so	invests	0.	The	strong	player	wins,	taking	10,	but	sees	that	he	could	have	kept	even	more	if	he	had	invested	as	little	as	1	card.	The	difference	and	regret	error	is	4,	even	though	he	won	the	round.		
Participants	We	recruited	259	healthy	volunteers	(124	female)	via	the	Cognitive	and	Experimental	Economics	Laboratory	at	the	University	of	Trento,	Trento,	Italy.	Subjects	had	a	mean	age	of	21.8	±2.8	with	a	range	of	18	to	38.	Subjects	were	randomly	assigned	to	seating	positions,	which	determined	the	outcome	of	the	priming	experiment.		
REt
REt = Vki −max Vt
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Procedure	Participants	read	onscreen	instructions	(also	duplicated	in	print)	on	the	rules	of	both	the	Wheel	of	Fortune	game	and	the	patent	race	before	completing	10	practice	rounds	of	the	Wheel	of	Fortune,	which	they	were	told	would	not	affect	their	payment.	They	were	then	told	the	next	Wheel	of	Fortune	task	would	have	the	single	largest	effect	on	their	payment.	All	experimental	subjects	were	presented	with	identical	probability	wheels	(probabilities	of	66.6/33.3%	of	€8/-€16	and	25/75%,	€18/-€6)	and	chose	either	the	right	or	the	left.		Subjects	undergoing	complete	feedback	priming	saw	the	arrow	on	the	wheel	they	chose	spin,	as	well	as	the	arrow	on	the	unchosen	wheel;	those	undergoing	partial	feedback	priming	saw	the	arrow	on	the	chosen	wheel	spin,	while	the	other	arrow	disappeared.	After	three	revolutions,	the	arrows	stopped	spinning	and	rested	on	the	outcome,	then	an	on-screen	alert	told	the	subject	whether	she	had	won	or	lost	and	the	amount.	Participants	completed	an	emotional	evaluation	via	an	on-screen	Likert	item,	then	the	Wheel	of	Fortune	outcome	was	presented	again	for	10	seconds.		Immediately	following,	the	patent	race	began	(Fig.	3-3).	Subjects	began	in	either	the	weak	or	strong	role	(132	and	127,	respectively).	They	played	50	rounds	of	each	role,	counterbalanced	for	order.	Their	opponent	was	a	computer	algorithm	programmed	to	use	Fictive	learning	to	determine	its	strategy.	For	the	algorithm,	each	strategy	(Five	strategies	in	the	weak	role,	playing	0-4,	or	six	in	the	strong	role,	0-5	cards)	was	assigned	an	initial	value	of	5.	The	function	updated	the	values	for	each	strategy	at	the	end	of	each	round.	It	calculated	the	earnings	each	of	its	own	choices	would	have	brought,	had	it	been	played	(including	the	choice	actually	made),	then	found	the	difference	between	those	values	and	the	existing	values	assigned	to	each	strategy.	The	function	attenuated	each	difference	by	multiplying	it	by	a	learning	rate	of	0.5,	then	added	those	amounts	to	the	existing	values	to	arrive	at	a	new	array	of	values	for	the	next	trial.		
Chapter 3  Timberlake  87Participants	were	clearly	told	that	they	would	be	playing	against	a	computer.	But	they	began	the	priming	task	and	subsequent	experimental	game	in	groups	of	2-4	so	that	no	subject	was	playing	the	game	alone	at	any	time.	Subjects	were	told	the	result	of	the	Wheel	of	Fortune	would	be	added	to	or	deducted	from	their	total,	which	included	a	show-up	fee	of	€5.	For	the	patent	race,	they	were	told	that	each	card	won	or	retained	was	worth	€0.01.		In	each	trial,	a	Fixation	cross	appeared	for	4-8	s,	followed	by	the	explanation	screen,	and	a	graphical	illustration	of	the	endowment	for	the	subject	and	opponent,	as	well	as	the	possible	earnings	for	the	subject.	Subjects	selected	the	amount	of	investment	using	arrow	keys,	then	conFirmed	at	their	own	pace.	Then,	2-6	s	later,	the	opponent's	choice	was	revealed,	along	with	the	subject's	earnings.	After	50	trials,	the	subject	was	informed	of	earnings	for	the	
Fig. 3-3 Course of play in each of two roles in the patent race. Players invest all or a portion of their endowment 
(first row blue outlines; selection in filled blue) and keep any uninvested portion (third row, filled blue). The 
computer’s investment is revealed (second row, filled gray), and then the player’s prize, if any, is displayed (third and 
fourth rows, filled green). 
Chapter 3  Timberlake  88round,	as	well	as	the	opponent's	earnings.	The	subject	then	switched	roles	and	performed	another	50	trials.		Control	subjects	had	no	priming	and	began	the	card	game	when	they	Finished	reading	instructions.	We	designed	a	simple	visual	representation	of	the	card	game	based	on	that	of	Zhu	and	colleagues	(2012),	displaying	both	the	player’s	endowment	and	the	opponent’s,	along	with	the	potential	reward.		
Computational	Learning	models	We	analyzed	participant	choice	behavior	by	performing	estimations	using	four	models:	Q-learning,	a	type	of	reinforcement	learning	(RL);	Counterfactual	Q-learning,	a	type	of	reinforcement	learning	that	incorporates	unchosen	outcomes	(CRL),	Fictitious	Play,	a	belief-based	learning	model	(BBL)	(Hampton,	Bossaerts	et	al.	2008);	and	a	hybrid	model	that	nests	the	RL	and	BBL	models,	a	simpliFied	version	of	the	experience-weighted	attraction	model	(EWA)	(Zhu,	Mathewson	et	al.	2012).	The	RL	and	BBL	models	constitute	special	cases	of	EWA,	with	a	parameter	∂	indicating	the	relative	weight	of	BBL	in	the	examined	behavior.	EWA	updates	according	to	two	rules,	depending	on	the	player’s	most	recent	choice:		
  	
Here,	  	represents	the	strategy	(choice)	k	of	player	i.	  	is	the	chosen	strategy	in	period	t,	so	these	two	equations	update	differently	depending	on	whether	it	applies	to	the	chosen	action	or	not.	  	is	the	strategy	played	by	the	opponent	in	period	t.	The	player’s	expected	reward	
Vki (t) =
ϕ ⋅ N(t − 1) ⋅ Vki (t − 1) + πi(ski , s−i(t))
N(t) , if ski = si(t)
ϕ ⋅ N(t − 1) ⋅ Vki (t − 1) + δi ⋅ πi(ski , s−i(t))
N(t) , if ski ≠ si(t)
ski si(t)
s−i(t)
Chapter 3  Timberlake  89for	playing	a	given	strategy	k	in	period	t	is	  .	It	is	determined	by	three	parameters:	  	,	which	depreciates	past	values	at	different	rates,	depending	on	how	fast	an	adapter	the	player	believes	the	opponent	to	be.	The	key	parameter	is	the	  	,	which	determines	how	much	weight	an	unplayed	option	has	on	updated	values.	If	a	player	believes	foregone	strategies	deliver	as	much	information	as	those	played,	then	  	reaches	1,	and	the	model	reduces	to	the	BBL	model.	At	no	weight,	  	=	0,	and	the	model	reduces	to	RL.		For	each	model	and	subject	by	subject,	we	performed	individual	maximum	likelihood	estimation	with	a	grid	search	over	a	range	of	values.	We	calculated	predicted	decision	probabilities	over	the	full	range	of	each	set	of	parameters	and	compared	them	to	the	subject's	actual	choices,	selecting	that	set	of	parameters	with	the	maximum	log	likelihood.	We	then	performed	individual	and	group	level	estimations.	
Results	
We	asked	whether	priming	players	with	exposure	to	a	large	gambling	loss	outcome	that	typically	induces	regret	would	modulate	their	strategy	in	a	different	task	played	immediately	afterward.	Subjects	were	grouped	depending	on	the	type	of	priming	they	underwent:	by	positive	or	negative	valence,	by	complete	or	partial	feedback,	and	those	who	received	no	priming.		We	First	considered	only	block	1	of	the	patent	race	because	it	was	the	closest	in	time	to	the	priming	task.	To	detect	differences	between	priming	groups,	we	characterized	their	gameplay,	examining	what	portion	of	possible	earnings	they	won	(Fig.	3-4	A)	as	well	as	how	much	regret	error	they	were	exposed	to,	a	predictive	measure	of	regret	avoidance	(Fig.	3-4	B).	We	calculated	earnings	percentage	to	normalize	between	the	weak	and	strong	roles.	Earnings	percentage	is	calculated	as	amount	won	divided	by	total	possible	earnings	regardless	of	opponent’s	strategy:	13	for	the	weak	role	and	14	for	strong.	We	analyzed	these	results	across	
Vki (t) θi
δi
δi
δi
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all	50	block	1	 trials,	as	 well	as	in	the	First	 20	trials	and	 the	First	5	trials.		We	
Fig. 3-4 Performance in the patent race game, grouped by priming condition: A) earnings as a percentage of total 
possible (to allow comparison between strong and weak conditions) across all 50 trials of block 1. B) Mean Regret 
Error (actual earnings less highest possible earnings) across all block 1 trials. C) Earnings percentage for first 20 trials 
(during which priming would likely be stronger). D) Earnings percentage for first 5 trials (during which priming would 
likely be strongest). E) Mean distance from equilibrium prediction in first 5 trials, accounting for dominated strategies. 
Error bars are s.e.m.
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expected	any	effect	of	priming	to	be	strongest	in	these	early	trials,	so	we	also	calculated	for	each	participant’s	First	Five	trials	the	mean	distance	from	Nash	equilibrium.	Equilibrium	probabilities	account	for	the	iterated	elimination	of	dominated	strategies,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	a	single	strategy	is	most	likely	for	each	role,	but	not	absolute.	For	each	trial,	we	measured	the	distance	from	equilibrium	as	the	probability	of	not	choosing	that	strategy,	or	the	probability	of	choosing	that	strategy	subtracted	from	1.	The	predicted	probabilities	(p)	are	listed	in	Table	3-1.	Distance	from	each	is	calculated	as	1-p.		In	both	strong	and	weak	roles,	we	observed	mild	trends	of	regret-primed	players	earning	more	than	disappointment-primed	players,	as	well	as	relief-primed	players	earning	more	than	satisfaction-primed	players.	Surprisingly,	non-primed	individuals	earned	more	in	block	1	than	all	priming	groups	when	they	started	out	in	the	weak	role	but	earned	less	in	block	1	than	all	primed	groups	when	they	started	out	in	the	strong	role.	Regret	error	indicated	little	differentiation	between	priming	types	in	the	weak	role.	In	the	strong	role,	participants	primed	with	the	two	types	of	negative	outcome	had	higher	average	regret	error	than	those	primed	with	positive	outcome.	Participants	who	were	not	primed	also	had	higher	average	regret	error.		There	was	little	differentiation	and	high	variance	among	all	groups	and	across	both	roles	in	earnings	percentage	during	the	First	20	trials	of	the	block.	The	same	lack	of	differentiation	characterized	the	First	5	trials.	Analyzing	the	distance	from	Nash	equilibrium	
Table 3-1: Predicted strategy probabilities
Weak Strong
Investment p p
0 0.6 0
1 0 0.2
2 0.2 0
3 0 0.2
4 0.2 0
5 - 0.6
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Fig. 3-5 Mean Regret Error (actual earnings less highest possible earnings) in across all block 1 trials of the 
patent race game, grouped by priming condition and segregated by trial outcome: A) weak role winning trials B) 
strong role winning trials D) weak role losing trials E) strong role losing trials. Error bars are s.e.m.
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Chapter 3  Timberlake  93during	the	First	5	trials,	suggested	that	all	four	priming	categories	played	expected	strategies	less	frequently	than	the	participants	who	did	not	undergo	priming.		We	then	looked	at	RE	segregated	by	winning	trials	and	losing	trials,	hypothesizing	that	across	groups,	players	would	generally	behave	differently	in	a	win	versus	a	loss	(Fig.	3-5).	Because	of	the	tendency	to	win	in	the	strong	role	and	to	lose	in	the	weak	role,	we	considered	only	subjects	with	four	or	more	wins	or	losses	for	consideration	in	each	category	(i.e.	if	a	player	won	all	but	two	of	her	rounds	in	the	strong	role,	the	outcomes	following	her	two	losses	would	not	be	considered	in	the	loss-trials	analyses).	Of	the	192	subjects,	187	were	considered	in	RE-win	calculations	and	181	in	RE-loss	calculations.	We	found	no	differentiating	trend	among	the	Five	groups.		
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Fig. 3-6 Performance in the patent race game, grouped by priming feedback and valence: A) Mean regret error (RE) 
in loss trials across all 50 trials of block 1, by priming feedback information level. B) Mean RE in win trials across all 
50 trials of block 1, by priming feedback information level. C) Mean RE in loss trials across all 50 trials of block 1, by 
priming valence. D) Mean RE in win trials across all 50 trials of block 1, by priming valence. Error bars are s.e.m.
Chapter 3  Timberlake  94Due	to	similarities	in	performance	across	both	axes	of	feedback	type	(i.e.	partial	and	complete)	and	feedback	valence	(i.e.	positive	or	negative),	we	pooled	priming	types	across	those	two	vectors	and	analyzed	their	performance	in	other	measures.	Playing	in	the	weak	role,	subjects	primed	with	full-information	feedback	(i.e.	regret	and	relief)	exhibited	a	trend	of	lower	RE	in	win	trials	than	those	who	did	not	undergo	priming	(Fig.	3-6	A).	Because	the	weak	role	presents	few	opportunities	to	win,	this	may	represent	successful	attempts	to	eke	out	wins	on	opportune	occasions.	Meanwhile	in	loss	trials,	RE	trends	higher	for	the	full-information	feedback	priming	group.	This	may	suggest	similar	attempts	to	win	by	investing	high	but	losing	anyway.		Considering	priming	by	outcome	valence,	compared	to	both	no-priming	and	negative-valence	subjects,	players	who	had	a	positive	priming	outcome	trended	lower	in	RE	during	winning	trials	and	higher	in	loss	trials	when	playing	the	weak	role.	By	contrast,	negatively	primed	subjects	trended	higher	in	regret	error	in	winning	trials	and	lower	in	loss	trials	when	playing	the	strong	role.	This	suggests	that	they	were	not	efFicient	in	their	wins	in	the	strong	
Fig. 3-7 Model frequency 
estimations A group-level 
Bayesian model comparison 
showed that for all types of 
priming, as well as no priming, the 
bel ie f -based learn ing (BBL) 
F ic t i t ious P lay mode l best 
described behavior. The red line at 
the 0.25 level represents chance, 
which none of the other models 
exceeds.
Chapter 3  Timberlake  95role,	indicating	possible	lack	of	sophisticated	understanding	of	the	game	or	concern	about	investing	too	low	and	losing.	Low	regret	error	in	losses	indicates	a	slight	misreading	of	the	opponent,	leading	to	a	loss	by	a	marginal	amount.		
Modeling	In	order	to	determine	the	relative	contribution	of	different	types	of	learning,	we	compared	data	to	four	learning	models:	Reinforcement	Learning	(RL),	Counterfactual	Reinforcement	Learning	(CRL),	Belief-Based	Learning	(BBL)	and	the	hybrid	model	Experience-Weighted	Attraction	(EWA).	The	First	two	models	constitute	special	cases	of	EWA,	with	a	parameter	∂	indicating	the	relative	weight	of	BBL	in	the	examined	behavior.	We	used	a	group-level	Bayesian	Model	Comparison	to	compare	log	likelihoods	of	model	Fit	to	choice	behavior.	To	our	surprise,	BBL	outperformed	all	other	models	(Fig.	3-7).	Employing	the	learning	rate	parameter	from	the	BBL	model,	we	compared	it	among	the	priming	types	but	found	no	signiFicant	relationships.		
Discussion	
The	manipulation	failed	to	yield	any	signiFicant	difference	in	measurements	of	choice	behavior.	No	studies	to	our	knowledge	have	attempted	to	change	choice	behavior	in	the	patent	race	game,	so	the	Field	was	wide	open	as	to	how	to	attempt	the	perturbation	and	how	to	measure	its	effects.	After	a	number	of	considerations	how	to	induce	regret,	we	settled	on	a	large,	monetary	result	in	the	hopes	that	its	magnitude	and	salience	would	be	effective.	But	it	is	possible	that	other,	more	visceral	forms	of	regret,	such	as	autobiographical	recollection,	or	repeated	forms,	such	as	several	rounds	of	the	lottery,	would	bring	changes	to	patent	race	play.	It	may	be	that	the	magnitude	of	regret	was	not	high	enough	to	yield	appreciable	changes	in	the	
Chapter 3  Timberlake  96latter	task.	It	is	also	of	course	possible	that	there	were	effects	of	the	priming	but	that	our	measures	were	not	precise	enough	to	record	them.	Before	analyses,	however,	we	considered	many	approaches	for	measurement,	both	in	hidden-variable	modeling,	summary	statistics,	and	calculated	variables,	along	with	which	portion	of	the	task	to	approach	First.	We	had	little	hope,	for	example,	that	any	effect	would	persist	into	the	second	block	of	the	task	but	included	it	for	purposes	of	comparison	with	the	First.		We	chose	to	use	an	algorithm	as	the	opponent	for	the	purposes	of	consistency,	but	its	behavior	does	not	match	that	of	human	gameplay	in	that	it	did	not	avoid	the	iteratively	eliminated	dominated	strategies,	other	than	as	a	result	of	adaptation	to	the	human	choice	behavior.	This	likely	gave	rise	to	different	play	behavior	from	human	subjects	than	they	would	have	exhibited	had	they	played	against	other	humans.	The	algorithm	could	be	maintained	but	its	behavior	changed	by	simply	reducing	the	initial	values	of	each	dominated	strategy	in	an	amount	commensurate	with	its	theoretical	rate	of	avoidance.	These	values	are	updated	each	round	and	represent	the	relative	attractiveness	of	each	strategy	and,	in	part,	the	likelihood	of	that	strategy	being	selected	by	the	algorithm.	Though	it	would	be	important	to	maintain	some	balance	between	consistency	and	natural	play	by	the	opponent,	a	future	study	might	aim	for	more	human-like	choices.	After	trying	to	answer	our	hypotheses,	with	the	more	speciFic	priming	types,	we	pooled	priming	groups	to	examine	effects	more	broadly:	by	valence	and	by	feedback	type.	Here,	as	in	the	more	speciFic	groupings,	there	were	no	notable	trends,	nor	signiFicant	effects.	Although	these	indicators	suggested	little	hope	for	effects	yielded	by	model	estimations,	we	conducted	them	and	found	that	even	the	assumption	of	the	model	that	would	best	Fit	was	incorrect.	The	failure	of	EWA	to	better	predict	subject	behavior	made	our	original	hypothesis	impossible	to	test.	We	could	not	compare	the	balance	of	RL	and	BBL	between	groups	because	our	analysis	told	us	that	BBL	alone	predicted	choice	behavior.		
Chapter 3  Timberlake  97In	control	experiments	using	an	algorithm	as	the	opponent,	typically	RL	has	better	Fit	participant	behavior,	possibly	because	players	view	the	contest	as	a	simple	reward	situation	rather	than	a	true	competition	(Zhu,	Mathewson	et	al.	2012).	The	use	of	BBL,	however,	suggests		that	participants	treated	the	game	as	a	competition	in	which	beliefs	about	the	opponent’s	actions	informed	subsequent	decisions.	This	could	be	an	effect	of	the	Fictitious	play	algorithm	we	employed,	which	uses	a	form	of	belief-based	learning	to	guide	its	choices.	Because	of	the	already	large	dimensions	of	the	study,	we	used	only	one	type	of	play	in	the	opponent	algorithm.	Employing	different	algorithms	in	a	future	study	might	indicate	if	this	is	a	behavior-mirroring	effect.		
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Experimental	question	How	does	stimulation	of	prefrontal	cortex	areas	change	the	consideration	of	other	players	and	accounting	for	their	actions	in	an	iterative	thinking	contest?		
Introduction	
In	competitive	situations,	choices	that	accurately	account	for	the	actions	of	others	lead	to	greater	success.	Because	individuals	demonstrate	ranges	of	sophistication,	this	assessment	presents	several	challenges:	understanding	that	there	is	a	range,	what	its	bounds	are	and	where	on	it	competitors	lie.	The	most	successful	players	are	not	necessarily	those	who	engage	at	the	highest	levels	of	sophistication,	but	rather	those	who	most	accurately	assess	the	level	of	sophistication	of	others.	Competitive	strategic	games	present	a	framework	to	measure	these	assessments	because	they	call	on	a	player’s	ability	to	mentalize,	that	is,	to	consider	the	state	of	mind	of	opponents.	Correlations	of	activity	in	the	prefrontal	cortex	to	reasoning	levels	during	such	tasks	present	reasonable	candidate	targets	for	manipulation	via	electrical	stimulation.		Level-k	models	assume	that	individuals	heterogeneously	employ	a	cognitive	hierarchy	of	thinking	types.	These	levels	correspond	to	the	number	of	recursions	in	consideration	of	the	beliefs	of	others.	People	at	level	0	assume	all	others	are	acting	randomly,	essentially	a	naive	lack	of	consideration	of	others.	People	at	level	1	consider	the	beliefs	of	the	other	but	no	more.	Level	2	thinkers	believe	that	other	individuals	are	at	level	1	and	account	for	the	iterative	thinking	at	that	level.		The	most	rational	action	in	such	a	situation	is	to	continue	as	many	steps	of	iterative	thinking	until	reaching	the	Nash	equilibrium	of	0,	but	the	fact	that	people	stop	well	short	of	this	suggests	that	they	are	rational	within	certain	limits.	This	bounded	rationality	may	be	due	
Chapter 4  Timberlake  101to	cognitive	limitations	and	the	greater	computational	demands	of	each	additional	step	(Camerer,	Ho	et	al.	2004).	John	Maynard	Keynes	encapsulated	this	notion	by	describing	an	old	type	of	contest	newspapers	used	to	run.	They	would	print	a	page	full	of	headshot	photos	of	100	women,	from	which	readers	chose	the	six	prettiest	and	sent	them	in.	The	winner	was	selected	by	Finding	which	entry	most	closely	matched	the	average	preferences	from	all	entrants	(i.e.	the	most	popular	choices).	So	the	task	before	the	reader	was	not	to	rely	on	his	own	estimation	of	beauty	but	to	imagine	that	of	all	the	other	entrants,	most	of	whom	would	be	unknown	to	him	and	whom	he	would	have	to	consider	in	a	general	way.	A	player	in	this	game	might	ignore	the	method	of	Finding	the	winner	and	simply	select	photos	according	to	her	own	preference,	not	considering	other	players	at	all.	She	might	rank	them	according	to	how	she	thinks	other	players	would	prefer	them.	And	she	might	rank	them	according	to	how	she	thinks	other	players	will	think	all	other	players	will	prefer	them.	And	so	on.	In	the	end,	individual	assessments	of	beauty	didn’t	matter	at	all,	rather	the	ability	to	gauge	how	all	others	would	assess	beauty	(or	how	all	others	would	assess	the	assessment	of	attractiveness).	In	a	modern	laboratory	and	quantiFiable	version	of	this	task,	participants	are	instead	directed	to	guess	the	number	that	is	some	fraction	of	the	average	of	guesses	by	all	participants.	Responses	to	the	game	can	be	reasonably	described	with	a	cognitive	hierarchy	model.	Given	the	parameters	of	a	number	between	0	and	100	and	2/3	the	average	of	all	players,	at	the	lowest	level,	0,	a	player	responds	randomly,	without	consideration	of	the	structure	of	the	game	or	interaction	with	other	players.	At	one	level	up,	level	1,	the	player	considers	all	other	players	to	be	level-0	players	and	bases	his	choice	on	their	random	play,	guessing	their	average	guess	to	be	something	around	50	and	then	multiplying	by	2/3,	reaching	33.	At	level	2,	the	player	Figures	all	the	other	players	are	level	1,	that	they	have	submitted	33,	so	she	multiplies	that	Figure	by	2/3	(effectively,	50	*	2/3	*	2/3)	and	arrives	at	22.	Continuing	
Chapter 4  Timberlake  102on	iterated	levels	of	thinking	leads	to	elimination	of	dominated	strategy	until	the	player	eventually	arrives	at	0,	the	game’s	Nash	equilibrium.		At	level	0,	the	player	is	considered	naive	because	he	responds	without	consideration	of	the	structure	of	the	game	or	other	players.	Level-1	players	employ	a	model	of	the	game	space	and	respond	to	the	actions	they	believe	other	players	will	take.	Notably,	there	is	no	opportunity	to	adapt	strategy	based	on	the	actions	of	other	players,	since	those	actions	are	not	revealed.	Nevertheless,	level-2	players	iterate	a	step	further	by	imagining	that	their	own	actions	are	being	considered	by	other	players	and	therefore	inFluencing	the	choices	of	the	other	players.	At	levels	higher	than	level	2,	the	players	consider	to	what	extent	they	and	their	opponents	are	aware	of	mutual	awareness	(i.e.	"I	know	that	you	know	that	I	know	…	"	etc.).	A	key	understanding	of	the	level-k	model	is	that	it	does	not	directly	describe	strategic	sophistication	ability,	but	rather	the	individual’s	assessment	of	others.	An	individual	might	be	capable	of	high-level	thinking,	but	if	she	assesses	others	as	naive,	she	might	only	make	choices	indicative	of	level-1	thinking.	Regardless	of	the	actual	outcome,	the	player's	guess	indicates	her	evaluation	of	the	other	participants	and,	therefore,	their	own	k-level	of	thinking.	The	mental	calculations	required	for	higher	levels	of	thinking	in	the	beauty	contest	game	demand	the	multiplication	of	integers	by	fractions	and	fractions	by	fractions.	Poor	performance	in	the	beauty	contest	(BC)	might	indicate	not	a	low	level	of	reasoning	but	rather	poor	mental	mathematical	abilities.	For	this	reason,	the	second	section	of	the	task	comprises	calculations	of	integers	multiplied	by	fractions	and	integers	multiplied	by	a	fraction,	then	multiplied	by	the	same	fraction,	direct	mimics	of	the	mental	calculations	required	of	level	1	and	level	2	thinking,	respectively.		
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Brain	areas	of	level-k	thinking	Functional	imaging	studies	have	located	several	areas	in	the	orbitofrontal	cortex	that	covary	with	components	of	iterative	thinking.	The	medial	prefrontal	cortex	(mPFC)	has	long	been	associated	with	mentalizing,	the	consideration	of	the	mental	states	of	others	(Frith	and	Frith	1999,	Amodio	and	Frith	2006,	Mitchell,	Macrae	et	al.	2006).	Notably,	increased	activity	in	the	mPFC	correlated	with	computational	signals	associated	with	a	strategy	that	incorporates	a	player’s	consideration	of	his	own	choices	on	the	decisions	of	others	(Hampton,	Bossaerts	et	al.	2008).	That	study	concludes	that	the	mPFC	is	part	of	a	network	that	performs	computations	used	in	mentalization.		Ventral	portions	of	the	medial	prefrontal	cortex	(mPFC)	in	particular	has	been	associated	with	various	self-referential	tasks	as	well	as	during	mentalizing	tasks	suggest	that	it	may	be	engaged	in	assessing	the	mental	states	of	similar	others	by	referencing	the	understanding	of	own	personal	feelings	(Mitchell,	Macrae	et	al.	2006).	Similarly	ventral	areas	of	the	mPFC	were	particularly	active	in	high-level	reasoning	players	during	beauty	contest	trials	against	another	human,	as	compared	to	those	against	a	computer	(Coricelli	and	Nagel	2009).	In	against-human	trials	only,	higher	activity	was	observed	in	that	area	in	both	high-	and	low-level	reasoners,	suggesting	the	mPFC	is	a	center	for	strategic	thinking	about	others’	behavior.	That	same	study	also	found	higher	activity	in	right	and	left	dorsolateral	prefrontal	cortex	(dlPFC)	in	high-level	reasoning	players	at	greater	magnitudes	than	in	low-level	reasoning	players,	implicating	the	areas	in	a	process	of	higher-level	reasoning	about	others.	They	did	not	observe	commensurate	activity	during	mental	calculation	tasks	that	made	similar	computational	demands.		To	investigate	how	and	at	what	point	these	constituent	areas	have	a	causal	role	in	the	process,	they	can	be	electrically	stimulated	for	excitatory	on	inhibitory	neuronal	effect,	accompanied	by	measurement	of	any	behavioral	changes,	in	particular	the	level	thinking	demonstrated	by	members	of	the	experimental	group.	
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tDCS	Noninvasive	electrical	stimulation	allows	for	the	modulation	of	neuronal	activity	at	the	regional	level.	In	particular,	transcranial	direct-current	stimulation	(tDCS)	provides	for	both	excitation	and	inhibition,	depending	on	the	orientation	of	electrodes.	The	technique	involves	a	low-level	electrical	current	(often	≤	2	mA)	between	two	electrodes,	from	anodal	to	cathodal,	though	the	brain.	The	areas	under	the	anodal	electrode	are	generally	thought	to	undergo	excitatory	stimulation	via	sub-threshold	depolarization	of	neurons.	Crucially,	tDCS	is	not	believed	to	trigger	action	potentials	in	neurons,	but	rather	to	change	the	likelihood	that	an	action	potential	will	result	in	post-synaptic	Firing	(Nitsche,	Fricke	et	al.	2003,	Coricelli	and	Rusconi	2010).	The	areas	underlying	the	cathodal	electrode,	near	where	the	current	leaves	the	body	are	believed	to	be	hyperpolarized,	resulting	in	an	inhibitory	effect.		Various	studies	have	successfully	stimulated	the	mPFC	(Civai,	Miniussi	et	al.	2015,	Hämmerer,	Bonaiuto	et	al.	2016,	Zheng,	Huang	et	al.	2016)	and	the	dlPFC	(Fecteau,	Knoch	et	al.	2007,	Fecteau,	Pascual-Leone	et	al.	2007,	Boggio,	Campanhã	et	al.	2010,	Hecht,	Walsh	et	al.	2010,	Minati,	Campanhã	et	al.	2012,	PripFl,	Neumann	et	al.	2013)	in	decision-making	tasks.	Though	similarly	implicated	in	strategic	thinking	tasks,	to	our	knowledge,	modulation	had	not	been	attempted	via	tDCS.	We	proposed	to	inFluence	behavior	by	altering	neuronal	activity	using	anodal	tDCS.	Because	fMRI	studies	suggest	an	increase	in	mPFC	and	dlPFC	activations	during	higher	level-k	thinking,	we	aimed	to	conFirm	the	causal	involvement	of	the	areas.	We	hypothesized	that	anodal	stimulation	of	the	mPFC	and	the	dlPFC	would	encourage	excitatory	activity,	resulting	in	higher	level-k	performance	during	the	beauty	contest	task	in	more	participants,	while	sham	stimulation	groups	would	have	fewer	members	exhibiting	higher	level-k	thinking.	We	expected	stimulation	and	sham	groups	would	have	similar	outcomes	of	other	measurements	of	tasks	under	stimulation,	such	as	of	memory	and	calculation.	To	expand	upon	brain	imaging	Findings	of	level-k	thinking,	we	applied	electrical	stimulation	to	participants	playing	the	same	game	used	in	a	previous	study.	Results	from	that	
Chapter 4  Timberlake  105study	described	the	frontal	activity	during	the	task	(Coricelli	and	Nagel	2009).	The	selectively	heightened	activity	of	mPFC	in	trials	against	other	humans	and	in	dlPFC	among	higher-level-thinking	participants	suggested	that	these	areas	may	play	some	role	in	generating	strategic	thinking.	We	hypothesized	that	electrical	stimulation	on	the	scalp	above	each	of	these	areas	separately	would	increase	neuronal	activity,	which	could	in	turn	give	rise	to	higher	levels	of	iterative	thinking.	If	that	result	were	indeed	found,	it	would	suggest	a	causative	role	in	iterative	thinking	for	the	targeted	area.		
Methods	
Participants	played	the	Beauty	Contest	game	against	other	present	participants,	during	which	some	underwent	stimulation	while	others	had	sensors	placed	on	their	scalps	but	experienced	sham	stimulation.	This	experiment	comprised	the	iterative	thinking	task	called	the	Beauty	Contest,	which	was	conducted	during	transcranial	direct-current	stimulation	(tDCS)	or	sham	stimulation.	That	main	task	was	followed	by	a	calculation	task,	two	digit	span	memory	tasks	and	Finally	a	series	of	questionnaires.	The	Beauty	Contest	requires	participants	to	guess	an	average	number,	but	that	Figure	is	inFluenced	by	both	their	own	selection	and	the	numbers	they	believe	will	be	chosen	by	others.	Because	the	target	number	is	modulated	by	the	choices	of	all	other	players,	the	most	successful	players	consider	how	the	other	participants	will	choose.	Based	on	the	choices,	each	participant	was	assigned	a	precise	level	of	thinking	score	and	then	categorized	as	high-	or	low-level	thinking.	
Participants	We	recruited	64	healthy	volunteers	(32	female)	to	take	part	in	a	two-part	study	at	the	Mattarello	Research	Center	of	the	University	of	Trento,	Italy.	Mean	age	of	participants	was	23.9	
Chapter 4  Timberlake  106years	(4.25,	SD).	Volunteers	gave	fully	informed	consent	for	the	project,	which	was	part	of	umbrella	tDCS	project	approval	from	the	University	Ethical	Committee.	Each	participant	was	screened	to	exclude	risk	of	epileptic	seizure,	psycho-active	medication	and	conditions	including	psychological	or	physical	illness	or	history	of	head	injury.	For	the	First	experiment,	we	recruited	throughout	the	university,	but	after	observing	difFiculty	in	the	mathematical	portions	of	the	experiment,	for	the	second	experiment,	we	recruited	in	areas	of	the	university	frequented	by	students	studying	science,	mathematics	and	engineering.	All	sessions	were	conducted	with	exactly	8	volunteers.		
Experimental	Design	and	Task	Experimenters	Fitted	two	electrodes	over	(experiment	1)	the	mPFC	(Brodmann	area	10)	and	visual	cortex	(BA17)	and	(experiment	2)	the	right	and	left	dlPFC	(BA9).	After	all	had	been	Fitted,	participants	then	underwent	30	minutes	of	trans-cranial	direct	current	stimulation	while	performing	50	trials	of	the	experimental	task.	The	experimental	task	consisted	of	a	First	session	of	26	trials	of	the	Beauty	Contest	game	and	then	a	second	session	of	24	trials	of	a	mental	calculation	task.	Next,	they	executed	a	two-part	memory	task:	Forward	Digit	Span,	measuring	short-term	memory	and	consisting	of	2	to	14	trials,	dependent	on	performance;	and	backward	digit	span,	measuring	working	memory	and	consisting	of	15	trials,	regardless	of	performance.	The	experiment	lasted	about	90	minutes,	with	the	30	minutes	of	stimulation	covering	instructions	for	the	beauty	contest	(so	that	any	effect	from	stimulation	also	affected	reading	and	comprehension	of	the	instructions),	completion	of	the	beauty	contest	and	completion	of	the	calculation	task.	The	stimulation	period	ended	for	47	participants	during	the	digit	span	memory	tasks.	Participants	completed	tDCS	questionnaires,	Raven’s	Progressive	Matrices	and	a	cognitive	reFlection	task	to	measure	inter	individual	differences	unrelated	to	effects	of	the	stimulation.	As	it	is	unknown	how	long	the	effects	of	the	
Chapter 4  Timberlake  107stimulation	last,	we	cannot	exclude	that	participants	were	still	under	the	fading	inFluence	of	stimulation	during	these	tasks.	The	beauty	contest	game	as	designed	by	Coricelli	and	Nagel	(2009)	consists	of	a	human	condition	and	a	computer	condition.	In	the	human	condition,	participants	are	directed	to	select	an	integer	between	0	and	100	(inclusive),	with	the	aim	of	being	closest	to	a	fraction	M	of	the	average	of	the	number	chosen	by	all	participants:	M*mean,	in	which	six	values	are	M<1	(1/8,	1/5,	1/3,	1/2,	2/3,	3/4)	and	another	six	values	are	M>1	(9/8,	6/5,	4/3,	3/2,	5/3,	7/4).	We	also	included	no-multiplier	control	trials	in	which	M=1.		In	the	computer	condition,	they	are	told	that	the	computer	will	select	seven	numbers	from	0	to	100	at	random.	Playing	only	against	the	computer,	and	not	against	other	participants,	the	participant	wins	if	her	number	is	closest	to	the	product	of	M	and	the	average	of	all	eight	numbers	(i.e.	her	number	and	the	seven	randomly	selected	numbers).	The	same	13	values	of	M	are	used	in	the	computer	condition	for	a	total	of	26	trials.	Computer	and	human	condition	trials	were	intermixed.	In	the	second	session,	which	comprised	the	calculation	trials,	participants	were	instructed	to	Find	the	product	of	a	two-digit	integer	N	and	either	M	or	M*M,	in	which	M	was	the	same	set	of	multipliers	used	in	the	beauty	contest,	other	than	M=1,	which	was	excluded.	Each	of	the	M	values,	other	than	M=1,	appeared	once	in	the	N*M	calculation	and	once	in	the	N*M*M	calculation	(in	which	both	Ms	are	the	same	multiplier).	A	correct	response	was	judged	to	be	+/-1	around	the	rounded	up	and	down	answer.	E.g.,	if	N*M	=	22.2,	the	range	21-24	would	be	judged	correct.	Participants	received	50	euro	cents	for	each	correct	response.	Participants	received	no	feedback	between	trials.	To	avoid	behavioral	priming,	the	calculation	task	followed	the	beauty	contest	for	all	participants.	Tasks	were	presented	and	responses	recorded	using	MATLAB	(The	MathWorks,	Inc.,	Natick,	MA)	using	PsychToolBox	extensions.	Participants	were	seated	at	divided	computer	stations	and	could	not	interact	with	or	see	each	other	during	the	task.		
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Fig. 4-1 Time course of beauty contest and calculation trials A) The screen progression for the beauty 
contest shows the condition (Human or Computer) at the beginning of each trial, along with a multiplier, in red, and 
the instruction. After 1-2 sec, the response prompt appeared. Participants answered at their own pace with no time 
limit. For each human-condition round, a reward of €5 was paid to a single winner from the session, or in case of a 
tie, divided evenly. For each computer round, the participant won €1 if she was closest to the target or €0.50 in case 
of a tie with one of the computer’s numbers. B) In the calculation task, participants were instructed to calculate the 
product of (in M*1 condition) a fraction multiplied by an integer or (in M*2 condition) the product of a fraction, the 
same fraction and an integer, answering with an integer. The multipliers were the same set as those encountered in 
the beauty contest. When the prompt appeared, the participant had to press “enter” to continue to the response 
screen, at which point the prompt disappeared to encourage a response instead of continued consideration. If the 
participant did not press enter within 21 sec, a warning appeared that there were only 9 seconds remaining. If the 
participant did not enter a response within 30 seconds, the trial ended and the response was categorized as 
incorrect. Participants won €0.20 for each correct calculation. A calculation was considered correct if it was within 1 
of the correct answer rounded up and rounded down to the nearest integers. All participants performed the 
calculation task after the beauty contest task. 
A
B
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Time	course	of	experimental	tasks	Each	trial	of	the	Beauty	Contest	game	(Fig.	4-1	A)	consisted	of	an	information	screen	displayed	for	1-2	sec,	which	included	the	condition	of	the	trial	(i.e.	human	or	computer),	the	multiplier	(M)	and	the	instruction.	The	information	screen	remained	visible,	and	a	response	prompt	appeared,	where	the	participant	could	type	her	response	using	the	computer	number	pad,	followed	by	the	“enter”	key.	Choice	was	self-paced	with	no	time	limit,	and	the	task	continued	as	soon	as	the	participant	responded.	Once	the	response	was	entered,	a	Fixation	cross	appeared	for	1-3	sec	before	the	next	trial	began.	Participants	received	no	feedback	between	trials.			In	session	2,	the	calculation	task,	a	similar	time	course	was	followed:	an	information	screen	with	type	of	calculation	(N*M	or	N*M*M),	multiplier	M,	integer	N	and	instruction	(2	sec),	followed	by	the	response	prompt	(Fig.	4-1	B).	Choice	was	self-paced,	but	response	time	was	constrained	to	30	sec,	with	a	warning	after	21	sec.	As	soon	as	the	response	was	entered,	a	Fixation	cross	appeared	for	1-2	sec.		
Questionnaires	After	the	stimulation	period,	participants	were	asked	four	debrieFing	questions:			
1. Please explain your reasoning in your first choice, M = 2/3, in the human condition.

2. Please explain your reasoning in your choice when M = 1/4 in the computer 
condition.

3. Did you have a general rule for the trials in the human condition?

4. Did you have a general rule for the trials in the computer condition?

Short-term	and	working	memory	tasks	Participants	then	completed	a	forward	digit	span	task,	in	which	a	Fixation	cross	appeared,	followed	by	a	series	of	digits,	appearing	on	screen	singly	and	sequentially	for	1	sec	each.	Once	the	series	was	complete,	a	series	of	lines	in	the	same	amount	as	the	series	appeared	on	screen	with	the	instruction	for	the	participant	to	enter	the	sequence	in	order.	
Chapter 4  Timberlake  110Participants	were	allowed	to	make	corrections	before	pressing	“enter”,	which	began	the	next	trial.	The	response	was	required	to	have	exactly	the	number	of	digits	as	the	prompt	in	order	to	proceed.	The	sequence	began	with	a	series	of	three	numbers,	increasing	by	one	digit	on	each	trial	until	an	incorrect	response	or	after	a	9-digit	series.	At	that	point,	a	second	sequence	began	with	a	series	of	three	digits,	increasing	each	round	until	an	incorrect	response	or	completion	of	the	9-digit	series.	We	generated	pseudo-random	series	of	non-repeating	digits,	then	used	the	same	series	and	orders	for	all	participants.	The	score	was	determined	by	the	longest	correctly	completed	response	in	either	of	the	two	series.	At	the	completion	of	the	forward	digit	span	task,	instructions	appeared	explaining	the	backward	digit-span	task,	in	which	participants	were	told	they	would	once	again	see	series	of	numbers,	but	that	in	order	to	correctly	respond,	they	had	to	enter	the	series	in	the	reverse	order.	A	Fixation	cross	once	again	appeared,	followed	by	a	series	of	single	digits	for	1	sec	each,	then	followed	by	the	series	of	blank	spaces.	Participants	once	again	entered	their	response	before	typing	“enter”.		In	the	backward	digit	span	task,	all	participants	completed	three	series	each	of	lengths	increasing	from	4	to	8,	for	a	total	of	15	series.	In	the	backward	task,	any	number	in	the	correct	position	was	awarded	a	point.		For	the	backward	task,	we	used	a	prescribed	set	of	series	from	Devetag	&	Warglien	(2003).	
Payment	Participant	performance	was	Financially	motivated.	Each	subject	received	a	€5	show-up	fee	and	€0.20	for	each	correct	calculation.	In	each	8-subject	session,	one	human	trial	of	the	Beauty	Contest	was	chosen	at	random,	and	one	computer	trial	was	chosen	at	random.	Anonymized	results	were	presented	to	all	subjects	on	the	computer	screen.	The	participants	who	came	closest	in	each	selected	trial	were	awarded	an	additional	€5.	In	the	case	of	ties,	the	
Chapter 4  Timberlake  111prize	was	split	evenly	among	all	tying	players.	Each	participant’s	total	appeared	on	the	screen	at	the	end	of	the	session,	and	they	were	later	paid	by	bank	transfer.		
tDCS	stimulation	The	tDCS	procedure	applies	a	weak	direct	current	into	and	out	of	the	scalp	via	two	electrodes,	each	sandwiched	in	saline-soaked	sponges	and	spread	with	a	layer	of	conductance	gel.	The	constant	current	is	delivered	by	a	BrainSTIM	battery-powered	stimulator	(E.M.S.	Medical,	Bologna,	Italy).	If	participants	reported	uncomfortable	tickling	or	itching	sensations,	experimenters	added	gel	under	the	electrode	to	increase	contact	between	electrode	and	scalp.	None	complained	of	pain	during	the	session.	During	debrieFing	session,	subjects	reported	mild	sensations	of	tickling,	tingling,	warmth	or	pain,	mostly	at	the	beginning	of	the	session,	but	some	at	the	end,	and	a	few	in	the	middle.	They	reported	that	the	sensations	subsided	quickly.	The	direction	of	the	current	can	have	different	effects	on	the	target	area.	Anodal	stimulation	encourages	cortical	excitability,	while	cathodal	stimulation	inhibits	(Nitsche,	Doemkes	et	al.	2007).	Participants	in	experiment	1	were	randomly	assigned	to	receive	anodal	tDCS	over	the	mPFC	(N=16,	10	female,	mean	age=24.4)	or	sham	stimulation	(N=16,	7	female,	mean	age=24.4).	Participants	in	experiment	2	were	randomly	assigned	to	receive	anodal	tDCS	over	the	right	dlPFC	(N=16,	7	female,	mean	age=22.4)	or	sham	stimulation	(N=16,	8	female,	mean	age=24.5).		Stimulation	and	reference	points	were	selected	by	simulating	tDCS	stimulation	in	SimNIBS	software	(Thielscher,	Antunes	et	al.	2015)	with	various	electrode	placements	and	sizes,	along	with	varied	current	strengths.	Simulations	were	viewed	in	GMSH	software	(Geuzaine	and	Remacle	2009).	Current	density,	the	strength	of	current	divided	by	the	area	of	the	electrode,	has	an	effect	on	stimulation	efFiciency.	For	excitatory	purposes,	it	is	desirable	to	make	the	anodal	electrode	smaller	to	focus	current	and	to	make	the	cathodal	electrode	larger	
Chapter 4  Timberlake  112to	diffuse	it	(Nitsche,	Doemkes	et	al.	2007).	We	set	a	current	density	target	of	0.07	mA/cm2,	which	meant	a	decrease	in	size	of	the	electrode	in	service	of	greater	precision	might	require	an	attendant	reduction	in	current	strength,	which	would	reduce	both	the	reach	and	intensity	of	the	stimulation	(Fig.	4-2).		In	experiment	1,	the	smaller,	anodal	electrode	(4x4	cm)	was	placed	over	the	vmPFC	at	the	FPz	position,	according	to	the	international	EEG	10/20	system,	and	the	cathodal	electrode	(5x7	cm)	was	placed	over	the	visual	cortex	at	the	Oz	position.	At	16	cm2	and	a	current	of	1	mA,	the	current	density	at	the	anodal	position	was	0.0625	mA/cm2.	In	experiment	2,	the	smaller,	anodal	electrode	(5x5	cm)	was	placed	over	the	right	dlPFC	at	the	F4	position,	according	to	the	international	EEG	10/20	system,	and	the	cathodal	electrode	(5x7	cm)	was	placed	over	the	left	dlPFC	at	the	F3	position,	both	positions	calculated	using	an	online	location	system	(Beam,	Borckardt	et	al.	2009).	At	25	cm2	and	a	current	of	2	mA,	the	current	density	was	0.08	mA/cm2.	For	stimulated	participants,	a	current	was	ramped	up	over	30	sec	to	1	mA	in	experiment	1	and	2	mA	in	experiment	2,	then	kept	constant	for	the	length	of	the	experimental	tasks	(no	more	than	29	min),	followed	by	30	sec	ramping	down.	In	the	sham	condition,	the	electrodes	were	placed	as	in	stimulation	condition,	but	stimulation	halted	after	the	30	sec	ramp-up,	unbeknownst	to	the	participant.	The	procedure	sometimes	produces	an	itching	sensation	at	the	beginning	of	a	session,	and	sham	participants	would	be	exposed	to	that	telltale	sign,	making	it	unclear	to	them	if	they	were	being	stimulated	or	not	(Gandiga,	Hummel	et	al.	2006).		Experimenters	and	assistants	set	scalp	locations	by	measuring	Fiduciary	points,	making	measurements	from	those	points,	then	marking	on	the	scalp	at	electrode	locations.	Electrodes	were	held	in	place	by	a	hairnet	and	surgical	rubber	straps.	Conductance	with	the	scalp	was	facilitated	by	applying	a	conductive	gel	to	the	underside	of	sponges	soaked	in	a	saline	physiological	solution.			
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Protocols	We	set	two	stimulation	protocols	for	each	experiment:	(full)	stimulation	and	sham.	For	each	session,	four	of	each	protocol	were	randomly	distributed	among	participants.	Participants	were	told	they	might	undergo	stimulation	or	sham.	The	experiment	was	double	blind:	neither	participants	nor	experimenters	(during	the	testing	and	analysis	phases)	were	aware	of	which	protocol	was	real	and	which	was	sham	stimulation.	Each	session’s	stimulation	was	initiated	and	monitored	from	a	central	PC	(schematic	Fig.	4-2	C,	D).			
Fig. 4-2 Simulated electrode placement over mPFC and visual cortex and simulated effects 
of current A) Electrode were placed over a simulated brain according to MNI reference coordinates for mPFC 
and visual cortex, based on Zheng and colleagues (2016). The sizes of the electrodes and the current were 
adjusted to achieve a focused simulated stimulation, as viewed in a cross-section brain (B). Schematics of the 
electrode placement are shown for C) mPFC and visual cortex: 1 mA for 30 min and D) right dlPFC and left 
dlPFC: 2 mA for 30 min. 
A B
D AnodeCathode
Anode
Cathode
C
Chapter 4  Timberlake  114
Statistical	analysis	First,	we	calculated	for	each	trial	the	quadratic	distance	QDM	between	the	response	and	the	theoretical	level-k	values	based	on	the	Cognitive	Hierarchy	model	using	the	equation	  ,		
where	x	is	the	choice	of	participant	i	in	human/computer	condition	j	for	multiplier	M	(Coricelli	and	Nagel	2009).	The	equation	is	solved	for	each	level	of	k	=	(0,1,2).	The	minimum	quadratic	distance	for	each	level	indicated	the	level-k	for	that	trial.	When	a	participant	had	a	majority	(seven	or	more)	trials	of	minimum	distance	for	a	level,	she	was	assigned	that	level-k.	If	the	participant	did	not	have	seven	occurrences	of	any	level,	her	level	was	set	at	level	0,	random	(Table	4-1).		Next,	we	used	subject	responses	to	calculate	a	precise	level-k	for	each	trial.	The	k	is	determined	by	the	number	of	times	the	multiplier	fraction	is	applied	to	the	mean	of	the	integer	range,	which	means	it	can	also	be	found	in	continuous	values	using	the	solving	equation		   	,	where	r	is	the	response	to	multiplier	M.	E.g.,	for	M=2/3,	a	response	of	25	indicates	a	level-k	of	1.7).	A	response	of	0	presents	a	calculation	problem	of	precise	level-k,	so	in	those	instances,	we	used	a	corrected	precise	value,	in	which	responses	were	indexed	by	adding	1	to	the	response	integer.	They	were	then	divided	by	50.5	instead	of	50,	ensuring	that	responses	of	100	would	be	the	same	as	in	uncorrected,	since	101/50.5	=	100/50.		Then,	for	each	experiment,	we	compared	level-k	outcomes	between	the	two	stimulation	protocols.	To	accommodate	outliers	and	non-normal	distributions,	we	used	the	Kruskal-Wallis	test	to	compare	each	subject’s	median	precise	level-k	for	First	human	trials	and	then	computer	trials	(illustrated	in	Fig.	4-3).	We	also	considered	data	from	the	calculation	task,	calculating	the	absolute	distance	(AD)	from	the	correct	answer.	We	compared	AD	across	
QDMijk = (xijM − 50 *Mk)2
ki = log(ri /50)/log(Mi)
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Table 4-1: Modal minimum QD
Experiment 1 - vmPFC 2 - dlPFC
Protocol sham full stimulation sham full stimulation
Versus-human 
trials Level 0 Level 0 Level 1 Level 1
Versus-computer 
trials Level 2 Level 1 Level 1 Level 1
Table 4-1 Level-k instances by stimulation protocol and opponent type For each trial, we solved 
for the quadratic distance from levels 0, 1 and 2, classifying the choice as the level with the lowest quadratic 
distance. If a participant had seven or more trials of one level, she was classified as that level. Otherwise, she was 
classified as level 0 (random). These are the most common level types for each treatment and condition. 
Fig. 4-3 Level-k in Beauty Contest by opponent and by stimulation protocol Precise level-k was 
calculated for each trial and then averaged by participant. These graphs illustrate the median level-k for the two 
experiments. There was no significant difference in the medians. Error bars are s.e.m.
A) Experiment 1: human trials B) Experiment 1: computer trials
C) Experiment 2: human trials D) Experiment 2: computer trials
Chapter 4  Timberlake  116all	trials,	as	well	as	categorized	into	trials	with	a	single	multiplier	(M*1)	and	trials	with	a	double	multiplier	(M*2)	(Fig.	4-4).	Higher	AD	values	indicate	worse	performance.	We	used	mixed	ANOVA	to	test	for	signiFicance	within	subjects	for	multiplier	level	and	between	subjects	for	stimulation	protocol,	as	well	as	for	interaction	between	the	two	factors.	Because	sphericity	of	data	tests	failed,	we	used	Greenhouse-Geisser	tests	for	interpretation.		
Fig. 4-4 Absolute distances in calculation task by stimulation protocol Mean absolute distance from 
correct answer in all calculation trials (A, C) by stimulation protocol, and mean distance in M*1 and M*2 trials (B, D), 
by protocol. Mixed ANOVA showed in both experiments an effect of multiplier level but not stimulation protocol 
alone, nor the interaction between stimulation protocol and multiplier level. Error bars are s.e.m. 
A) Experiment 1: all calculation trials
C) Experiment 2: all calculation trials
M*1 trials M*2 trials
D) Experiment 2: calculation trials by multiplier level
B) Experiment 1: calculation trials by multiplier level
M*1 trials M*2 trials
Chapter 4  Timberlake  117Kruskal-Wallis	tests	were	run	with	SPSS	Statistics	(IBM	Corp.,	Armonk,	NY).	Mixed	ANOVA	tests	were	run	with	Stata,	Stata	Corp.,	College	Station,	TX.	
Results		
In	the	First	experiment,	tests	showed	a	signiFicant	effect	of	the	multiplier	on	calculation	performance	(F(1,30)	=	32.36,	p	<	.001)	but	no	signiFicance	in	stimulation	protocol,	nor	in	the	interaction	between	multiplier	level	and	protocol.	In	the	second	experiment,	we	found	the	same	pattern:	a	signiFicant	effect	of	the	multiplier	(F(1,30)	=	130.28,	p	<	.001)	but	no	signiFicance	in	stimulation	protocol,	nor	in	the	interaction.		In	experiment	1,	a	Kruskal-Wallis	Test	was	conducted	to	examine	the	differences	on	level-k	according	to	the	stimulation	protocol	undergone.	No	signiFicant	differences	were	found	between	the	two	stimulation	protocols	in	human	trials	(Chi	square	=	1.04,	p	=	.309,	mean	rank	sham=18.19,	mean	rank	full=14.81),	nor	in	computer	trials	(Chi	square	=	1.74,	p	=	.817,	mean	rank	sham=18.69,	mean	rank	full=14.31).	In	experiment	2,	a	Kruskal-Wallis	Test	was	also	conducted	to	examine	the	differences	on	level-k	according	to	the	stimulation	protocol	undergone.	No	signiFicant	differences	were	found	between	the	two	stimulation	protocols	in	human	trials	(Chi	square	=	0.05,	p	=	.821,	mean	rank	sham=16.13,	mean	rank	full=16.88),	nor	in	computer	trials	(Chi	square	=	0,	p	=	.955,	mean	rank	sham=16.41,	mean	rank	full=16.59).	(Table	4-2).		
Table 4-2 Kruskal-Wallis test statistics table
Experiment 2 (dlPFC)
chi-square p mean rank sham mean rank full
versus humans 0.05 0.821 16.13 16.88
versus computer 0 0.955 16.41 16.59
Experiment 1 (vmPFC)
chi-square p mean rank sham mean rank full
versus humans 1.04 0.309 18.19 14.81
versus computer 1.74 0.187 18.69 14.31
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Fig. 4-5 Participant description 
visualizations Visualizations for typical level-k 
players show 1) performance in the calculation task, 
with the solid line representing the correct answer 
and subject responses shown as red diamonds for 
single-multiplier trials and blue diamonds for double-
multiplier trials; 2) beauty contest responses, with the 
solid red line representing the theoretical level 1 and 
the dashed blue line, the theoretical level 2, with 
participant responses shown as red diamonds for 
computer trials and blue diamonds for human trials; 
3) trial-by-trial quadratic distance from level 1 versus 
computer (red line), level 1 versus humans (dashed 
blue line) and level 2 versus humans (solid blue line); 
4) trial-by-trial level-k precise and corrected versus 
humans. 
A) A level-0 player’s results show proficiency in 
calculations, but irregularity in the beauty contest 
against both computer and  humans. B) A level-1 
player has responses against both computer and 
human along the theoretical L1 line (graph 2) and 
shows consistent level-1 choices across all trials. C) A 
level-2 player has versus-human choices closer to the 
theoretical level 2 dashed blue line and has level-k 
choices above level 1 across all trials. 
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Chapter 4  Timberlake  119After	Finding	no	signiFicant	difference	in	the	experimental	task	due	to	stimulation	conditions,	we	explored	the	data	in	the	hopes	of	Finding	guidance	for	a	subsequent	experiment.	We	First	plotted	calculation	answers	to	ensure	that	a	given	participant	did	not	have	any	mathematical	limitations	(Fig.	4-5	[i]).	We	then	compared	participant	answers	in	both	human	and	computer	conditions	to	theoretical	level	1	(the	target	for	responses	in	computer	trials)	and	theoretical	level	2	(Fig.	4-5	[ii]).	Next	we	plotted	the	time	course	of	quadratic	distances	over	the	course	of	the	task	for	each	opponent	type	(Fig.	4-5	[iii]).	And	Finally,	we	plotted	trial-by-trial	level-k	for	human	trials	only	(Fig.	4-5	[iv]).	We	categorized	players	by	their	choices	over	the	course	of	the	task	(Fig.	4-6)	in	an	effort	to	see	if	their	understanding	of	the	task	appeared	to	change	(as	illustrated	in	Fig.	4-7).	We	found	no	difference	in	categorization	types	between	the	types	of	stimulation	in	either	experiment.	Several	players	in	each	experiment,	and	in	both	stimulation	protocols,	appeared	to	change	their	levels	of	thinking	over	the	course	of	the	experiment:	some	from	level-0	to	level-1,	and	some	to	level-1	to	level-2.		
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Player categorizations by stimulation protocol
Fig. 4-6 Player categorizations by stimulation 
protocol
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Discussion	
We	used	tDCS	to	test	64	volunteers,	applying	full	or	sham	stimulation	over	First	the	mPFC	and	later	the	dlPFC	while	participants	played	a	strategic	thinking	game	against	each	other.	Results	showed	a	mild	trend	for	higher	levels	of	thinking	among	the	sham	group	in	the	First	experiment	(Fig.	4-3	[A]),	which	aimed	to	stimulate	the	mPFC	with	anodal	tDCS.	Meanwhile,	results	from	the	second	experiment,	in	which	the	dlPFC	was	targeted,	did	not	indicate	even	a	trend	in	level-k	thinking	between	sham	and	stimulation		(Fig.	4-3	[C]).	The	lack	of	signiFicant	outcome	may	indicate	a	problem	with	our	experimental	design.	We	may	have	targeted	areas	with	less	precision	than	necessary.	That	could	be	improved	with	a	
Fig 4-7 Evolving participant description visualizations Some players’ choices suggested an 
understanding of the task that changed throughout the session. A) An example of a player who at first seems to play 
at level 0, in later trials reduces the quadratic distance to level 1 in both computer and human trials. B) A player who 
begins making choices around level 1 or level 0 by the late trials of the task makes several level-2 choices in a row. 
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Chapter 4  Timberlake  121different	arrangement	of	electrodes,	as	well	as	by	consulting	anatomical	scans	of	participants	from	which	to	map	electrode	positioning.		On	the	other	hand,	the	problem	may	lie	not	with	design.	It	may	be	that	even	if	we	successfully	stimulated	the	targeted	areas,	any	change	in	neuronal	activity	has	insufFicient	effect	on	task	performance	–	or	that	any	change	is	below	measurable	levels.	It	is	also	possible	that	the	areas	we	targeted	for	manipulation,	while	involved	in	the	process	of	iterative	thinking	as	described	in	Coricelli	and	Nagel	(2009),	do	not	play	a	singularly	sufFicient	role	in	that	process.	Despite	results	from	previous	studies,	it	is	possible	that	mPFC	and	dlPFC	do	not	play	causal	roles	in	level-k	thinking.		The	tDCS	technique	itself	is	not	fully	proven	and	may	not	have	an	effect	on	brain	activity	that	can	modulate	decision	making	at	all.	Though	tDCS	has	been	used	with	success	in	stimulating	motor	areas,	its	effectiveness	in	decision-making	studies	has	been	far	less	demonstrated.	The	dlPFC	has	been	a	promising	area	in	those	successful	studies,	but	the	mPFC	less	so.	Problems	could	lie	within	the	task	as	well.	Though	the	Beauty	Contest	game	has	been	successfully	deployed	by	many	groups	across	numerous	studies,	the	presentation	of	the	task	proved	particularly	difFicult	in	this	setting.	A	key	component	is	ensuring	the	task	instructions	are	clear	but	without	guiding	participants	to	higher	levels	of	thinking.	Examples	and	practice	trials	have	high	potential	to	prompt	the	higher	levels	we	are	trying	to	measure	as	arising	from	stimulation	and	so	were	excluded.	The	trends	we	did	see	in	data	suggest	that	stimulation	has	a	surprising	effect	on	level-k	thinking,	that	is,	attenuation	(Fig.	4-3).	Anodal	stimulation,	which	typically	induces	cortical	excitability,	on	the	mPFC	appears	to	have	diminished	the	number	of	high-level	thinkers.	This	could	suggest	greater	speciFicity	is	needed	in	identifying	and	stimulating	locations	of	level-k	reasoning	in	the	mPFC,	possibly	at	the	individual	level.	
Chapter 4  Timberlake  122Consistent	with	previous	studies,	we	positioned	electrodes	to	stimulate	the	right	dlPFC	and	to	diminish	current	under	the	reference	electrode	so	as	not	to	inhibit	the	left	dlPFC.	If	that	dispersal	was	insufFicient,	it	would	create	an	inhibitory	effect	in	the	left	dlPFC.	If	the	area’s	role	in	iterative	thinking	is	bilateral,	then	an	effective	stimulation	would	both	excite	and	inhibit,	possibly	producing	a	net-zero	change	in	behavior.		Without	feedback,	participants	should	not	learn	over	the	course	of	the	task,	but	with	repeated	exposure	to	similar	prompts	with	minimal	variations,	reasoning	may	change	resulting	in	players	who	at	First	act	as	level	0	or	level	1	players	realizing	a	more	sophisticated	strategy	–	what	some	have	claimed	is	a	phenomenon	called	Epiphany	Learning	(Chen	and	Krajbich	2017).	Indeed	we	saw	evidence	of	this	phenomenon	in	nine	participants	whose	behavior	indicated	a	transition	from	level	0	to	level	1	in	the	course	of	the	task	and	eight	with	indications	of	moving	from	level	1	to	level	2		(examples	in	Fig.	4-7).			In	both	studies,	we	found	signiFicant	effect	of	the	multiplier	level	in	the	calculation	task,	but	not	of	the	stimulation	protocol	alone,	nor	of	its	interaction	with	multiplier	level.	This	suggests	that	our	groups	comprised	a	spectrum	of	mathematical	abilities,	with	some	participants	able	to	calculate	well	enough	on	M*1	trials	but	fewer	calculating	well	on	M*2	trials.	In	a	group	where	most	participants	were	not	able	to	calculate	either	multiplier	level	well,	there	would	be	no	effect	of	multiplier	level	on	the	absolute	distance	from	the	correct	answer.	Furthermore,	because	this	was	a	control	task	ensuring	that	any	effect	detected	in	the	beauty	contest	is	not	due	to	inhibition	or	encouragement	of	calculation	abilities,	equal	performance	between	stimulation	protocols	is	prerequisite	for	further	inferences	from	the	beauty	contest.	An	effect	accompanying	stimulation	of	the	mPFC	would	be	a	surprise,	since	Coricelli	and	Nagel	detected	no	activity	in	the	mPFC	associated	with	the	control	calculation	task	(2009).	
General Discussion 
The	moment-to-moment	decisions	human	beings	make	throughout	their	waking	lives	come	atop	a	mountain	of	prior	experience	encountered	in	a	variety	of	domains	and	situations.	Because	we	know	that	these	occurrences	are	not	independent	and	come	together	to	form	a	continuous	experience,	it	is	reasonable	to	suspect	that	some	of	these	choices	and	consequences	must	commingle	and	inform	one	another.	Yet	many	implications	and	mechanisms	of	transfer	are	to	this	point	unexplored.	We	poked	at	this	problem,	asking	how	differences	in	decision-making	conditions	might	inFluence	changes	in	later	choices	and	learning.	In	four	chapters,	we	considered	similarities	between	decision-making	regret	and	moral	decision	making,	differences	in	learning	with	age,	emotional	priming	in	learning	and	electrical	stimulation	of	iterative	thinking.		
Moral	decision	making		Understanding	how	humans	make	low-importance,	quantiFiable	decisions	may	aid	understanding	of	broader	choices	with	larger	impact	like	moral	decisions.	The	brain	processes	observed	to	underly	certain	types	of	economic	decision	making	and	moral	decision	making	appear	to	overlap.	Perhaps	not	surprisingly,	similar	injuries	to	and	deFiciencies	in	the	areas	implicated	in	these	processes	give	rise	to	similar	hindrances	to	those	processes.	Both	people	with	high	pscyhopathy	indications	and	patients	with	lesions	in	the	ventromedial	prefrontal	cortex	(vmPFC	)	experience	regret	but	do	not	apply	it	as	fully	to	future	decisions	as	healthy	subjects.	People	of	both	these	groups	also	make	more	utilitarian	moral	decisions,	rejecting	the	emotional	attenuation	seen	in	the	choices	of	healthy	subjects.		The	conFluence	of	these	deviations	from	behavior	seen	in	healthy	populations	suggest	possibilities	for	the	vmPFC’s	particular	role.	It	could	be	the	site	for	learning	that	both	provides	
Discussion  Timberlake  124error	signals	that	inform	regret	and	provides	foundation	for	moral	decisions	regarding	others.	It	may	be	a	location	for	conFlict	between	utilitarian	and	emotional	considerations;	or	more	basically,	a	way	station	that	simply	delays	decisions	until	the	conFlict	can	be	worked	out	elsewhere.	It	may	also	be	an	integrator	of	emotion	into	complicated	decisions	across	many	domains,	putting	to	use	the	experiences	of	the	past	in	consideration	of	future	consequences.		
Aging,	regret,	risk	and	learning	We	examined	data	from	two	decision-making	tasks	designed	to	compare	choice	behavior	and	learning	between	older	and	younger	adult	age	groups.	In	the	First	task,	participants	chose	between	two	lotteries	with	different	probabilities	of	winning	or	losing	uniform	amounts.	In	some	trials,	only	the	outcome	of	the	chosen	lottery	was	revealed,	while	in	others,	both	outcomes	were	shown.	In	a	subsequent	probabilistic	learning	task,	participants	selected	between	pairs	of	symbols,	each	of	which	had	hidden	probabilities	of	delivering	rewards	or	punishments.	For	some	symbol	pairs,	both	outcomes	were	shown,	while	for	other	symbol	pairs,	only	the	outcome	of	the	chosen	symbol	was	shown.	We	characterized	their	choice	inFluences	in	the	lottery	task	using	mixed	regressions,	and	we	analyzed	learning	behavior	via	computational	modeling.	Based	on	the	Findings	of	a	previous	study,	we	hypothesized	that	older	adults	would	experience	regret	to	the	same	extent	as	younger	adults,	but	that	they	would	anticipate	and	avoid	it	in	subsequent	choices	to	a	lesser	extent.	We	further	hypothesized	that	the	two	age	groups	would	learn	similarly	in	partial-information	feedback	contexts	but	that	learning	rates	would	differ	in	complete-information	counterfactual	contexts.		We	found	in	fact	that	in	the	lottery	task,	both	groups	were	signiFicantly	emotionally	affected	by	complete-feedback	negative	outcomes,	the	condition	for	regret.	However,	younger	adults	reported	signiFicantly	more	negative	reactions	to	these	outcomes.	Yet	when	it	came	to	anticipating	or	avoiding	regret,	both	groups	incorporated	it	into	their	choices,	but	not	differently.	The	attenuated	reaction	of	older	adults	to	negative	outcomes	is	consistent	with	a	
Discussion  Timberlake  125positivity	effect	that	accompanies	aging.	Older	adults	pay	selective	attention	away	from	the	negative	early	in	processing	of	experience.	Even	later	in	appraisal,	younger	adults	tend	to	dwell	on	negative	experiences	(Charles	and	Carstensen	2010,	Carstensen	and	DeLiema	2018).	Older	adults,	while	not	suffering	the	negative	emotional	consequences	to	the	same	extent,	still	applied	the	experience	into	future	choices	at	about	the	same	level.	This	suggests	a	beneFit	of	age:	avoidance	of	potentially	negative	outcomes	but	at	lower	emotional	cost.	In	the	learning	task,	younger	adults	had	better	outcomes	in	terms	of	earnings,	but	it	appeared	to	be	due	to	overall	performance,	rather	than	sustained	ability	in	counterfactual	learning.	Both	age	groups	earned	more	in	complete-feedback	trials	than	in	partial-feedback	trials,	and	younger	adults	earned	more	in	complete-feedback	trials	than	older	adults	did.	The	difference	between	trial	types,	however,	was	not	signiFicantly	different	between	age	groups.	This	indicates	that	both	groups	are	more	successful	when	incorporating	counterfactual	learning	and	that	younger	adults	simply	outperformed	older	adults	generally	in	the	learning	task.	This	fails	to	support	the	Findings	of	Tobia	and	colleagues	(2016),	who	found	that	older	adults	were	more	responsive	to	counterfactual	gains	but	that	this	actually	hindered	subsequent	choices.	Further	analyses	should	explore	the	differences	in	gains	between	positive	and	negative	counterfactual	outcomes	between	age	groups.	This	experiment	would	also	beneFit	from	extension	to	neuroimaging	to	compare	to	the	fMRI	results	of	the	Tobia	study.	Although	our	hypotheses	did	not	directly	address	risk	preference,	the	lottery	task	incorporated	possibilities	of	both	gain	and	loss,	so	we	considered	risk	as	a	regression	factor	in	our	analysis.	We	found	that	it	did	not	play	a	signiFicant	role	in	the	choices	of	younger	adults	but	that	it	did	in	older	adults,	who	avoided	it,	and	particularly	in	complete-feedback	trials.	Their	risk	aversion	and	the	risk	tolerance	of	younger	adults	is	partially	consistent	with	Tymula	and	colleagues’	general	assessments	of	risk	preference	variations	across	adulthood	(2013).	Our	results	show	lower	risk	tolerance	among	older	adults	after	encountering	regret	situations	but	risk	preference	on	par	with	younger	adults	in	partial-feedback	contexts.	Our	results	
Discussion  Timberlake  126support	a	similar	distinction	in	risk	preference	observed	between	younger	adults	and	older	adults	with	Multiple	Sclerosis,	in	which	younger	adults	were	risk	neutral	in	a	wheel	of	fortune	lottery,	while	older	adult	patients	were	risk	averse	(Simioni,	Schluep	et	al.	2012).	Another	study	that	addressed	both	regret	and	risk	showed	that	healthy	older	adults	did	not	change	risk	tolerance	after	experiencing	regret,	while	younger	adults	and	depressed	older	adults	did	(Brassen,	Gamer	et	al.	2012).	The	regret-eliciting	task	in	this	case	was	a	“hot”	devil	game,	like	the	balloon	analogue	risk	task,	in	which	risk	computation	is	not	explicit,	and	learning	to	tolerate	more	risk	eventually	leads	to	higher	rewards.	Our	results	bolster	support	for	the	notion	that	regret	leads	to	risk-seeking	behavior	in	younger	adults	but	that	older	adults	are	resistant	to	this	and	may	even	become	more	risk-aversive	after	experiencing	regret.	A	future	study	with	this	as	hypothesis	could	more	speciFically	address	this	possibility.		In	tasks	where	risk	is	explicitly	stated,	decision-from-description	paradigms,	such	as	the	wheel	of	fortune	lotteries,	older	and	younger	adults	typically	perform	similarly	(Mata,	Josef	et	al.	2011),	consistent	with	our	results	in	partial-feedback	trials,	but	in	contrast	to	increased	risk	aversion	we	saw	in	complete-feedback	contexts.	Yet	older	adults	reported	feeling	less	badly	about	regret	outcomes.	This	raises	the	possibility	of	a	relationship	between	reduced	experience	of	regret	and	increased	risk	aversion,	even	with	stability	of	regret	anticipation.	A	future	study	could	explore	this	potential	relationship	speciFically.	Other	studies	should	examine	risk	and	regret	in	variations	of	paired	tasks	with	attention	to	the	conditions	that	give	rise	to	regret	and	to	the	particular	types	of	risk	each	task	employs.	
Regret	induction	We	had	participants	play	a	strategic	competitive	investment	game	with	asymmetric	roles,	encouraging	variations	in	strategy	to	reveal	patterns	of	learning	behavior.	In	previous	studies,	this	game	has	been	used	to	characterize	individual	learning,	speciFically	when	
Discussion  Timberlake  127behavior	is	compared	to	a	hybrid	Experience-Weighted	Attraction	(EWA)	model	that	nests	both	reinforcement	learning	(RL)	and	belief-based	learning.	Belief-based	learning	(BBL)	requires	an	understanding	of	the	structure	of	the	game	as	well	as	anticipation	of	the	strategy	of	the	other	player.	Just	prior	to	playing	the	game,	participants	played	a	wheel	of	fortune	lottery	designed	to	induce	regret,	relief,	disappointment	or	satisfaction.	In	repeated	games,	regret	has	been	shown	to	inFluence	learning	(Camille,	Coricelli	et	al.	2004).	Our	hypothesis	was	that	those	exposed	to	complete-feedback	counterfactual	emotions	would	be	primed	for	thinking	about	alternative	situations	rather	than	only	the	choice	they	had	made.	We	suspected	that	they	would	engage	to	greater	extents	and	at	greater	rates	in	the	more	sophisticated	BBL	than	in	simpler	RL.	We	would	measure	these	outcomes	with	a	parameter	in	the	hybrid	experience-weighted	attraction	model	that	indicates	the	balance	of	BBL	and	RL.	A	requirement	of	computational	modeling	is	demonstrating	that	the	model	used	is	the	best	of	those	available.	Because	we	planned	to	use	a	model	that	incorporated	both	RL	and	BBL,	it	was	necessary	to	consider	those	comparatively	simpler	models	on	their	own.	Our	model	comparison	showed,	to	our	surprise,	that	the	BBL	model	outperformed	both	RL,	EWA	and	a	reinforcement	learning	model	that	also	incorporates	counterfactual	outcomes.	Our	BBL	model	features	a	learning	rate	parameter,	but	this	is	distinct	from	the	weighted	parameter	of	the	EWA	model	that	indicates	relative	utilization	of	RL	and	BBL.	Gauging	this	weight	among	different	groups	was	central	to	our	hypothesis.	Because	we	had	to	reject	the	use	of	the	EWA	model,	we	could	not	test	our	hypothesis.	Previous	studies	that	modeled	patent	race	gameplay	have	consistently	found	EWA	to	be	the	best-Fitting	model.	A	possible	reason	for	the	unexpected	outcome	of	our	model	estimations	may	be	the	opponent	algorithm	we	programmed.	The	algorithm	was	based	on	Fictitious	play,	a	form	of	belief-based	learning.	In	past	studies,	players	have	played	against	other	humans	or	against	pooled	responses	by	humans,	in	which	the	opponent’s	choice	was	selected	from	a	number	of	human	choices	on	that	trial	number	(Zhu,	Mathewson	et	al.	2012).	Though	we	believed	participants	would	behave	
Discussion  Timberlake  128and	learn	similarly	against	an	algorithm	set	to	play	with	similar	choices	to	a	human,	it	may	have	inadvertently	prompted	mirroring	behavior	from	our	participants.	It	is	unlikely	that	the	priming	task	had	such	a	broad	effect,	since	we	detected	no	pattern	across	priming	types,	nor	control	participants	who	did	not	undergo	priming.		In	future	studies,	we	should	consider	using	a	different	type	of	opponent,	be	it	a	variety	of	computerized	opponents	with	varied	models	and	parameters,	actual	human	opponents	or	the	pooled	opponent	play	employed	by	Zhu	and	colleagues.	We	at	First	rejected	using	the	pooled	play	because	we	believed	the	play	would	seem	disjointed,	and	we	wanted	a	realistic	opponent.	We	thought	that	even	if	participants	knew	their	opponent	was	an	algorithm,	they	would	still	use	the	same	learning	behaviors	to	try	to	win.		
Electrical	stimulation	of	sophisticated	thinking	In	competitive	strategic	conditions,	consideration	of	others	and	an	ability	to	gauge	their	mental	state	is	an	advantage.	Previous	studies	show	that	individuals	consider	the	actions	of	others	to	a	range	of	extents:	from	not	at	all	to	assessment	of	others	as	also	highly	considerate.	We	used	a	beauty	contest	calculation	competition	in	which	each	participant	guessed	a	target	number	that	would	be	inFluenced	by	their	own	choice,	as	well	as	the	choices	of	others.	The	average	of	all	the	choices	multiplied	by	a	fraction	determined	the	target	number,	and	so	for	fractions	less	than	1,	the	equilibrium	goal	was	0.	The	degree	of	sophistication	of	thinking,	then,	was	measurably	greater	as	a	participant’s	choice	approached	0.	In	previous	imaging	studies,	these	higher	levels	of	thinking	were	accompanied	by	increased	activity	in	the	medial	prefrontal	cortex	(mPFC)	and	in	both	right	and	left	dorsolateral	prefrontal	cortex	(dlPFC)	(Coricelli	and	Nagel	2009).	A	well-established	limitation	of	imaging	studies	is	their	inability	to	establish	causation,	and	in	the	case	of	fMRI,	even	sequential	order.	One	aim	of	stimulation	studies	is	to	Fill	that	gap	by	interrupting	or	encouraging	processes	by	targeting	
Discussion  Timberlake  129brain	areas	during	activities	whose	results	are	well-studied.	If	observable	behavior	is	changed,	it	indicates	that	the	targeted	area	plays	a	particular	role	in	the	process.	We	hypothesized	that	the	“neural	signatures”	of	higher-level	strategic	thinking	in	mPFC	and	dlPFC	indicated	responsibilities	of	these	areas	for	more	sophisticated	reasoning.	To	test	the	hypothesis,	we	targeted	those	areas	using	transcranial	direct-current	stimulation	(tDCS).	If	the	group	of	subjects	receiving	stimulation	had	higher	levels	of	thinking	or	higher	levels	at	higher	rates,	it	would	indicate	a	causative	role	for	the	targeted	area.	Our	stimulations,	however,	did	not	produce	different	behavioral	results	between	sham	and	stimulation.	This	outcome	may	be	an	indication	that	the	targeted	areas	of	dlPFC	and	mPFC	do	not	play	causative	roles	in	higher-level	reasoning.	The	higher	activity	observed	in	these	areas	in	fMRI	studies	during	higher-level	reasoning	simply	may	not	drive	the	process	that	gives	rise	to	the	behavior.		It	would	be	overreach	to	say	this	is	conclusive,	however,	especially	given	the	unproven	nature	of	tDCS	as	a	technique.	Though	studies	targeting	motor	actions	and	visual	perception	have	seen	successful	manipulation	via	tDCS,	the	record	in	strategic	decision	making	is	shorter.	A	mild	trend	in	the	stimulation	of	mPFC	was	in	the	opposite	direction	of	our	hypothesized	result:	lower	levels	of	thinking	in	the	group	that	received	full	stimulation.	This	suggests	less-sophisticated	thinking	as	a	result	of	excitatory	activity	in	the	mPFC.	If	further	study	supported	this	trend,	it	could,	along	with	the	established	imaging	results,	indicate	a	regulatory	or	mediating	role	for	mPFC,	rather	than	a	generative	one.	However,	some	evidence	from	previous	studies	indicates	that	anodal	tDCS	stimulations	for	more	than	26	minutes	at	some	point	cease	having	excitatory	effects	and	reverse	to	inhibitory	(Thair,	Holloway	et	al.	2017).	This	is	a	less	likely	explanation	because	we	examined	trial-by-trial	level-k	activity	at	the	individual	level	and	did	not	see	indications	of	a	reversal	from	higher-	to	lower-level	activity.	If	anything,	level	thinking	appeared	to	increase	in	some	participants	over	the	course	of	the	experiment.	Other	studies	have	demonstrated	inhibitory	effects	of	cathodal	stimulation	but	no	behavioral	change	
Discussion  Timberlake  130due	to	anodal	stimulation,	suggesting	that	targeted	brain	areas	may	be	active	at	an	optimal	level	and	unable	to	be	further	excited	(Antal,	Nitsche	et	al.	2001).	Reviews	of	tDCS	studies	have	found	variability	depending	on	age	and	sex,	as	well	as	mental	states	of	alertness,	sleep	debt,	time	of	day,	and	even	recent	caffeine	consumption	(Krause	and	Cohen	Kadosh	2014).	Future	studies	could	control	for	more	of	these	factors,	conducting	all	experimental	sessions	at	the	same	time	of	day,	requesting	participants	abstain	from	caffeine	for	a	period	before	the	session	and	asking	for	information	about	recent	sleep	habits.		These	multiple	attempts	to	make	modulations	to	learning	and	decision	making	processes	largely	did	not	produce	measurable	effects.	Though	these	were	often	failures	to	reject	null	hypotheses,	these	inquiries	together	reveal	the	resilience	of	a	set	of	learning	and	thinking	processes	that	can	withstand	perturbations	in	the	lab.  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